DIALOGUE - AGREEMENT - OR ARMED CONFLICTS?

AIM Pristina, 24 March, 1998

In a situation and atmosphere full of developments, turns, expectations and wondering what will be and what might happen tomorrow, after Drenica, the main preoccupation is the date of the beginning of the Serbian-Albanian talks. The impression is that expectations are such as if the talks will begin tomorrow. However, it should be said that in fact this atmosphere is transferred from Belgrade, mostly via media. The present wave of expectations in this sense started last month by persistent announcement of some Belgrade journals that meeting of Rugova and Milosevic would begin in the end of February. In the atmosphere full of all kinds of rumours, speculations and guesses, the Albanian leaders were restrained, not only because they were busy with their internal problems, but because they did not have sufficient arguments for stirring up unfounded expectations. Only when more than a week ago, the delegation of the Serbian government came to Pristina in order to begin negotiations with the Albanian citizens of its "national minority", it became clear to what extent this beginning would be difficult and uncertain. The latest signing of the Protocol on implementation of the agreement on the right of the Albanians to education in mother tongue in school and university premises, signed more than a year and a half ago, confirmed not only how difficult the beginning will be, but also how tedious and uncertain talks will be.

When speaking of the beginning of the dialogue, it is assessed in Pristina that Belgrade will not be able to resist the pressure of the great forces. However, the beginning need not be significant, if there is no chance for them to successfully end in a reasonable period of time which could affect the possible positive shift of the situation in Kosovo. At this moment, both parties are expressing readiness for a dialogue without preliminary conditions. Regardless to that, starting positions are so distant from each other that it is impossible to find any elements which may announce prospects of negotiations, even if about so-called partial issues.

Besides the imposed will for negotiations which is not exactly the best presumption for a successful beginning, it should be stressed that another two significant questions have not yet been clarified to the end. There is great disagreement or uncertainty concerning mediation of the third party. The mediator has been a problem for a long time in propagandist haggling about readiness for negotiations of the one or the other party. Considering Kosovo to be its internal problem, the Serbian party has persistently been refusing even to discuss foreign mediation. In the propaganda addressed to its own public, Belgrade is still represented as if it still has not even the slightest intention to give in concerning this question. However, there are hints, especially after the visit of the French and German foreign ministers to Belgrade that it is ready for some kind of a compromise. At this moment, it seems that mediation of an occasional, but not permanent special representative will be accepted. There are elements for conclusion that concerning this issue the Albanian party is manifesting signs which indicate softening of previous stands. In a conversation with the journalists a few days ago Ibrahim Rugova said that presence of a third party is not a precondition for talks, but that it was believed "to be a guarantee for implementation of a possible agreement and a good service for the two opposed parties". The role of the third party in Kosovo was not formulated in this way before. That this is a sign of softening and readiness for a compromise is also confirmed by certain diplomatic sources which claim that the Albanian party may give in, in the sense that they will not insist that the mediator be present during the entire process of negotiations.

If a compromise is reached concerning this issue, another, also essential question remains to be clarified before the beginnning of negotiations. This is the question of the level of the delegation of the party from Belgrade. As it is known, Belgrade believes the issue of Kosovo to be an internal, primarily Serbian, but also Yugoslav issue. The question of the level of the delegation is essential because it predermines the level of the solution. Since last year, big powers and the international organizations have started to use the formulation that the solution should be sought within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This formulation was finally confirmed by the Contact Group in its ten-item plan, but it cannot be claimed that this formulation was equally sincerely accepted by all. It seems that during their recent visit to Belgrade, foreign ministers of France and Germany were ready for a compromise with Milosevic concerning this issue, and the head of Russian diplomacy, from time to time still declares that Kosovo is and internal issue of Serbia. After Mr. Kinkel's and his French colleague's visit, Slobodan Milosevic nominated his old associate Vladan Kutlesic to be his special envoy for talks with representatives of Kosovo Albanians. However, it still is not clear whether Kutlesic is a member of the Serbian delegation which is inviting the Albanians to talks in Pristina for about ten days already, or he has a special status. As far as it is known, Kutlesic has not been in Pristina.

It seems that ths situation is not clear on the Albanian side either. The representatives of the Albanians have not rejected the invitation of the Serbian delegation which is expecting every day the Albanians to come to talk because of its inadequate, non-Yugoslav composition. However, the fact that they had not firmly stressed its non-Yugoslav level as an argument for refusing to talk with that delegation was more a result of inertia and the assessment that the Serbian delegation, that is the Serbian government itself did not have serious intentions, but primarily had propagandist effects in mind in the Serbian and possibly the international public and diplomacy.

