How to Solve the Problem of Kosovo

Compromising 'Step by Step'

Resolution of the problem of Kosovo should imply a compromise which would on the one hand enable a high level of self-administration in spheres of vital significance for preservation and development of their ethnic identity for the Kosovo Albanians, and on the other unchanged borders and unthreatened vital state interests of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. The compromise should meet two important, apparently contradictory principles of the international community: the principle of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of the state.

AIM Belgrade, 19 April, 1998

In the existing exceptionally strained conditions in Kosovo where each party is standing firmly anchored to its position, a 'step by step' strategy in seeking a solution for Kosovo seems to be better than the strategy 'from general to individual', because in the existing international circumstances, internal relation of forces and completely different political goals and aspirations - an integral, general solution is not possible: the right to self-determination is simplified by the Albanian leaders in Kosovo and brought down to the right to secession, which is, again, used by the Serbian authorities as an instrument in the struggle with their political opponents.

By gradual resolution of everyday vital problems it would be easier to reach a solution of the global, status problems. Small achievements will simply open the space for normalisation of relations, releiving of tensions and normalisation of circumstances in the entire region.

In order to make an effective dialogue possible, it is necessary to take measures for relieving the tension, for confidence building and normalisation of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

The assumption for this is that the authorities in Belgrade stop with police repression against those who are expressing their political stands unviolently and to initiate proceedings for determination who is responsible for application of excessive violence against civilians and demonstrators. The Belgrade regime would have to accept the offered level of internationalisation and not to interpret the offer of good services (assistance in communication and initiation of the dialogue with leaders of Kosovo Albanians as "interference in its internal affairs".

Leaders of Kosovo Albanians are expected to unambiguously denounce terrorism and confirm devotion to non-violent political methods in resolving problems. Seeking for a solution would imply their public abandoning of the extremist political demands including the demand for establishment of independent Kosovo.

As the third essential factor in resolving the Kosovo conflict, the international community should, with a well-balanced pressure exerted on both parties, prevent the protagonists from abusing the problem for their political purposes. By threatening only one party (Serbian) that in case of failure of the talks, it will have to endure sanctions, can stimulate the other party to obstruct talks and intentionally provoke such a reaction. Experience shows that the sanctions which are threatening Serbia again have affected least of all those because of whom they had been introduced the first time. They just offer the possibility to the ruling regime to strain the political situation by manipulating "patriotism", and by stimulating extremism of the other party. It is more adequate to offer a possibility to the region of the Balkans to develop with the prospect of better mutual connections between states and the possibility of integration into European institutions. International financial and technical aid in this direction would contribute to confidence building.

The first step which would lead to a compromise between the Serbs and the Albanians is normalisation of operation of public institutions, schools and universities in the first place. Participation of the Albanians in the elections (local, provincial, republican and federal) should be enabled by a joint effort and in accordance with OSCE standards and observers. Along with it, a mixed Serb-Albanian non-governmental commission should be established, consisting of judges, lawyers, activists of humanitarian organizations... The commission would monitor the situation concerning human rights, it would receive complaints, offer advice... It would be some kind of a collective protector of human rights which would collect documentation, initiate investigations of certain cases, propose initiatives to the government. Its moral integrity would contribute to improvement of the achievement of human and minority rights.

After the initial steps and measures aimed at resolving the problem, the European Union should normalise economic relations with FRY, and the OSCE include FRY into its institutions engaging at the same time a gigh commissioner for ethnic minorities and a permanent mission of the OSCE. This would provide a stimulus to further resolution of the problems.

Resolution of the status of Kosovo and collective status of the Albanian ethnic community implies gradual changes of the exuisting constitutional and legal framework and coordination of republican constitutions with the federal. Only a harmonious legal system enables the rule of law and ensured operation of the legal state is the basic precondition for solving the problem of Kosovo.

Providing a high level of autonomy for Kosovo has special significance. It will enable:

a) the right to possess and hoist national insignia;

b) an education system which will take into consideration values and needs of Kosovo Albanians;

c) I. a legislative body as part of the legal system of Serbia;

II. administrative structure, including regional police forces for public security

III. autonomous judiciary, but preserving extraordinary legal instruments in the domain of the Supreme Court of Serbia. These agencies would reflect the composition of the population.

The provincial assembly would have two chambers. One would be elected in general elections in electoral districts of the same size (in this way, ethnic Albanians would have the majority in them). The other chamber would be established on the basis of parity, with half of the representatives of ethnic Albanians and the other half consisting of representatives of the Serbs and members of other entities living in Kosovo (the Muslims, the Turks, the Romanies and others). The two chambers would be equal in decision-making concerning questions of vital interest, so that the provincial assembly would not be able to reach any decisions which are harmful for either any ethnic community or the country as a whole.

The high level of autonomy would include territorial, cultural and political autinomy on the personal principle (personal autonomy). Self-administration would exist as part of territorial autonomy, while personal autonomy (non-territorial) would protect human and special ethnic rights of the Albanians on the level of the federation.

In this way, with respect to the general international framework, on the one hand, Serbian and Yugoslav state interests would be satisfied, and on the other, ethnic Albanians would be enabled to create and influence issues of vital interest for their ethnic community through territorial autonomy and agencies of personal autonomy on the federal level.

Representation on the federal level on the personal principle would be enabled through, conditionally called, council of the Albanians in FRY, which would be elected in special elections, according to election rules determined by them. The council would have the right of take the initiative and to submit proposals in spheres of vital interest for the Albanians in FRY. For issues of vital interest which would be determined by agreement and listed in extenso the council would have the possibility to use the right to veto.

Changes in the constitutional and legal system would also imply establishment of a Republican council for protection of the rights of members of national and ethnic groups headed by the president of the Republic, the members of which will be representatives of minority and ethnic groups in Serbia (by model of the Constitution of Montenegro which prescribes this institution by its Article 76) and introduction of the Ombudsman (protector of human rights).

A high level of autonomy will enable implementation and application of standards of human individual and collective rights established by the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

The model of the autonomy which is presented could be a good foundation both for a lasting solution because it starts from the actual situation and it is based on a compromise which respects the international political framework. This model could also be the foundation for another constitutional and legal solution, such as regionalisation which would presume a braoder political consensus and a more profound constitutional and legal reconstruction of the state.

Zoran Lutovac

(AIM)

(The author is an associate of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade)