THE CONTACT GROUP AND KOSOVO

AIM Pristina, 11 March, 1998

As a weaker side in the Albanian-Serbian confrontation, the Kosovo Albanians waited impatiently for the conclusions of the Contract Group meeting held in London. In a conflict atmosphere prevailing in Kosovo there are two opposing opinions with regard to the final declaration of the Contract Group: one of those who are still studying and assessing the document and the other of the general public which is under a strong impression of the recent bloodshed in Drenica and expects the local population to be protected from any possible new massacre, as the local Albanians call it, of the Serbian armed forces. Also, the general public refuses to accept that the international community is unable to provide food aid to columns of hungry women and children, wounded as well as to the population in totally cut-off parts. All in all, that public does not have any understanding for the tolerance with which this whole situation is viewed and the gradual and methodical manner it has chosen in dealing with the present situation.

However, the so called political public and the Albanian political representatives view the London decisions from the aspect of hitherto international position of the Kosovo Albanian movement and its future prospects. Although the decisions are still being analysed, the first statements given from the Albanian point of view assess them as an important step forward towards turning the Kosovo, i.e. the Albanian question, into a truly international one. After talking to Robert Gelbard, the American representative who visited Pristina on Tuesday, Ibrahim Rugova said that he thought the decisions of the Contact Group extremely positive. At the same time, he emphasized that their positive impact will be confirmed only after their consistent implementation in practice.

Rugova also said that the Albanians have expected more, but that this would be sufficient to turn the situation to the better. On the other hand, at the Press Conference organized for numerous Yugoslav and foreign journalists Gelbard pointed out that the conclusions adopted by the Contact Group in London were an expression of the consternation of the international community over the "operations of the Serbian Government and violent conflicts in which at least 80 persons lost their lives, including women, children and innocent civilian population" and emphasized that in its operations the Government units have used brutal "disproportional and excessive" force in a way which was, according to Gelbard, totally "illegal". After that Gelbard added that the Contact Group insisted that Belgrade should reduce tensions and thus show the sincerity of its actions, as well as that Milosevic is aware that the time has come to politically resolve the problem of Kosovo.

In this context, Gelbard pointed out that Milosevic and his Government have been asked to stop the violence, to allow the international community, including the media and other non-governmental organizations, access to Drenica and all other places in Kosovo, to publicly commit SFRY that it would initiate dialogue on the status of Kosovo and to cooperate in the implementation of the ten-point Plan of Action adopted by the Contact Group.

Robert Gelbard also stressed that the Contact Group set a ten days deadline for the implementation of these items and threatened with further actions in case no tangible progress is achieved in the implementation of this Plan and its terms when it meets again late this month.

However, it could be said that Rugova's stances are dominant in those segments of the Albanian society where the policy is created and implemented and public opinion created. Actually, they are a political mainstream of sorts, located between those who doubt that the London conclusions will be sufficient to stop the Kosovo spiral of violence, on the one hand, and those who think that through the decisions of the Contact Group the Kosovo problem has finally become the international problem, on the other. In essence, no one denies the positive character of the efforts exerted by the most powerful countries of the world so that, in the end, it seems that these nuances or differences are only a consequence of different opinions regarding the eventual results of these decisions and willingness to carry them out in practice.

For the time being the Albanian political life is not burdened by these differences. But, due to the unsettled relations within the Albanian movement itself, they should be dealt with great care, especially as it is becoming rather certain that the Albanian-Serbian dialogue might start soon. In this context, further exacerbation of this type could encumber the internal problems of the Albanian side in its approach to and conduct of dialogue with Belgrade. A possibility should not be ruled out for these insignificant differences to become a cause of a more serious rift within the Albanian movement.

The Albanian political representatives and analysts generally classify the London conclusions of the Contact Group into two categories. The first and the most important are stands and measures which directly concern the problem of Kosovo and the Albanians, then their relations with Serbia and finally, the prospects these measures open for the the Albanian movement, i.e. Albanian question to reach the world. The second group of issues are threats and pressures, mostly of financial and economic nature, directly aimed against FR Yugoslavia. A third category could be added to this rough general division, but measures from this group will gain in importance only after their possible adoption in the following weeks.

Of the greatest importance is undoubtedly the deadline given to Belgrade by which it has to publicly state that it undertakes the obligation to embark upon unconditional dialogue with the Albanian representatives on the status of Kosovo. This is what the Albanians have been asking for for years, but their suggestions, which were not seriously taken by many circles, met with no response in Belgrade. True, it should also be mentioned that these suggestions were always accompanied by demands for the mediation of a third party. This issue has not been expressly defined in London conclusions, but the fact that a demand for commencing a dialogue was imposed from outside speaks for itself. If that had not been the case, the Serbian Government wouldn't have declared its readiness to talk with the Albanian representatives just a day after the Contact Group conclusions have been announced.

Belgrade refuses any mediating services as it regards Kosovo its internal problem, while Pristina insists on that, partly for opposite reasons - i.e. to have Kosovo treated as a broader, international problem. In all likelihood this problem will be resolved in a pragmatic manner, although it seems that by supporting the proposal for Felipe Gonzalez to be appointed special OSCE envoy for Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the Contact Group has in way already met the Albanian requests halfway.

The granting of support to the demands for the return of the Permanent OSCE Missions and more intensive OSCE presence in Kosovo, as well as to the Gonzalez's special mission, created an impression that the Kosovo problem has been handed over to a renown, but still powerless organization charged with the efficient resolution of a specific problem. Viewed in this manner this solution is probably more to the benefit of Belgrade and its allies. It is clear that OSCE can be hardly expected to cut the mustard. However, if the international community is resolved to solve this problem than it is reasonable to assume that the OSCE will have the most powerful countries of the world behind it. During his last visit to Pristina, the American envoy, Robert Gelbard, said that the United States remained resolved and ready to facilitate the reaching of a political solution. The Albanian representatives would like the Kosovo problem to be formally put on the UN Security Council's agenda. In their opinion that would represent a climax in the internationalization of the Kosovo issue.

From the moment first speculations as to the contents of the Contact Group conclusions appeared, possible military intervention and the involvement of the Hague Tribunal were seriously considered in Kosovo as possible options. There is sufficient documentation in the Hague on criminal acts of the Serbian authorities in Kosovo which are subject to the international law. It is obvious that the mentioned documentation was not taken into consideration earlier for political, i.e. diplomatic reasons.

True, the crimes committed recently in Drenica exceed all those committed in Kosovo hitherto. But, everyone interested in this question thinks that there was reason enough even before for Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal to issue a statement as the one of several days ago that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction over the case of Kosovo and that some issues which can appear in this court are already being considered. The Kosovo analysts and political activists attach political importance to this issue. They think that the involvement of the Hague Tribunal in the Kosovo affair can give Belgrade a rough time because of the nature of the relation of the Serbian, i.e. Yugoslav state towards them. The Albanian analysts and experts assess that the Hague could easily become a threatening factor for Belgrade to agree to negotiations on a political solution.

No less important for the political prospects and safety of the Albanians is to have some facts about their torture and discrimination presented, or better still, established at such high level and in so reputed institution as the Tribunal, on which they have insisted for years. All in all, the Albanian side thinks that the Hague Tribunal is the right place for striking a convincing balance of political and diplomatic arguments on both sides. They very seriously rely on the fact that raising of the Kosovo question before the Hague Tribunal will make the Serbs, both the state and individuals, more careful in using violence and the Albanians, both as a national entity and individuals, at least a little safer.

Both Albanian experts and politicians think that some announced measures, if decisively implemented, could make life much easier for the Albanians under these hard conditions. This primarily concerns the demands of the Contact Group for the opening of all parts of Kosovo, including Drenica, to everyone wishing to visit them, including journalists. In that sense, the most adamant is the request for a free access of all humanitarian organizations whose assistance Kosovo needs most at this moment. It is interesting that this is for the first time that an international document mentions something that could imply that specific things will be done or developed in Kosovo. For several years now, at least when the Albanian prospects are concerned, the only thing mentioned was deterioration and things were truly moving in that direction. Now, the world proposes the establishment of an international agency for international assistance in the development of a civil society in Kosovo. For a long time now the Kosovo Albanians think of nothing else but how to survive. They do not trust promises and it remains to be seen what these promises might bring them.

Finally, the most sensitive problem treated in the London document is terrorism. The Albanians were under the impression these last few weeks that a balance has been struck in the world between a systematic large-scale Serbian violence against the Albanians and the emergence of a politically oriented terrorism in the Albanian ranks. Mention has been made of the Liberating Army of Kosovo (OVK). Many think that so many innocent Albanians would not have lost their lives had not this balance been the objective. Would Belgrade all the same have so monstrously massacred dozens of Albanians, including many who could not have anything to do with terrorism?

The striking of balance between violence of both sides in Kosovo is absolutely impossible and untenable. It is impossible both as regards quality as well as quantity. If principles, i.e. the quality was insisted on, irrespective of who has killed whom, then the organization and its members, who on behalf of the Serbian authorities are killing the Albanians without any reason should long ago be labelled terrorist. The OVK was first heard of two years ago and during this time it assumed responsibility for the murder of over 20 policemen and the so called "honest" Albanians loyal to the Belgrade regime. Before that the Serbian authorities had over 200 Albanians on their conscience. Not to mention dozens and hundreds of thousands of those arrested, tortured, beaten up, abused, maltreated..

Such argumentation for the majority of Kosovo Albanians does not also mean the "defence" of terrorism. Albanians would easily publicly condemn terrorists in their midst, but it seems that they refuse to accept that resistance, with all means and only for the sake of protecting one's life, family and property, should be called terrorism.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI