SDS IN THE OPPOSITION

The Mystery of Peaceful Departure

AIM Banja Luka, 4 February, 1998

Connoisseurs of political circumstances in Republica Srpska are surprised by the unusually conciliatory behavior of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in the process of its passing over into the opposition. The fact that Klickovic still has not yet met Dodik and that they have not signed any protocol on takeover does not mean anything in comparison with the repertoire of "instruments" the SDS used before when someone, even if it were the Radicals, dared show their face in the institutions in which it had sovereignly ruled. There were no mass protests of the people, nor was there a hue and cry against Dodik and his cabinet in the media (like against Mladen Ivanic), there was no mobilization of reserve forces of the army, of the para-police forces (of the SDS), there was even no insisting on continuation of the second session of the National Assembly. Peaceful transition into the opposition was announced by former ministers who were the first to start taking out from the government building in Pale the "undesirable" documentation, and even carpets, television sets and video recorders. Milorad Skoko was seen passing with dignity by a SFOR tank with a video recorder under his arm and putting it in the trunk of his office car.

The fact that all SDS ministers have left Pale like some travelling salesmen is no reason for members of the new government to feel triumphant. The peaceful departure of the Serb "national lion" into the opposition should primarily cause caution and wondering how come it is giving up power so easily although it had fought so frantically to preserve it? In answering this question, one should not attribute everything to the fact that Dodik's government has been recognized and supported by all the leading countries of the west and international institutions, but also by the official Belgrade, nor to the fact that the day after the 2nd session of the parliament in Bijeljina, apart from the government building in Pale, the seat of the ministry of internal affairs was also blocked, as well as the office of Momcilo Krajisnik and of the Serb members of the council of ministers of B&H and even the streets of Pale. If, as officially announced in Pale, prime minister Milorad Dodik in a few days visits the by now former seat of the regime of RS, while he shakes hands with Klickovic (if the latter condescends to come from the cafe owned by Momcilo Mandic in Belgrade, even in his sweatsuit, or from Podgorica where he has started a privately-owned business enterprise), it should not be forgotten what means the SDS used in its struggle against the political block of Biljana Plavsic. At that time the "national lion" had already lost the Banja Luka studio of Serb Radio-Television (SRT) and a few police centres in the most densely populated municipalities in the west of RS, and then lost tv relays, and later on even the Pale studio of SRT. The refusal to budge a single step from the arrogance and former practice of absolute rule induced one of the former high government officials to declare the following: "We are doing our best to lose power". The examples of the appointment of an over-zealous official of the SDS, pre-war cameraman Mirko Cabrilo, known also as the Fifth Camera, director of TV studio in Banja Luka to "straighten things up", and beating up of a judge of the Constitutional Court, confirm the conclusion of the former government official. The of political strategy which can be defined as the struggle for defeat and not for victory, reached its climax in the inglorious march of about 10 thousand SDS supporters to Banja Luka on the eve of the local elections.

The ultimate result of such policy which the SDS was greatly concerned about and accused the opposed political block for it, was that mentioning of Pale made hair of the people in Bosnian Krajina stand on end, and vice versa, at the very mentioning of Banja Luka, people in the eastern part of RS shudderred. This result was confirmed by the local elections in which the coalition SDS-SRS won absolute majority in eastern municipalities of RS. Nowadays, even the most enthusiastic fans of the SDS who are, according to the opinion of leaders of this party, mostly concentrated on the territory around Serb Sarajevo, rightfully wonder who has divided RS.

In analogy to this "self-criticism", supporters of Dodik should also demand to know how far geographically and to what hierarchy level of the authorities, the new government of RS actually reaches. Why did, therefore, the SDS act to its detriment even at the cost of splitting the RS in two? Is the only reason because it strove to come out the moral winner who can say - we did everything possible to make RS independent as we had promised in the beginning of the war, but collaborationists in Banja Luka betrayed our cause (the mythical cliche from Serbian history of Tsar Lazar and Vuk Brankovic who betrayed him at the battle of Kosovo in 1389)? Is it because the leaders of the SDS have finally become aware of the fact that the international community is unwavering in its intention to implement even the spirit of the Dayton accords and not just keep to its letter, and that their strategy of postponing and obstructing everything that even reminds of reintegration of B&H has failed? Or, along with affirmative answers to the first two questions, has the Serb "national lion", after eight years in power, taken passing over into opposition as a necessary lull before its next appearance, and in fact already started the campaign for general elections in September?

The SDS does not begin the campaign for September '98 so poor as its is generally believed to be: all representatives in the joint authorities of B&H belong to it, it has at its disposal opportunistic behavior towards the government of RS in local authorities in place where it has won, and it controls local media. It also has the television station Kanal S, established in Pale on the eve of election of Dodik's government in Bijeljina, which, as it is announced, will cover the east of RS with its relays. And finally, it has the SRS with its 39 deputies in the parliament, although the coalition with the Radicals is effective only when Milosevic decides that Seselj is not too dangerous for him. The SDS will certainly also use as a weapon the fact that Dodik's government was elected with the help of the votes of Bosniac deputies.

There is also the fourth question: is the SDS nowadays really interested in winning executive power in RS and the assembly majority again, in view of the fact that the leaders of this party have passed over into the opposition more than excellently well off. Real estate in Pale (houses made of money allocated for "construction of Serb Sarajevo") and real estate in Serbia, "heavy" bank accounts, qualify the leaders of the SDS for future businessmen, who will according to the law of connected vessels, be interested in the success of Dodik's government at least as much as it itself will be. Indeed, as much as the cabinet of Milorad Dodik will be collecting international financial aid, buying social peace and establishing the rule of law, the wealthy leaders of the SDS will be just as interested in investing and legalizing their dirty money made in the war. Therefore, after September '98, we might get used to seeing Gojko Klickovic in his sweat-suit, phoning from his mobile phone in Bistrica Hotel in Jahorina, 49 per cent of shares of which he now owns, and organizing the stay of a group of tourists from Greece, or Momcilo Krajisnik, together with Boro Bosic and a team from B&H Federation, travelling to one of the Arab countries to negotiate a business deal for Energoinvest. In such a course of events, it would not be unthinkable if president of RS flies to her first official visit to Washington in a specially arranged airplane rented from the greatest private airline in the Serb lands owned by Jovan Tintor.

The lesson to be drawn from this line of thoughts is that the lion never sleeps.

Momcilo OSTOJIC