Until the latest visit of the US envoy for the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, the Albanian representatives had not seemed to believe that the beginning of the talks was so close. They had their basic commitments and certain outlines about the approach to the question of talks, but not an elaborated platform, nor a a prepared team for the beginning of the talks at any moment. Only on Tuesday, Rugova nominated his 15-member advisory group which as it was explicitly said, would prepare the platform for the talks with representatives of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic.

Although there can be no differences among Rugova's advisors concerning the ultimate Albanian goals, this group includes men who have already, in public appearances, expressed not only different nuances but even significant differences concerning the approaches to resolution of problems and forms of the optimum solution. They will present themselves as Rugova's negotiators, but it will be difficult to avoid the personal touch of every one of them, especially because they are all strong personalities and because some of them have personal political ambitions. The group is very heterogeneous concerning their expertise for certain fields, political orientation when speaking of the concept of non-violent resistance of the Albanian movement and, which should not be ignored either, personal experiences. Among other, the following names are on Rugova's list: Veton Suroi, Shkelzen Maliqi, Blerim Shala, lawyer Bairam Kelmendi, Rexhep Ismaili, from the Committee for Human Rights Pajazit Nushi, Esat Stavileci, and the students will choose their representatives.

Apart from Mahmut Bakali, if former vice-presidents of the Democratic League of Kosovo Fehmi Agani and Hydajet Hyseni are excluded, as well as the prime minister of Kosovo, the government in exile Bujar Bukoshi, but also Christian Democrat Mark Krasniqi, parliamentarian Adem Demaqi and Edita Tahiri, who were party officials in the past years, not one of them have had any significant experience in politics, and none of them in diplomacy.

That is another reason why a quick beginning of the future talks should not be expected. But, the beginning of negotiations will not be slowed down only by these problems and by the Albanian party. Speed will not be politically acceptable for the Serbian party either, regardless of its possible sincere approach to the talks and a wish to bring them to the end. Almost two years were needed to formulate the Protocol on implementation of the agreement on normalisation of Albanian education and it is still uncertain whether it will be implemented, as the mixed Serbian-Albanian group "Three Plus Three" agreed, from the beginning of next school and university year in September and October. The just signed Protocol is accepted by the Albanian politicians and the Albanian public with much restraint, primarily because they do not believe that it will be implemented. And not only because of possible obstacles and calculations of the official Belgrade, but also because of powerful resistance of the Serb extremists primarily in Kosovo. The latest general Serb demonstrations in Pristina were organised on the very day of signing of the Protocol and against it. The teaching scientific council of the University in Pristina headed by rector Radivoj Papovic called it the beginning of "betrayal of Kosovo and Metohija", because it is contrary to interests of the Serb nation in this space. That is why the slogan chanted in the demonstrations "Don't Give Them Pensils" on the banner with a pencil drawn on it and a gun pointed at it is very illustrative. The struggle for preservation of the attribute of statehood - the University - was announced, because as Papovic promised "Everybody can come to the Serb University, but we shall not share it with anyone".

If this is the situation in education, what can one say about other problems. Of course, the atmosphere of exclusivism may affect the course of negotiations. Relations in Kosovo are envenomed to such an extent that, as they appear at the moment, talks under reflectors of the public have no chance. Secret or public talks are not just a two-edged, but both multi-edged knifes. But the situation is such that it is necessary to talk. But this will also be a big problem for confronted parties and for those who are ready to help them with the negotiations. During his latest visit to Kosovo, Amarican envoy Robert Gelbard, explicitly declared himself in favour of secret talks far from the eyes of the public, because of the very strained atmosphere in this region.

The problem which deserves attention at least when the Albanian party is concerned, is the approach of Belgrade to negotiations and the current situation. Recently, Ibrahim Rugova was warning th eSerbian party not to try to achieve anything by use of force, bercause things would anyway be resolved by negotiations. This was so far the most benign way of warning Belgrade that it cannot count on being able to force out concessions in negotiations by massive use of military and police force in Kosovo. A firm stand has not yet been taken, but if use of force against people and their property continues like in Drenica and immediately after signing the Protocol on education in villages between Decani and Djakovica, where victims on both sides were mentioned, it may happen that these talks will not be organized for resolving the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and peaceful means. In any case, from the present perspective of the situation and the disposition in the Albanian movement, it can be said that Sebian policy of simultaneous waving the olive branch and the stick will not be accepted.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI