WHY DID KINKEL VISIT TIRANA?
AIM Tirana, February 12, 1998
When after having met with the Ministers of the European Union in Brussels on January 27, this year, the Albanian delegation started on its way back to the country, one of its high officials took a plane to Bonn. Sabri Godo, leader of one of the opposition parties and Head of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Albanian Parliament, had a personal invitation of his counterpart in Bundestag, to pay him a visit in order to exchange views regarding constitutional process in Albania. As it will turn out later, Godo was there as a representative of the opposition whom the Germans decided to interrogate about the political situation and crisis in this small Balkan country. He was considered something of a contrast to the destructive stand of Berisha and his followers from the Democratic Party. German politicians, once close friends of the former president, realized that once charismatic leader had become a part of the problem and not of the political solution they have been looking for in Albania since the crisis of February - March 1997. Several days before Godo's visit to Bonn, high German diplomats were firmly resolved to clearly and resolutely inform the opposition representative of their conviction that the time has come to put an end to all misunderstandings on the Albanian political scene.
And, same as it happened with the Foreign Minister Milo in November 1997, the main German message to Albania was related to the "national reconciliation". This was a sign that after a year of continuous crisis, the Western giant has lost its nerves because of the policy of turning of backs and burning of bridges which the Albanian authorities and opposition pursued in their mutual relations since the elections of June 29, last year. This line of action was also followed in a four-hour high-level diplomatic visit of Klaus Kinkel on February 6, to Tirana. Brief, but packed with meetings, Kinkel's visit to Albania made the position of Germany towards the troubled Albanian political situation more clear. However, it was also a first specific signal that after two years the strongest country in Europe has returned to the closed Albanian file.
The last two years marked many ups and downs in the Albanian - German relations. Kohl's government, Berisha's political ally during a greater part of his five-year term of office, started to show the signs of estrangement at the time of parliamentary elections in Albania in the course of
- And while it unreservedly supported the former President and his Cabinet during the process of political reforms Bonn, same as other European-American partners did one after another, could not but send disturbing signals pointing to rigged election results. Still, the reactions of the European capitals, but not of the USA, to the increased authoritarianism of the Albanian government were not firm and did not aim at quick overthrowing of Berisha. And just as it happened during four years of war in former Yugoslavia, the Europeans were reserved in their criticism of the Albanian Government thus hoping to preserve the political stability in the neighbouring Albania which formally held the key to the spreading of the Yugoslav conflict to the southern part of the peninsula.
However, German reluctance continued even later. In April 1997, Bonn refused to take part in the UN led multinational forces "ALBA" for the establishment of order in Albania after a crisis caused by the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes. This absence was explained by "unstable situation in the country". It seems that the real reason for this passive attitude was the disappointment of the German diplomacy because it had failed with Berisha after five years of continuous efforts. On the other hand, it was perhaps then that Bonn decided to wait for the results of early elections of June 29, 1997, and resume negotiations with the new winners.
Last September, during his visit to New York, the Prime Minister Nano and the Foreign Minister Milo met with the chief of German diplomacy, Kinkel. Official statements issued on that occasion were very optimistically intoned by the German side. This meeting was the talk of the town for a long time in Tirana. On that occasion Kinkel, among other things, invited his Albanian counterpart for official visit. And indeed, the fall 1997, marked the beginning of the unblocking of German aid to Albania. Some 400 million marks will flow into the Albanian state treasury within financing of infrastructure, mining, financial and educational projects.
By Milo's visit to Bonn and Kinkel's to Tirana, Albania and Germany have officially restored normal climate in their mutual relations. Now the German government has recognized the legitimacy of June elections, the parliament and the government that have resulted from them. More than once Bonn clearly made it known that it was against opposition's request for overthrowing Nano's government and holding early elections. On the other hand, Germany revived its activity in the fields of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Strong German influence within the EU, Council of Europe and the OSCE was recently decisive in sending encouraging messages to Fatos Nano who, as it seems, is considered to be the only card to play, after Berisha discredited himself.
However, if the protagonists in Albania have changed, regional interests of the West and Germany have not. During his meetings in Tirana, Kinkel made it clear that he was interested in the soonest possible restoration of stability in Albania as an important precondition for achieving stability in the disturbed Kosovo. If Berisha was used yesterday to prevent the war from breaking out in Kosovo and Macedonia, Nano should do the same now. And that was the final message of this high German official, a message that the Albanian government, it seems, understood quite well.
Actually, Kosovo and the emigrants were two central themes of Kinkel's visit to the Albanian capital. Expressing his great satisfaction with the new attitude of Tirana towards Belgrade and Skopje, he said to Fatos Nano that the crisis in Kosovo could create a situation similar to that in Bosnia, if not even a more dangerous one. But, if a possible armed conflict would have grave and direct consequences for the region, the Northern Europe already feels them in the inflow of emigrants. About 400 thousand Albanians, mostly from Kosovo, are currently in the Federal Republic of Germany. Most of them seek political asylum and refuse to return home. This situation is becoming disturbing for the German officials who have openly announced the adoption of a firm stand towards all emigrants who might have problems with the law.
Closely connected, Kosovo and the Albanian refugees, are now the two main items on the German agenda. As a consequence, both Western political initiatives launched in recent months, which aim at initiating negotiations on the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, bear a German sign. Last fall, in cooperation with Washington, German diplomats have tried to organize a mission to Pristina. Reasons for which Ischinger, a high German diplomat, and Gelbard, the American representative for former Yugoslavia, were unable to go to the Balkans are still unclear. "There was no agreement regarding terms of reference" was the official explanation. Many think that the American envy because of the increased role of France stopped this initiative. However, while the Americans will once again unsuccessfully try to get to Kosovo, Germany showed that it had no intention of withdrawing.
In November 1997, Kinkel and the French Foreign Minister sent a letter to the President of Yugoslavia, Milosevic, stating the official stand of the German - French initiative. Return of the OSCE Mission to Kosovo, EU Representative Office in Pristina, greater respect for Felipe Gonzalez, the OSCE envoy in former Yugoslavia, were the demands that Vedrine and Kinkel have sent to Slobodan Milosevic. In return for a favourable reaction the potent Belgrade leader was offered "the beginning of the abolition of trade measures against FRY, return to the OSCE and opening of roads for normalizing the EU - FRY relations". These were main items within which German diplomacy seems resolved to act so as to achieve a possible compromise in Kosovo. Although the letter of two heads of diplomacy remained unanswered, two high European officials plan a visit to Yugoslavia later this month on a mission that would have Kosovo and the local crisis as its main subjects.
And although the result expected from the European duo is not known yet, everything in the Albanian-Serbian crisis is at a stalemate. Only few days ago, Serbia made it known through diplomatic channels that it had no intention of implementing the Milosevic-Rugova Agreement on Education. According to Belgrade it is unacceptable for students to demand educational programmes which have been prepared outside the central Serbian authority and receive diplomas with a heading "The Republic of Kosovo". Thus the German-French initiative came to a mine field which neither the Western diplomacies nor Nano's and Milosevic's handshaking on Crete could cross safely. Perhaps the latter is waiting to shake someone else's hand before he takes a seat at a table in order to start a dialogue by which another devastating war for the entire Balkans, if not Europe, would be avoided.
AIM Tirana
Skender MINXHOZI