IN TIRANA: DIPLOMACY AND NATIONALISM

AIM TIRANA, 10 march 1998

Although the question of Kosova has never been easily and clearly conceivable for the general public within the state borders of Albania, this time it fell like a bombshell among other bombshells. Albania, which is not yet sure it has overcome its ¾self-struggle¾, suddenly saw itself drawn to the brink of another war, incomparably more cruel and more savage: a war with the Serbs, which assumes a special meaning, for according to Balkan tradition, going up at least to the Middle Ages, the Albanians have been fed with a long series of songs and legends which present the Serbs only as vicious occupiers and wicked intruders.

This time the surprise of the Albanians, who, it must be said, have had more than their fair share of surprises, has at least two reasons. First, because they did not expect these results from the undoubtedly peaceful policy, which the Kosova leader Rugova has been carrying out for eight years now and which, although it has been frequently questioned, was generally considered the best means to ward off war. Second, because the Kosova question was felt as something far away from our territory, a consequence of the long separation between the two parts of the Albanian nation: since the founding of the first Albanian State in 1912 Kosova has never been administratively part of the mother State. This division was made even deeper during the communist regime when, with the exception of its last years, it was virtually forbidden to mention Kosova, even less to talk about relations with it.

And, as if this long history of tormented relations were not enough, Albania, apart from its complete economic disintegration, had recently suffered the destruction of its State administration in all its structures ¾ the army, the police, the intelligence services, etc. It found itself with a political class involved in fierce inner strife, with everybody accusing everybody, according to a Balkan and communist mentality, for being sold out to the foreigners. The accusations of the Berisha supporters leveled against Nano were clearly articulated and almost official: he was considered the man who had sold out Kosova and the Albanian cause in general to the foreigners, that is, the Greeks, whereas the accusations of the Nano supporters, albeit never officially expressed, but implied and talked about by Berisha¾s opponents or the defectors from the Democratic Party, suggested that he was a Serb spy. They were basedon the fact that Berisha¾s wife is of half Montenegrin extraction and that he had for a long time supported Rugova¾s option of a peaceful road.

This was more or less the atmosphere in Albania when the first news of the Serb massacres in Drenica came to be known.

The first reactions of the Albanian polical circles, it must be said, were somewhat confused, mainly because of the lack of information and insufficient preparation. To make matters worse, in open opposition to the Albanian official stand, as well as the policy of the representatives of Kosova and the international policy, Berisha had recently given his support and blessing to the activities of the Kosova Liberation Army, but only some weeks later, under international pressure, he was force to go back on his words, calling them Arkan¾s stooges. Whereas the independent mass media or those close to the government coalition ¾ the mass media now are fully liberalized in Albania ¾ were prudent and showed restraint in their statements, those of Berisha¾s Democratic Party unhesitatingly took up a warlike stance: all the day they broadcast music from Kosova and pathetic statements on the readiness of the Albanians to fight for the cause of Kosova, and so on. They did not fail to call everything that happened that day in Drenica a direct consequence of the Nato-Milosevic meeting, at which ¾Nano had signed the selling out of Kosova¾.

For his part, in a style borrowed from the West, at a press-conference Premier Nano came out with a declaration in which one thing was remarkable: it was excessively lengthy. It was clear that this time, as the Prime-Minister had promised, the Albanian Government would react in a different way, not in the old populist style, but in a more institutional manner. Evidence of this is that the Albanian Foreign Minister, Paskal Milo, after availing himself of the opportunity offered by his German visit to sensibilize public opinion there over the question of Kosova, traveled to France to meet his French counterpart, while the President of the Republic, Rexhep Mejdani wrote letters to Kofi Anan and the heads of State of the more important countries of the world. On the other hand, Nano, who was in constant telephone contact with the prime-ministers and foreign ministers of the neighboring countries and beyond, was engaged in intensive political activity.

However, along with diplomacy, nationalism, too, had its share of activities. During the extraordinary session of the Albanian Parliament over the situation in Kosova, to which the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Defense as well as the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs were called on to report, the small group of the deputies of the Democratic Party, with former President Berisha at the head, appeared in the hall of the Parliament and sought to make a declaration. Berisha¾s declaration was moderate in its expressions, but not in its tone. In the conclusion of his declaration, Berisha said that next day the members of the Albanian Parliament were invited to a manifestation in Skanderbeg¾s Square under the slogan ¾One Nation, One Stance¾. The gauntlet was thrown. The head of the parliamentary group of the Socialist Party and the Chairman of the Parliament replied positively to Berisha¾s call. According to press reports, Berisha had insisted in being the first speaker at the meeting, a request which the others did not accept. Unlike other occasions, Tirana¾s Skanderbeg¾s Square was filled to capacity. The predicted exercise in nationalism was somewhat muted by the tone of speech of President Mejdani and the Speaker of the Parliament, the Social-Democrat Gjinushi, despite Berisha¾s shouting, even before reaching the tribune, in his typical populist style: ¾Kosova,Kosova!¾ Nano did not come to the meeting and his absence was noticed, although later, in the evening, he came out on television with a speech reporting on a routine meeting of the Government. There were also some groups of people calling: ¾Give us weapons! Give us weapons!¾

There was an impression that the national cause had forced the Albanian political parties to overcome their eternal dissentions, although one cannot say that this has actually happened. Many analysts think that it was only an attempt on Berisha¾s part to regain the lost ground with a quick move, as well as an expression of the efforts of the other political parties not to allow Berisha to fly the banner of nationalism single-handedly ¾ a banner which, dependent on the situations in this part of the world, can be easily turned into a combat horse to conquer power.

In the meantime, the news of Albricht¾s intensive international activities, the immediate convening of the Contact Group and its serious warnings, regardless that the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation refused to put his signature under two points of the Declaration, was well received on both sides of the border, both by Rugova and the Albanian Foreign Minister, although, as was said, something more was expected from this Declaration, that is, actual military action.

It is important to observe that the adhesion of Greece to the Declaration of the Balkan States was somewhat of a surprise. This Declaration calls on Milosevic not only to stop violence and repression, but also to sit down and talk over autonomy with the leaders of Kosova. The Declaration of these States is considered in Tirana a reward for Nano¾s new open policy in the region. A result of this new policy, the Tirana analysts point out, is also the decision on the immediate convening of a meeting of the NATO ambassadors precisely on the proposal of the Tirana Government.

In the meantime, the Kosova crisis has sensibly frozen relations between Tirana and Moscow. The cause for this was a letter the Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, sent the Albanian Prime-Minister in reply to the latter¾s letter addressed to the member States of the Contact Group. Russia charged Tirana that it was blowing on the fire in Kosova, but it remained totally silent about the massacres in Drenica. It is reported from different sources that the Albanian Foreign Minister, Paskal Milo, has sent a strong- worded reply to Moscow, accusing it of one-sidedness and failure to denounce the killing of innocent women and children.

Nano¾s words, quoted by his spokesman, in his telephone talk with Robin Cook immediately after the conclusion of the meeting of the Contact Group, in which he had re-emphasized that he would ¾insist, in exchange for an increased foreign presence in Kosova, in combating any rise of nationalist tendencies¾, were another expression of Tirana¾s determination to go on with its peaceful options, regardless of the measures it has to take to heighten vigilance on the border and to receive eventual refugees.

Nationalism and diplomacy go hand-in-hand in Tirana. Albania has laid great hopes in the West, but fears these hopes may turn out to be illusive, seeing what has happened to the Albanians on the other side of the border.

AGIM ISAKU, AIM TIRANA