Options for Preventive Intervention in Kosovo

Pristina Mar 13, 1998

AIM Pristina, 11 March, 1998

In the context of escalation of the crisis in Kosovo and possible initiatives and projects for establishment of confidence and resolution of the question of Kosovo, Shkelzen Maliqi, known philosopher, publicist and analyst of political developments in Kosovo, as well as a participant of numerous talks with representatives of various international diplomatic initiatives especially in the past few months organized on the topic, presents his views of the possible models for resolution of this very complicated political tangle.

From Protectorate to Preventive Military Intervention

  1. From the standpoint of interests of the international community and security in the region and in general, the instrument of preventive action in crises such as the one in Kosovo must be applied; if quick and efficient preventive measures are not taken, conflicts will break out in Kosovo which will be difficult to localize. Many previous strategic analyses have eleborated to detail catastrophic scenarios of a chain reaction in which war would spread in whole of south-eastern Europe which would include the southern wing of the NATO, and in which Kosovo would only be the trigger.

  2. It is obvious that for the regime such as Milosevic's it will not be sufficient if preventive measures are again going to be limited to diplomatic pressures and economic santions. Preventive measures must include announcement that the instrument of humanitarian military intervention would be applied as a concrete and realistic threat, if the authorities in Belgrade continue to act irresponsibly and war-mongering.

  3. The objectives of the preventive military intervention would be:

a) prevention of new mass police and military reprisals and massacres of the Albanian population in Kosovo;

b) resolute prevention of the campaign for systematic ethnic cleansing of Kosovo of the Albanians;

c) creation of conditions for initiation of serious political negotiations between relevant political factors in Belgarde and in Pristina.

  1. Threat with military intervention would be an extreme measure. Previously the Contact Group and other international institutions (e.g. OSCE) should elaborate a detailed plan of political measures which would include:

a) formulation of a clear political framework for resolution of the crisis through dialogue;

b) offer of guarantees that the international factors will ensure realization of agreed solutions with set time limits;

c) elaboration of a plan of urgent measures for re-establishment of confidence, such as implementation of the agreement on normalization of work of Albanian schools, establishment of a complete and efficient health system, permit for work of Albanian electronic media, normalization of work of the Albanian sports societies and sports competitions, etc.

  1. All diplomatic demands which are addressed to Belgrade must have strict time limits for implementation. If in this period Belgrade does not manifest readiness for cooperation, a concrete plan of powerful and efficient political and economic sanctions should be activated.

  2. The best solution for Kosovo would be establishment of a temporary protectorate, but not with an open mandate in the sense of no-man's-land the population of which would declare its will in a referendum at a later date (which is nowadays unacceptable for Serbia), but with strict restoration mandate for a certain period in which negotiations would be held and in which instruments and institutions of confidence would be built.

One of the models is the manner in which Europe intervened in Mostar. A foreign mandatary commission could be sent to Kosovo which would mediate in local disputes. The other possibility is formation of a temporary civilian administration and transitional mixed police.

  1. A pragmatic model of semi-protectorate would be in establishment of a tripartite commission which would be formed of the Albanians, the Serbs and the international community with a mandate to resolve conflicts and organize local authorities while negotiations about the final status of Kosovo were conducted. The tripartite commission could have a more complex structure, such as:

1) a representative of Kosovo Albanians

2) a representative of Kosovo Serrbs

3) a representative of the Republic of Serbia or FR Yugoslavia

4) (optionally) a representative of the Republic of Albania

5) foreign guarantors (e.g. delegated representatives of the Contact Group, all five or as they agree).

A governor or a neutral administrator (from a European country) could be the head of the commission.

The administration of the commission would be technical and it would not predetermine questions of affiliation and sovereignty. With this commission in charge, Kosovo would still be economically linked to FR Yugoslavia (essentially a concession to Belgrade), politically and systematically its status would be hibernating (it would not directly affect the elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia). If a temporary solution could be found for representation of Kosovo according to a certain proportion in the federal and the Serbian parliament (the Albanians will hardly accept this), for which there are no constitutional foundations at the moment, it might help to transfer the dialogue into the parliaments.

Another possibility is constitution of a parliament of Kosovo and creation of an interparliamentary commission for resolving controversial legal issue and administration of Kosovo.

The first task of the commission could be organizing of elections for local authorities according to the principles of temporary division of power. The commission would arbitrate in local controversies.

As concerning the army and the police, Yugoslavia could be guaranteed a certain presence of the army in military barracks, but a compromise would have to be reached about the police, or international supervision.

AIM Pristina

Shkelzen MALIQI