New RS Government and Return of Refugees
Between the Hammer and the Anvil
AIM Banja Luka, 12 February, 1998
If the government of Milorad Dodik supports return of Serb refugees to B&H Federation, it will be proclaimed a traitor and puppet, and if it opposes such initiatives, sale of Serb property will continue, that is, a specific process of depriving the Serbs of their property through land register will take place. The new government will also have to resolve the questions of exchange, compensation or sale of property, final and definite closing down of collective refugees centres, but also the attitude to the category of population which was so far treated as "national refuse" - the Serbs who have remained or wish to return to their homes in B&H Federation.
In the forthcoming period, these authorities of Republica Srpska will be faced with numerous difficult and unpleasant questions which the previous government and the entire Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and its party-state establishment have evaded for so long, intentionally pushed aside and as dirt shoved under the carpet of the inclination of the nation towards almost endless endurance. In the year marked by the international community as the "year of return of refugees", the newly elected parliament of RS but especially the government of Milorad Dodik will have to grapple with the key, fatal question of defining its attitude towards return of Serb refugees to their homes on the territory of B&H Federation and in general, the attitude twoards the Serbs who live on the other side of inter-entity demarcation line. These are questions which the future very much depends on, and even the very survival of Republica Srpska.
In a recent live tv program, to a question of a spectator how he could reach his property in B&H in order to sell or exchange it, the nominated head of the SDS, Aleksa Buha laconically replied: "That is the task of the government!" Such an answer undoubtedly implies the intention of the SDS to lay a whole pile of accumulated problems caused by the past and all the previous SDS government at the door of the new prime minister and his cabinet. Such a stand coincides with the opinion of some analysts that abstention of the SDS from participation in the new government was intentional and planned in order to let others discharge the unpleasant obligations from the Dayton accords and in order to run in the forthcoming elections with a "spotless" reputation.
Milorad Dodik's government, however painful and unjust it may be, will have to take a big responsibility, and even a part of the blame which objevctively belongs to its predecessors. When speaking of return of refugees, the obligation and responsibility of the new government are the result primarily of the need to preserve "ethnic hygiene". In other words, it is necessary to define a rational attitude towards initiatives for return of the Serb population to the territory of the Federation.
Initiatives such as Marceta's "Coalition for Return" were treated by the previous authorities as treacherous, subversive and almost illegal. That is how, along with all kinds of divisions of the Serbs, we got a new one - into "authentic" Serbs from RS (of a patriotic commitment) and "Alija's Serbs" who include those who have either remained in or have the intention to return to B&H Federation (of a "dubious" patriotic commitment). However, regardless of such treatment, Marceta's initiative has succeeded in ensuring legitimacy for itself, by the very fact that it has, for instance, won power in Drvar. Supporters of this and similar initiatives, faced with fantastic pressure of the authorities are, unfortunately, losing the feeling for RS being their homeland because it is depriving them of the fundamental right to choose their place where they want to live. Of course, the position of returnees to B&H Federation is not ideal, in fact, this part of the population is increasingly acquiring the feeling of being a specific ethnic and civil "refuse".
On the other hand, the Serbs who have remained during the war and after signing of the Dayton accords on the territory of the Federation, are also between the hammer and the anvil, satanized as both "Alija's Serbs" and "Radovan's Chetniks". President of the association called the Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs (DISS) Maksim Stanisic says that the Serbs in Sarajevo (according to data of the cantonal authorities there are about 28 thousand of them) feel utterly abandoned. So far nobody of the official agencies and institutions of RS showed interest in the conditions in which these people live. On the other hand, Sarajevo Serbs are faced with chronic lack of understanding of the federal authorities concerning their demands connected with assertion of their right to education, health insurance, information and other.
These facts have brought quite certainly to tumbling down of Republica Srpska even from the standpoint of ethnic cohesion and from the standpoint of political stability and preservation of attributes of sovereignty. That is why ignoring of this issue would lead the new government to unsolvable problems and inevitable paying of "old debts", that is, to multiplication of results of old mistakes.
The government of RS, its national assembly and all the other state agencies are, therefore, faced with four essential questions correct treatment of which will help RS readily begin but also complete the "year of return".
First, the new authorities must seriously and responsibly tackle the catastrophic conditions in which refugees in RS live. Collective centres must finally be closed down, and every refugee family must be given some kind of a roof over its head. Besides, an effort must permanently be made to improve general conditions of living and raising the standard of living both of the refugee population and the domicile population. Valid solutions in this sphere will contribute to reduction of social and political tensions, but also prevent the evident population drain (emigration to third countries).
Second, government of RS must urgently start a dialogue with the federal authorities, joint administration of B&H and the international community on initiation of the process of exchange, compensation and sale of abandoned property on the two sides of the inter-entity borders. It is needless to mention how this process would accelerate and stimulate the process of resolving the problem of refugees in B&H which is in the interest and aspiration of almost the entire world.
Third, the most painful, and one might say - the key question which will certainly cause deep and broad polemics, is defining of the attitude towards individual or in some way institutionalised initiatives for return of the Serb population to their homes on the territory of B&H Federation.
New authorities, to put is simply, must make a choice between support to these initiatives or opposition to them (which was customary so far). Either choice will have far-reaching consequences. Opposition and prevention of individual and collective return will cause further sale of property of the Serbs in B&H Federation, but also further demolition of ethnic, social and even political stability of RS. According to data received in the already mentioned association (DISS) in Sarajevo, almost every third Serb family which has left Sarajevo after Dayton is making inquiries about the possibilities of sale of their property, and many have already done it. Goran Kapor, vice-president of DISS says that the Serbs are selling their property for mere trifles, while on the other hand, Bosnian refugees who are at the moment living in the Federation do not even think about getting rid of their property in RS in this way. "Such a trend threatens the Serbs to be deprived of their property completely in a very short time, and make Bosnia & Herzegovina the property of the Bosniacs, if observed from the aspect of land register", warns Kapor.
On the other habd, possible support or stimulation of return of the Serbs to B&H Federation will be considered as treason by majority of the population, as a project of destruction of RS and adaptation to the international scenario of creation of two "multiethnic entities" in B&H. Such course of development, one could say, would destroy in an efficient way the still loose credibility of the new government and cause new political variances in Republica Srpska.
That is the reason why the cabinet of Milorad Dodik must find a very sensitive course of action which will mark an equal distance between the two, conditionally speaking "extreme variants". The principle of "reciprocity" established by the SDS must be eliminated from everyday use, which equally scared the domestic refugee population and irritated the international officials. It is, therefore, necessary to talk about specific projects of non-massive return keeping always in mind all the possible implications of such projects on ethnic, social and political stability of RS.
Goran Mihajlovic