Kosovo Albanians And The Solidarity Of Their Ethnic Brethren

Athens May 4, 1998

AIM Athens, 30 April, 1998

The escalation of the conflict in Yugoslavia does not seem to trigger the same level of solidarity by Albanians in the "mother-state" as by those, living in Macedonia. In the March demonstrations of Albanians in Tetovo, Skopje and Tirana protesting against the killings in Kosovo, the media reported that the demonstrators were "tens of thousands" in the two Macedonian cities but only "thousands" in Tirana. This low level of support from Albanians in Albania is unexpected, if one merely compares population numbers. In Albania, Albanians are 80% out of 3.4 million, while in Macedonia they are only 23% out of a total population of 1,93 million. Thus, a deeper look is needed to understand the different level of solidarity.

Oppressed minorities

Albanians of Macedonia are potentially more supportive, since first and foremost they "share" with Kosovars a similar bad fate as a oppressed minority. On the other hand, Albanians of Albania, though faced with many economic problems, sometimes mores evere than those of the two former Yugoslavia regions, they have been and are nowadays the sole rulers of their country.

From 1974 until the collapse of communism in former Yugoslavia, the two Albanian minorities enjoyed better constitutional status than they do today. The 1974 constitution gave full autonomy to the Kosovo Albanians, but the Serb government curtailed it in 1989. In a similar way, Albanians of Macedonia were mentioned as constituent nationality along with the Turks in the 1974 constitution, but they were no longer mentioned as such in the new 1991 Macedonian constitution. Macedonia is now a nation state of the Macedonian people, and the constitutions only mentions Albanians as a minority. The struggle for a renewed recognition as a constituent nation creates great tensions in Macedonia. In 1997, the conflict was exacerbated when Macedonian authorities ordered that the Albanian flag be removed from the building of the Gostivar municipality. Protests and clashes with the police followed, and three people lost their lives. In addition to that, GostivarÆs mayor Rufi Osmani was eventually sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

Albanians of Macedonia see another similarity to their own situation with the Kosovars as far as the university education is concerned. In TitoÆs Yugoslavia, the two Albanian minorities were able to attend mother-tongue courses at the University in Pristina. Nowadays they lack this opportunity. Albanians of Macedonia may officially study only in Macedonian, and Kosovars in Serbian. An attempt to create Albanian-language university in Tetovo in Macedonia was to a great extend unsuccessful. It was ill-born, since even by its inauguration in 1994 it faced violent resistance from the authorities. Today, the university exists to a great extent undisturbed, but it is unrecognized and, as a result of this, creates frustration among students and makes them defensive nationalists.

On their part, Kosovo Albanians also lost opportunities to their education in Pristina. According to the 1996 educational agreement between Rugova and Milosevic, the university is supposed to be reopened for Albanian students. However, that agreement is yet to be applied.

Although relations between the Albanian minorities and the Slavic majorities remains tense in both cases, Albanians of Macedonia face a relatively better treatment. They have their political parties, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). They are represented both in central and local governments. Their right to state education in their mother tongue up to university level has been recognized. Unlike them, Albanians of Kosovo enjoy no such fundamental rights. RugovaÆs party is not represented in the state structures. Furthermore, his shadow-state, and not the official state, cares for the Albanian-language education of his compatriots. After the abolition of the autonomy in 1989, the government curtailed Albanian-language education and made Serbian compulsory for everybody in Kosovo. Albanians boycotted this decision and took part in the parallel education activities of the shadow state. In 1996 Rugova ended the boycott after signing the agreement with Milosevic.

Historical and cultural experiences

There is no doubt that all Albanians belong to one and the same nation, therefore they are expected to show solidarity with Kosovars in the common crisis. However, the strong historical divisions - starting almost from the outset of their nation-building in the late 19th century - are a next reason for the differences of the current attitude of Albanians of Albania and those of Macedonia. Albanians lived under a single state only in World War II under Italian and German occupation; in other times they were divided. Even during the Cold War, when they belonged to the socialist camp, YugoslaviaÆs Tito and AlbaniaÆs Enver Hodxha had tense relations, because of different models of socialism. Yugoslavia was the socialist country most open to the West, while Albania lived isolated from all countries, even from those of the Eastern block. This isolation made many Albanians of Albania lose connections with their relatives abroad.

Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia have more intimate relations with each other also because of the development of some personal ties. Since 1990, many Albanians emigrating from Kosovo, settled in Macedonia rather than going to Albania. Those who did the last were strongly disappointed, because they were not received well in a country with more economic problems than Macedonia. Nevertheless, some of those who remained in Albania oppose nowadays the moderate policies of the current Albanian government towards the Kosovo crisis. Recent emigrants are more inclined to show support for their ethnic brethren than people who are not bound by common experiences.

Political ties

The supposedly existing ties of political parties of Albanians of Macedonia and Kosovo might also be a link for strong solidarity. Many of their elites were educated at the University of Pristina. The attitude of politicians of Albania towards the Kosovars has two faces. The previous government of Sali BerishaÆs Democratic Party was more nationalist and more supportive than the current Socialist government of Fatos Nano. Prior to the 1997 general elections which changed the political currents in Albania, Tirana backed RugovaÆs insistence of total independence without, however, voicing that openly or even recognizing his shadow-state. Currently, NanoÆs government seems to use a relatively conciliatory tone with Belgrade. This became visible during a summit of heads of governments and states of Southeastern Europe in Crete in 1997. Both countriesÆ officials have not met at such a high level for decades.

Solidarity for Kosovars is expressed in Albania much more cautiously than in Macedonia, because any active involvement of Albania in the Kosovo problem goes beyond the dimension of protesting killings and the defense of human rights, touching upon the issue of Albanian unity that may be interpreted as irredentism. However, until now there are no real signs of irredentist dreams. Albania is overburdened with its own economic and social problems and relies too much for its economic recovery on the West which would be opposed that idea.

In conclusion, from the number of ethnic Albanian demonstrators in Albania and Macedonia protesting in early March 1998 Serbian police violence and killings in Kosovo, one can find different extent of solidarity with Kosovars. MacedoniaÆs Albanians are more inclined to support them because both groups are oppressed minorities today and share a common historical past. In communist Yugoslavia, both groups enjoyed better constitutional status, educational and other rights than they do today. Macedonian Albanians are more supportive also due to the political ties between their ethnic party and the Kosovo shadow state, as well as due to personal ties between emigrants who recently escaped from Kosovo and settled down in Macedonia.

On the other hand, we see Albanians of Albania who, despite their many seconomic hardships, enjoy self-rule. While both previously discussed ethnic groups were not isolated from each other during the Cold War, Albania was isolated from them, what explains part of the AlbaniansÆ reluctance to be very intimate with KosovoÆs problems. Moreover, these very hardships make many Albanians frustrated with the weight Kosovo has in their countryÆs media and politics at the expense of efforts to help solve their own problems. AlbaniaÆs state support for the Kosovo shadow state is lukewarm at least on the surface, since a full-hearted support would mean a support of Albania for internationalization of the conflict.

Maria Koinova