Serbia and Kosovo

With the Head Buried in the Sand

The current national homogenization concerning the issue and the tragedy of Kosovo enables many things - from easier formation of the Serbian government, through revival of the campaign against the "turncoat" Milo Djukanovic, to the possible constitutional changes which would be directed to reinforcement of the personal power of Slobodan Milosevic. What is bloodshed and re-introduction of the sanction in comparison with that?

AIM Belgrade, 11 March, 1998

"I believe that Serbia must uncompromisingly get rid of terrorism in Kosovo in the manner in which all the countries in the world do it. I fully support all the measures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Kosovo is an internal issue of Serbia..." Approximately like this and similarly, for days - quite harmoniously - all the citizens speak in polls conducted by the central daily news program of the state television. None of them mention "protection of the fatherland", "the cradle of Serb statehood", "threatened Serb children", etc. - as it was customary earlier, in activities for "saving Serbdom".

Not even the authorities mention any "Serb sanctuaries": everything is beginning and ending by stressing territorial integrity of the state and its constitutional and legal system.

On such, one could say, purely legalistic foundation, national homogenization is constructed again. What the actual situation in Kosovo is like, how the crrisis will develop and what lies in the background of the bloodshed in Drenica, does not seem to interest anybody. That is why one cannot avoid the impression that this is just another great manipulation at the basis of which is "defence and protection" of the current authorities. Although the demands of the relevant Albanian politicians are maximalistic (independence of Kosovo) and as such completely unacceptable for Belgrade, it is a fact that the regime in Serbia for more than a decade has not offered any possibility for a compromise. It is highly questionable whether it is capable of anything of the kind: the rise of the president of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic as the national leader had begun in Kosovo; his policy has mostly created the present stalemate position and the completely unbearable situation in the province.

That the nation is, at least at the moment, homogenized and that the consensus is general, is confirmed by almost all relevant political parties. The Serb Radical Party (SRS) of Vojislav Seselj, although it had announced that it would vote against the draft federal budget, it changed - due to the "situation in Kosovo" - its opinion, so that in the Chamber of the Republics of the assembly of FR Yugoslavia, all its deputies voted in favour of the budget. The Radicals just demand from the authorities to be consistent and not to stop halfway in the "struggle against Albanian terrorism".

The Serb Revival Movement (SPO) of Vuk Draskovic has also supported the action of police in Drenica. It is a fact that Draskovic demands that "fighting against terrorism be accompanied by a reformist package" and in this context proposes formation of two-chamber assemblies in Kosovo. In all that, however, the SPO follows the policy of the regime. Draskovic even identifies with the attack of the state prosecutor against five privately-owned newspapers that they were encouraging Albanian terrorism and separatism by their writing. The other parties, the Democratic Party (DS) of Zoran Djindjic, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Kostunica and the Democratic Centre (DC) of Dragoljub Micunovic, accuse the regime of having "neglected Kosovo", they demand flexibility, but nobody questions the action of the Serbian MUP in Drenica.

It is certainly a fact that the actions of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (in Albanian: UCK) have the weight of an armed rebellion and elements of terrorism and that in the past two years they have caused great frustrations in Serbia. Especially because until recently the regime itself had tried to push them all to the margins. However, just a few pose the question of real causes of the appearance and spreading of the influence of the UCK. In other words, nobody denies the role of the ten-year politics of the "lightly promised speed" in resolving the problem of Kosovo by Slobodan Milosevic, which led to - but by no means not only it alone - the current situation in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, the relevant political public in Serbia is aware that some kind of a dialogue with representatives of Kosovo Albanians is inevitable, especially after the latest demand of six states-members of the Contact Group (dated 9 March) that Milosevic stop using force in Kosovo and begin a dialogue immediately. On the contrary, the UN Security Council will consider re-introduction of economic sanctions. Since the regime has some kind of a monopoly on the problem of Kosovo, it should not be expected that the parties outside the regime will try to exert pressure on the authorities to meet the mentioned demands of the Contact Group: SRS is expressedly nationalistic, chauvinist and xenophobic; SPO is engaged in negotiations about entering the cabinet and it is striving not to burden them with anything; the other parties are afraid that if they diverted attention in any way they would be pushed even further to the margins and branded as traitors. Besides, it is completely vague what they could propose as the basis for initiation of a dialogue.

Since they were founded to this day, when speaking of Kosovo, they did not essentially differ from the authorities. That is why everything is in the hands of Milosevic. And he and his regime are not for the time being manifesting that they are ready for any form of detente. Especially because new national homogenization concerning the question of the crisis in Kosovo enables much to be desired - from easier formation of the Serbian government of "national unity", revival of the campaign against Milo Djukanovic in May parliamentary elections in Montenegro, and in this situation changes of the federal constitution cannot be eliminated either which would go in the direction of reinforcement and fortification of the personal power of Milosevic himself.

What is just another bloodshed and just new sanctions in comparison with that? That at the moment no withdrawl of the regime is in sight, is clear from the platform of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) for Kosovo published on the same day as the ultimatum of the contact group. The Left formulated it in five principles. Essentially they are the following: Kosovo is the internal issue of Serbia; terrorism is to be fought by all legal means; the international community must have the same attitude to the terrorism in Kosovo like to any other in the world and as an internal problem of Serbia; the Albanians have all the rights in Serbia; joint life with dialogue and use of rights guaranteed by the Constitutiion, and not boycott. The listed items show that the regime has not made a single move which would go in the direction of meeting the demands of the international community, and nothing to say about political forces of Kosovo Albanians. National homogenization, that is, the authorities which are founded on it are obviously priceless. Where this leads to and how it ends, has already been seen in this space.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)