Kosovo between the Right to Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity of the State

Dialogue of the Deaf

Leaders of Kosovo Albanians and the authorities in Serbia and FRY have so far mostly referred to "international norms" and "Helsinki principles", but interpreted these norms and these principles selectively and restrictively. They stressed everything that spoke in their favour, but ignored everything that was opposed to their political objectives and practice.

AIM Belgrade, 2 February, 1998

Talks about Kosovo were so far mostly single-ethnic talks of likely-minded persons. Very rarely internal Albanian talks were dialogues of persons who did not share the same opinion, and in the Serb case even more rarely. Exceptional Serb-Albanian talks were actually "dialogies of the deaf", or rather monolugues, and points of contact in the form of joint statements were so general that they could not at all become operational. This on the one hand points out to a low level of political culture of the intellectual and political elite in this space, and on the other hand, it additionally illuminates the proportions of complexity of the problem of Kosovo.

Such developments imply seeking a "common denominator", or a starting point for a forthcoming dialogue. In view of the fact that neither Kosovo Albanians nor the authorities in Serbia and FRY, nor the opposition, nor the intellectuals, are capable of inviting one another to sit down together and talk, least of all to lay down foundations for an effective dialogue - as a way out of the blind alley, a mediator's role of the "international community" seems to be a solution. Whether this preventive diplomacy will be silent, discreet as in the case of the Agreement on Education signed by Milosevic and Rugova, when the mediator was Saint Egidio, or public and open with someone else's participation - this is less important, the effects are much more important.

However persistently the authorities in Serbia may be repeating that the problem of Kosovo is the internal affair of Serbia and FRY, for a long time already it is not, in view of the fact that Kosovo is the topic on the agenda of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the European Parliament and even of parliaments of certain states. The latest aspect of internationalisation which this time the Serbian authorities are advocating is condemnation of terrorism in Kosovo.

The role of the international community could be constructive if it were based on agreement of both parties and with the necessary initiative of good will from both sides. This would practically imply the initiative of the Serbian party which would be based on the platform of a generally acceptable solution and actions of good will directed primarily towards elimination of repression and violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and enabling relevant international institutions within the OSCE (a standing mission, commissariat for ethnic minorities, office of democratic institutions and human rights) to offer good services, expert advice, supervise elections etc... Kosovo Albanians would, on the other hand, abandon the project of the independent state and join the political life of Serbia and FRY and, by a compromise, seek for modalities of a generally acceptable "internal self-determination".

Both the leaders of Kosovo Albanians and the authorities in Serbia and FRY so far mostly referred to "international norms" and "Helsinki principles", however, they interpreted these norms and principles selectively and restrictively. They stressed everything that could speak in their favour and neglected everything that was contrary to their political objectives and practice. For example, the right to self-determination, which leaders of Kosovo Albanians refer to, does not necessarily mean the right to an independent state. Similarly, in order to be able to rely on Helsinki principles, that is, primarily the principle of territorial integrity of the state, FRY must first completely comply to Helsinki norms and keep up the standards of the OSCE.

The essence is that Helsinki principles be applied integrally and not selectively, in other words, as a coherent package of rights and obligations. Helsinki principles, especially after 1989, were developed in the spirit of encouragement of development of democratic, civil states founded on universal human rights, and not nationalistic states in which rights are conditioned by ethnic origin. This is the way which should be taken in resolving the problem of Kosovo. Shameful exceptions should not be the obstacle, least of all an example to be followed.

Two Helsinki principles which are at the same time two universal principles of the international community - the principle of the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of a state - are the framework into which a compromise should be put.

Discussions about who is the holder of the right to self-determination, just nations or ethnic minorities as well, may lead to entrenching of positions and biased or extremist interpretation of the principle of the right to self-determination, rights and obligations of minority and majority nations... In the existing context it is more appropriate to discuss the content of self-determination acceptable for both parties, duties of the state and obligations of citizens, as well as the role of the international community.

Resolution of the problem of Kosovo should imply a compromise which would, on the one hand, enable Kosovo Albanians to achieve the right to self-determination, and on the other, not change borders and threaten the vital state interests of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia.

That is how two important, apparently contradictory principles of the international community would be met, but also demands of both opposed parties. The problem is that the right to self-determination is interpreted in a biased way by the Albanian leaders in Kosovo and it is simplified and reduced to the right to secession, and on the other hand, the problem of Kosovo was turned by the Serbian authorities into an instrument used in their struggle against political opponents.

According to the letter of international documents, the right to self-determination is not achieved at the expense of territorial integrity of a state. Change of borders can be introduced only by mutual agreement, and not at all against the will of interested parties, but primarily of the existing state concerned. The principle of self-determination should be interpreted in accordance with relevant norms of international law, especially goals and principles of the UN. UN Charter and relevant European documents encourage and support a multiracial, multiethnic and multinational, secular, undescriminating pluralist state which is founded on recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

Responsibility of governments to their own population has, through OSCE, become one of international standards, in other words, sovereignty of states has become an international issue when human rights are concerned. The concern for human rights has limited sovereignty of OSCE member states and enabled interest of an organization, group of its members or even certain countries not to be considered as meddling into internal affairs of a state. At the same time, internationalization of sovereignty reduced the need for a national state as protector of human rights, which the leaders of Kosovo Albanians insist on.

Sovereignty of a state has also become relative in respect to security. Insisting on secession against the will of Serbia by leaders of Kosovo Albanians, and repression applied by Serbian authorities, not only actually threaten stability and security in the region but are contrary to Helsinki principles and obligations and standards on which security for the 21st century projected by the OSCE is founded. Cooperative security is based on democracy, protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law, market economy and social justice (item 3 of the Declaration), and these are also the principles based on which resolution of the problem of Kosovo should be sought.

Democratic consolidation in Serbia could not be achieved in conditions of a crisis created, among other, due to outvoting of minorities (ethnic, political, religious, cultural, linguistic...) on the constitutional level. If the basic consensus does not exist within a political community and if the principle of majority is interpreted as an absolute principle, you have outvoting of minorities even in spheres which are vital for them, threatening their fundamental minority interests and turning formal democracy into "tyranny of the majority".

In Serbia, "democracy on paper" was achieved without the fundamental consensus of the main political protagonists and representatives of all segments of the society, although agreement on key political values is the basis of a legitimate political power in a democracy, and such democracy is established by everybody as the unquestioned political goal.

What remains to be done in order to change that is to improve the framework of written democracy and fill it with democratic content, that is, to make it legitimate by participation of the opposition and minorities on the constitutive and practical political level. On that road, Kosovo will be one of the most important stations.

Zoran Lutovac

(AIM)