LEX SPECIALIS AND THE STICK FOR KOSOVO

AIM Pristina, 7 March, 1998

After the mass police action of reprisal which Belgrade took in Drenica region in Kosovo, considered by Serbian authorities to be the main stronghold of the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK), numerous domestic and foreign reporters and political analysts believe that the regime in Belgrade, after maintaining of the status quo in Kosovo for the past several years, has lost patience and decided to resolve the Kosovo crisis by war. It is claimed that the prepared scenario is similar to the ones used to provoke war in Croatia or Bosnia & Herzegovina. Moreover, there are indications that for these punitive expeditions Belgrade has engaged special police and military units, as well as paramilitary forces already "specialized" in Croatia and Bosnia for cleansing villages and towns and territory and mass liquidations or banishment of the population. The taken action of reprisal indeed remind of what has already been seen in ethnic wars in this space. Serbian units are systematically "combing through" the Drenica region trying to destroy strongholds of the OVK, but also, by the way, to cleanse the territory exclusively populated by the Albanians. Punitive units are surrounding and attacking Albanian villages leaving behind demolished and burnt down houses. The Albanian population, primarily women, children and the elderly, fearing reprisal, have started to leave their homes and seek shelter in forests. Columns of refugees have started to arrive in surrounding towns, especially Vucitrn (Vushtri) and Mitrovica where they are accommodated by relatives and other citizens.

The male, fit for military service, part of the population of the attacked region has remained in the villages and seems to be striving to resist the attack and protect the homes and territory. It seems that the resistance of the population of Drenica is more powerful and better organized than those who planned police action had assumed. The Albanians of the region of Drenica had on several occasions before demonstrated a high level of self-organization and joint actions. Although there are no precise data about the level of coordination and the level of command of the armed resistance, it is obvious that it has significantly slowed down the course of the operation. After the first police surprise attack on the village of Prekaze which started at dawn on 5 March, and in which, as claimed by eye-witnesses, many houses have been burned to the ground, the punitive expedition needed much more time to reach other villages. It is claimed that there was no demolition in them, certainly because these villages were deserted in time, but also because of organized defence, configuration of land, greater mobility and planned dispersion of resistance.

Developments since the evening of 6 March escalated to the proportions which can be marked as a small, local war. The pursuit for "members of the OVK" who are called terrorists by state propaganda perhaps might end by provoking a new "Drenica rebellion" similar to the one at the end of the Second World War when Yugoslav partisans put an end to the quite powerful units of the local commander Shaban Polluzha.

The question which has been most of all subject to speculations in the past few days is the number of those who are offering resistance and the armament of the units in Drenica. Evaluations range from a few hundred to a few thousand. If there are a few hundred armed combatants, the present conflicts could be considered to be very dangerous, but not inevitably expanding. But, if the reaction to the Serbian punitive expedition has led to mobilization of the local Albanian population and formation of units which have more than one thousand armed combatants, with a central or coordinated command, then the combats which are going on are not at all naive. Their consequences may really be far-reaching and take the form of an expanding spiral in which new military forces will be engaged and increasingly heavy armament used with a tendency to spread to other regions (Klina, Decani, Podujevo) where there have already been conflicts and tensions. Of course, if such a spiral continued to expand, conflicts could be transferred to urban centres of Kosovo (Pristina, Pec, Djakovica, etc.) from where partial evacuation of the Serb population would begin. Finally, since a strong emotional and political mobilization of the Albanian public opinion has already started in Albania and Macedonia for support to the threatened brethren in Kosovo, the present local war could easily turn into a Serbian-Albanian war accompanied by general unstabilization of the region and the catastrophic scenario of "threatening the southern wing of the NATO", and maybe even of the Atlantic Alliance itself.

It is obvious that the Serbian police, which as assessed in the latest action has engaged at least about 500 men, is assisted by the army, since helicopters, armed vehicles, tanks and small-calibre cannons are used in the expedition. But, although these units are superior in arms, their number will not be sufficient to put an end to rebellious units if they have actually managed to mobilize a few thousand combatants. The expedition troops may be trying to apply the tactic of tiring out and starving the defenders of Drenica, but such an action would take too long and would be too expensive. In order to encircle such a large number Albanian rebels and physically overcome or force them to surrender, additional troops would be needed which would encircle the whole region of Drenica. For such an operation, engagement of much greater military force would be needed and probably for a long time.

