KOSOVO, FACTOR DETERMINING POLICY OF TIRANA

AIM Tirana, 12 February, 1998

For more than seven years, depending on the situation in Kosovo and in Macedonia, Albania occasional becomes a country where aeroplanes are landing carrying personages of foreign policy of the most powerful states in the world. The same is happening in the past several days, when it is almost impossible not to bump into some of them at the small and generally cramped Rinas airport. Pangalos, Dini, Lloyd, and finally Kinkel. This seems to be happening for two reasons: first, as stated, because of straining of the situation in Kosovo (high police repression, the announced presidential elections for the Republic of Kosovo, intensified activity of the Liberation Army of Kosovoi) and second, because we have a new team in the administration in Tirana who are expected to offer full guarantees for the future of the region. On the ther hand, meetings of ambassadors of significant states accredited in Tirana with leaders of Albanian politics are intensifying and often described in the not very analytical press in the capital of Albania as "enigmatic".

In talks with leaders of Albanian politics in these dubious times for the Albanians themselves, with Albanian's dilapidated economy and evident insecurity of living, it is certainly not difficult, and probably even very easy for world politicians to extort all kinds of promises which they, as the creditors, need. As long as the Albanian economy is on this level, as long as the loans from the world amount to several hundred million, and as long as they ensure even the balance of payments, it is clear that options Tirana will have at iits disposal will be the ones offered to it by international diplomacy or it will be forced to adapt to the offered options.

Just a quick glance at political relations between Tirana and Pristina enables an easy conclusion that Tirana's options concerning Kosovo and the Albanian issue are either retrograde or have not progressed at all. When created, the Democratic Party, which had anticipated that it would very soon take over control of Albania, not only touched upon the national issue, but was maximalistic in its aspirations. Since it advocated quick union of all Albanian territories (the Democratic Party was the first which after 50 years mentioned the "forgotten" problem of Chameria, the question which it abused in its relations with Greece), it proposed the thesis of "loosening borders", and later even "deleting" them with Kosovo.

Analyses were made in free press at the time, in which the communist clique which had ruled Albania for half a century was naively proclaimed to be responsible for division of the nation. There were at least two factors which were the immediate cause of elaboration of this thesis by the Democratic Party: political naivete of the very closed and isolated Albanian society within state borders, and the fact that after 3/4 of a century former Yugoslavia was being dissolved again. The dream about the benefits to be drawn from this situation was evident. In the meantime, in Kosovo, the interpreter of ancient history Ibrahim Rugova came to the head of the political movement and proclaimed that the only way to reach the ultimate goal was the peaceful way. This time, it should be said, in the beginning and even later, he was not only vague in stating his goals, but even sounded as if he was withdrawing from the battle. Sometimes considered to be Gandhievan, and sometimes as a revolt of civil disobedience, once as a necessity to create a parallel state, but always declared as peaceful, after seven years, as the only evident result, this policy yielded only departure of Kosovo by its young population, dismemberment of the pluralist political life, increase of poverty and anxiety among people. On the political level, it must be said that Kosovo has become an item on the agenda of international talks. Certainly with a delay, when other states have already been created, but that is what has happened. But, on the other hand, Serbia itself, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia slightly more moderately, but also Bosnia soaked in blood, chose a different road to say goodbye to Serbia which had aspirations to rule then whole of former Yugoslavia. It is certain that because of this "self-elimination" of Kosovo, there were other factors apart from Rugova, among which primarily the fact should be emphasized that Kosovo as a province (it has never become a republic) had been lost somewhere among the developments in the beginning of the eighties.

One should also note a "sudden" visit of a political three-man group from the leadership of a small party, but significant for its initiatives such as departure to Belgrade of the Democratic Alliance, nowadays part of the ruling coalition in Albania, and at the time just separated from the Democratic Party. These were the first steps made towards a dialogue with Belgrade. Although the visit was arranged soon after the one-day visit to Tirana of the then federal prime minister Panic, it was vehemently attacked by Berisha's regime, simply because he felt that the question of Kosovo could be used by other forces in Albanian politics, which meant that the power of the Democratic party, that is, his own, would be threatened. Since he had no nuclear weapons, large quantities of oil or a considerable military force, copper or diamonds, Berisha realised that he could compensate for all that by the "national issue". He therefore made the most of this trump card, and mostly to its detriment, but not unsuccessfully. At the same time, this visit was also sharply attacked in Kosovo, as it seems for the same reason.

And finally, the "Albanian issue" was once again (like at the time of Enver Hoxha) simply turned into a source of political support for powerwielders in Tirana. It is sufficient to observe Berisha's actions in order to realise this. He abandoned "nationalistic" options from the beginning of his political activities only when he was given the necessary political and economic international support. When he felt that he was losing support, he acted in the direction of a part of the Albanians in Macedonia inspiring a great split inside their most significant party and appearing in public as a support of the radical faction led by Xhaferi and Thachi. Staring from the fact that he is the politician with the greatest experience in this sphere, he is doing the same with the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) and opposes it to Rugova. He is supporting it just in order to show to the big powers that he is still in the game and that his opinion should be heard. It is sufficient to read the editorial published a few days ago in a journal in Albania, which is believed to be the spokesman of Berisha, in which it is stressed that Kinkel and all the significant world politicians should realise that the man with the greatest influence in Kosovo is Berisha himself, therefore, the only logical conclusion is: he should be consulted.

Be what may, things have changed in Albania. Another political class is in power. Advocating an open and modern policy, Nano not only participated at the Balkan summit in Crete, but met in a tete-a-tete the former "butcher from the Balkans" (nowadays ironically: "peace-maker of the Balkans), Milosevic. The political movement of Kosovo not only did not wish to cooperate in preparation of theses for these talks, but they are angry because of this meeting, so that Nano is forced to withdraw. On the other hand, Milosevic is not just failing to act in the spirit of these talks, but he is, in fact, increasing repression in Kosovo and he has not made a single step in the direction of implementing the agreement he himself signed with Rugova almost two years ago. After that, as it seems according to some agenda prepared elsewhere, Nano paid a visit to Skopje, where in a European mannerism, he declared that no taboo existed for him, that he could talk with anybody and about anything. He appeared open to all options, the French-German, the American-German, the Russian-Greek initiative. The most important thing for him is to meet people and discuss problems in order to resolve them and push them in the right direction. As it seems, the old Balkan style: I say two, but mean four, is not Nano's characteristic. Just as it is not characteristic for him, nor for any politician in Albania so far, to sit down and elaborate a longterm strategy of the national issue.

Just as everybody must admit that definite resolving of this issue was not possible either by Tirana or by Pristina, everybody understands and is concerned by passivity of Albanian politics which has done nothing, even if it were in a very benign and open field such as cultural integration.

As it seems, other options will be created in the meantime: American, Greek, Serbian, Israeli or Malesian, but one thing will still be lacking: an elaborate Albanian political option (not the romantic)!

And this will continue to happen until the question of Kosovo is considered to be only a source of support for remaining (or not remaining) in power.

AIM Tirana

Agim ISAKU