SPECIAL STATUS FOR THE PROVINCE

Threats and Proposals for Kosovo

AIM Belgrade, 23 March, 1998

Among numerous visits from the world which are arriving in Belgrade and Pristina after the police "Drenica action against terrorists" two should be singled out which could decisively affect further developments in this geo-political space: the visit of Robert Gelbard and the visit of the European diplomatic couple of foreign ministers - of Germany and France. Differences are evident both in the assessment of the effects by Belgrade, and in the general framework which is offered for resolution of the problem of Kosovo. Ministers of Germany and France pointed at the obvious progress "which needs to be confirmed" by the Serbian regime and at the special status as the framework for resolution of the situation, while special US envoy for the Balkans stressed that "Belgrade has not met a single demand of the Contact Group for interruption of violence in Kosovo": Gelbard also indicated the need for "a high level of self-administration for Kosovo" and resolution of the status within the FRY and not Serbia.

What possibilities for negotiations do these frameworks leave and what can be put into them? What is expected from the Serbian, and what from the Albanian party...

The two foreign ministers came to Belgrade to present once more the full seriousness of the statement of the Contact Group; to point to possible sanctions which the European Union would introduce against Yugoslavia if it failed to set out in the direction indicated in the statement of the Contact Group, that is, to denote to Belgrade the possible "awards" for cooperativeness...

Nevertheless, what everybody was interested in the most was their proposal of the "special status" for Kosovo. More precisely, what is actually offered, primarily as the institutional solution? However, the concrete response this time was not given for the simple reason that this proposal had no aspiration to offer a ready-made solution but to indicate the general and procedural principles according to which the problem should be resolved. The initiators of the proposal did not give a detailed explanation of their idea, nor did they elaborate it. Certain presumptions can be deduced only indirectly.

The special status is the option the foundation of which could be the second part of the Proposal of the Aggreement for a General Solution of the International Conference on Yugoslavia in the Hague titled Human Rights and Rights of Ethnic and National Groups dating back from November

1. Item 5 of this document says: "special status of the autonomy will be enjoyed by the regions in which persons who belong to a national or ethnic group form the majority". In the mentioned item the term "special status" means: a) possession and hoisting of national insignia of the region; b) education system which takes into account values and needs of the group; c) legislature, administration, including regional police forces, and judiciary which would be responsible for the questions in this region and which reflect the composition of the population in the region; d) provisions for adequate international monitoring.

When speaking about the special status, the idea of a constitutional system founded on different levels of sovereignty should be considered. Kosovo would be an autonomous unit with a lower level of independence in comparison with Serbia and Montenegro. The essence, or the aim would be to enable a high level of autonomy on the one hand, and insurance against possible secession of autonomous units, or units with the special status populated mostly or largely by a minority population, on the other.

American offocials, Gelbart primarily, talk about a high level of self-administration for Kosovo, of resolution of the problem within Yugoslavia, not Serbia, but also about the re-establishment of autonomy abolished in 1989.

The autonomy constituted in 1974 was the autonomy within Serbia, but this autonomy enabled representation on the federal level. If things are observed from this standpoint, then there is no contradiction in statements of American officials. It is quite a different question how appropriate it is to re-establish an autonomy created in a completely different context and environment of cold-war division? Indeed, that autonomy was created at the time of SFR Yugoslavia which had six republics and two provinces, at the time when constitutional single-party power was distributed on ethnic principle.

What would re-establishment of the 1974 autonomy mean in the institutional sense, in view of the fact that it had almost all the characteristics of statehood except the right to secession? The province, exactly as the republic, participated in the establishment and work of the highest federal agencies - from the assembly of SFRY, the presidency of SFRY and the federal executive council, all the way to the federal court and the constitutional court of Yugoslavia; through its delegates, Kosovo was an equal participant in adoption of federal laws and in making all decisions in the chamber of republics and provinces of the assembly of SFRY; according to the 1974 constitution, the provinces - just like republics, had the possibility to veto amendements of the republican and the federal constitution; they independently passed their own constitutions which did not have to be in conformity with either the federal or the republican constitution, but just were not supposed to be contrary to them; they had their own presidencies and supreme courts, their status of rights and obligations and organization were regulated by the federal constitution instead of the republican... Therefore, concerning jurisdiction of provinces, Kosovo was almost equal to the republics, having had also the right to pass laws which again did not have to be in conformity with the republican ones.

What significantly distinguishes the present (1990) from the 1974 autonomy is the level of independence in relation to the Republic of Serbia and abolishment of provinces as constituent parts of the federal state, that is, narrowing down of prerogatives of the provinces by this constitution, or reducing them from the level of independence within the former federation to the level of the utonomy within the parent republic.

The international community rejects the present autonomy as unacceptable, while re-establishment of the 1974 autonomy without changes is unacceptable for Serbia, just as it is "insufficient" for the Albanians. Is there any space for talks in it? It seems that it is suggested to the Serbian and the Albanian party through the American officials to go back to the "initial position" which should be the foundation for the talks on the status of Kosovo. The Serbian party is expected to start to make specific moves in the direction determined in the staement of the Contact Group, while pressure on Kosovo Albanians to give up independence is foreseen for after "parallel elections" in which Rugova is expected to confirm and reinforce his legitimacy.

The disproportionately high pressure on the authorities in Belgrade in relation to that exerted on Rugova can be explained as support to his moderateness and weakening of the extremists who are in favour of a more active and even armed attempt to achieve their goals. In the statement of the Contact Group there is also the message to the Albanian extremists in which terrorism is condemned: "Our condemnation of the action of the Serbian police in no way should be unerstood as approval of terrorism". Between the lines it can be read that "application of excessive force by the Serbian police against civilians and peaceful demonstrators" was condemned, therefore not application of force against terrorists. Both Europe and the USA are offering mediation, Rugova believes that it is a precondition for efficacious negotiations, and the Serbian authorities are rejecting mediation as interference in internal affairs, forgetting that it was by mediation of St. Egidio that the agreement between Milosevic and Rugova was signed.

In comparison with the EU and the USA, China and Russia look upon the problem of Kosovo in a somewhat different way. At first Russia was mentioning the 1974 auitonomy, and then it approached the official Serbian stands. However, those who are turning their eyes towards China and Russia should pay much more attention to their previous diplomatic activity than to their verbal commintments. Punishing of Serbia with possible sanctions (with the exception of the one of refusing to grant visas to the officials responsible for the massacre in Drenica which is the only one that might have certain sense) could produce a counter-effect and push the Serbian party into extremism which is again feeding Albanian extremism and so on to infinity. Connoisseurs of the local political circumstances in the sanctions recognise an opportunity for Seselj whose popularity is not negligible. The leader of the Radicals is the least ready to negotiate with the Albanians, even less than the left coalition.

Zoran Lutovac (AIM)