These are, of course, mostly speculations, What the actual course of development will be like depends on the variant for resolution of the current critical situation the regime in Belgrade will choose. If the punitive expedition happens to be recalled in time, if after that, return of Drenica Albanians to their homes will be ensured, tensions in the region of Drenica will still be great, but at least the former situation of delicate balance of fear and status quo would nevertheless be re-established.

However, there is justified fear that the current punitive expedition has profoundly and irreparably undermined the fragile Kosovo status quo. Whether due to police stupidity or more likely intentionally and as planned (the latter is more likely especially if allegations that units "specialized" for ethnic cleansing were involved in the action) the operation in Drenica has already caused such a profound disturbance of the situation that going back is impossible.

The logical question arises whether the main aim of Belgrade is actually to create a new territorial and ethnic configuration, and not - as the action is justified - to liquidate Albanian "terrorists". Just as in Croatia and Bosnia scenarios of ethnic cleansing and ethnic demarcation of territory were initiated and implemented to the end, in Drenica, as an important territorial and ethnic Albanian "spearhead wedge" which separates the eastern from the western part of Kosovo, is not this actually an attempt to implement the scenario of ethnic cleansing of the territory of top priority for Serbian interests in case of possible need for ethnic demarcation with the Albanians but also for more efficient control of Kosovo as a whole? If observed retrospectively, it can be clearly seen that the operation in Drenica was carefully prepared not only in the past several months when the significance and the presence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo was artificially exaggerated, but a few years back, all the way to the notorious attack on the police patrol in May 1993, a few days before Dobrica Cosic was relieved of duty of the president of FRY.

When speaking of exaggerated significance of the OVK, the fact is meant that it still is not strong enough to dictate the developments. The Albanian political scene is still controlled by forces which are moderate and not inclined to war. Ibrahim Rugova, as the president and the leader who enjoys support of majority of the Albanians, has not given up on political resolution of the crisis, and even declared recently that he was ready to meet and talk to Milosevic in the presence of a third party as a guarantor that the talks would be serious. Rexhep Mejdani, president of Albania, at the rally of support in Tirana, replied to the more militant demonstrators that Albania was in favour of peace and political solution of the crisis in Kosovo. Only Milosevic can add fuel to the fire betting on the card of instigating local rebellions such as possibly the one in Drenica, in order to have a pretext for the expanding intervention of the police and army and ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.

It is evident, therefore, that Milosevic is the one who is dictating the nature and the speed of developments. He is, in fact, pursuing a policy on two tracks, on the one hand intensifying the conflict and bringing it to the verge of a new war, and on the other, completing negotiations about certain political concessions to Kosovo Albanians as measures for re-establishing confidence and preparations for the Serbian-Albanian dialogue the international community is insisting on. These concessions refer primarily to implementation of the agreement on normalization of work of Albanian schools. As Monsignor Pally, representative of the Vatican organization Sante Egidio which mediated in Albanian-Serbian negotiations about schools, recently declared, it seems that everything has been prepared for implementation of this agreement. It seems to be typical of Milosevic's type of rule - with one hand he is signing the Lex Specialis and with the other holding the truncheon, and in the case of Kosovo - firearms. His concessions demand signatures signed in blood. The price Kosovo should pay at this moment is the bloody massacre in Drenica and humiliation and beating up of peaceful demonstrators in Pristina. Although he is ruling a bankrupt state which is forced to make concessions and compromise, Milosevic nevertheless wishes to show who wears pants in the house and who will continue seriously to have to be taken into account in the future.

Perhaps this is the most logical explanation of what has been going on in Kosovo in the past few days. The bloody showdown in Drenica, the threat of a new war and ethnic cleansing are intended to keep up the fascination of the world and the domestic public with the inevitability of the factor called Milosevic.

It is questionable, however, whether this scenario of simultaneous presentation of Janus's faces of the Balkan Saadam will be accepted in the world centres. He has been seen through. He too is bankrupt.

AIM Pristina

Shkelzen Maliqi