Two Years of Traditionalist Modernism in Greece's Human Rights Policy

AIM Athens, 28 January, 1998

Following decades of delay and after several denunciations by Greek and foreign Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as criticism by Prime Ministers, Ministers and European Deputies who did not dare go any further, on the 23 January 1998 the Greek Council of Ministers, despite warnings from vocal nationalists' circles and the reported opposition even of several ministers, decided unanimously to abolish Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code, with which since 1955 60,000 non-ethnic Greeks (mostly of Turkish ethnic identity) were stripped of their citizenship.

The abolition of Article 19, as was well clarified by Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization Minister Alekos Papadopoulos, will not have a retroactive effect, since, as he insisted "the loss of Greek citizenship for most of the 60,000 was done after their own request." But, anyone who visits Thrace, a Northern-Eastern region of Greece, with about 1/3 of the population identifying ethnically as Turks, will have little difficulty encountering those well known non-persons of this community who do not exist for the Greek state, and therefore are unable to enjoy any rights. In fact Greece is the only European state where a part of its population does not enjoy any legal and social protection. The government had recently acquiesced to issuing identity and travel documents to about 1,000 such stateless living in Greece, since it could no longer not implement the law and the relative 1954 UN Convention it had signed since 1975. But it left pending their case by saying that it will examine the possibility of individual restoration of citizenship for them. Certainly, though, most victims of this racist provision who now live abroad will remain, like the Turkish community of Greece in general, the scapegoats of the two states, whose fortunes depend on the state of their antagonistic relations.

The abolition of an article which discriminated between ethnic and non-ethnic Greeks should be seen as a landmark in Greek minority policy because it has an important symbolic value: that provision represented in fact the ultimate threat against minority people. Had it been abolished a few years ago it would have been heralded as a great progressive move. However, the fact that the recent government decision was received as something which the government was almost obliged to do after years of tergiversation is a characteristic expression of its difficulty to implement its modernist line. This government which must go beyond the limits of the political culture it inherited from its predecessors seems unable to provide itself with the necessary public support in order to realize its projects. The Prime Minister himself, Kostas Simitis, did not hesitate to admit during the Cabinet meeting which decided the abolition of Article 19, that this was "An important step which should have been made long time ago, a step entirely in accordance with our human rights policy." At the same time, both Ministers from the Foreign Affairs Ministry were quite ready to admit, long before its abolition, that Article 19 does not "allow the Muslim minority to integrate into Greek society" thus, giving "the opportunity to Turkish propaganda to exploit the minority" (G. Papandreou) and that it is "at odds with human rights."(Th. Pangalos) However, it took two full years in power for K. Simitis, heralded as the most modernist Prime Minister Greece has had since the restoration of democracy in 1974, to introduce a reform which will make this country meet the Western standards he claims to abide by in general and specifically in the field of human and minority rights. The extent to which this reform was the result of pressure coming from within and abroad can be seen in the absence of preparation of public opinion for this reform, an opinion which so far was educated and conditioned to view anything involving minorities in Greece with great suspicion.

Here is undoubtedly a democratic government whose good intentions no one wants to doubt. A democratic republic which is neither expected to act as a monarchy nor as a dictatorship in order to implement reforms. Its top officials appear to be aware that several principles in Greece, in particular concerning human and minority rights, are either badly applied or not applied at all. Nevertheless, whenever it proceeds with the necessary reforms in order to transform this state of things no media, no intellectuals and no other institutions, such as the educational system or the judiciary body, appear to be preparing society to recognize and respect the new rights. On the contrary, we are faced with the spectacle of top civil servants who are prepared to move ahead along with the demands of modernist and progressive reforms, while the middle and lower cadres, as well as institutions that inform and socialize public opinion, resist or are unprepared to welcome and support such reforms, if they do not undermine them sometimes. The question, therefore, is how serious is the government about its so called human rights policy when in fact it does not even try to communicate its intentions and prepare civil society whose support is a fundamental requisite for the general implementation of human rights reforms? One, therefore, is led to conclude that the modernist Simitis government in the name of instant popularity and votes limits and often sacrifices in practice its human rights policy because it does not dare confronting traditionalist political culture.

It was in fact after the mounting pressure from Greek and international NGOs and a small political party -the Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos)- that the Simitis government abolished Article 19. The belated such move gives therefore the impression that changes in human rights are introduced without authentically believing in them but, as Turkey does too, merely to have a good image abroad. This kind of recuperated by traditional forces modernism can also be observed in many other aspects of domestic politics, international relations in general and Greek-Turkish relations in particular, not to mention the Macedonian question.

How can anyone thus take seriously the Greek Minister of Press and Mass Media, D. Reppas, who after the abolition of Article 19, claimed that "Greece has attained a high standard with respect to the safeguarding of human rights and equality before the law," or some suggestions made by the Greek press, that, henceforth, is eliminated even the last reason for which Greece was faced with resolutions of international organizations condemning her? After all are we to believe that for this government a human and minority rights policy is limited to signing international conventions and ratifying documents, which are then not applied because it is not prepared to challenge the traditionalist political culture that is incompatible with the announced modernist and progressive human rights policy?

Let us only look at some examples of characteristic forthcoming trials, almost unknown to Greek public opinion, which expose Greece internationally and create the impression that there exists a totalitarian and obscurantist mentality. These are cases of people being persecuted for expressing or disseminating opinions which ought to be respected in any democracy regardless of whether they are or are not accurate or acceptable by the large majority of the population, the authorities or the official Church. On 19/2/1998, Eva Androutsopoulos will go on trial in Komotini for alleged "proselytism to Buddhism and to religious beliefs of the Orient:" she is not even a Buddhist herself. On 19/3/1998, Traianos Pasois, a "Rainbow" minority party leader, will go on trial in Florina for "disseminating false information," with wall calendars with Macedonian toponyms. On 24/3/1998, the European Court of Human Rights will hear the case of the refusal by the courts of the registration of the Shelter for Macedonian Culture. A unanimous decision of the European Commission recommends the conviction of Greece for the violation of article 11 of the European Human Rights Convention on freedom of association. On 15/9/1998, four "Rainbow" leaders are to be tried in Florina because in 1995 they put up a sign written also in its members mother tongue, Macedonian. Finally, the most extravagant case: Sotiris Bletsas, member of the Society for Aromanian (Vlach) Culture, awaits his trial because in 1995 he had allegedly distributed a publication of the European Union s Bureau for Lesser Used Languages which mentioned the minority languages in Greece. Things have reached such an absurd state that a diplomat in Athens was heard commenting ironically after the event: "When are they going to arrest the whole EU office?" After all it is the one which is indeed distributing these brochures. In all these cases, the Greek state itself or members of the country s elite (bishops, deputies, local party and professional association leaders) are witnesses for the prosecution.

These are not isolated cases, in fact they are only some examples of the trials for which is responsible a judiciary body in a democratic state which claims to abide by international conventions. Greece has signed a number of conventions for the protection of human and minority rights such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; freedom of expression and of the media; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; freedom from any form of discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious specificity. These kind of trials take place every year and Greece is quite often taken to the European Court for not respecting fundamental human and minority rights. When, however, these trials happen to be publicized by the Greek media they rarely provoke the criticism not to speak of outrage by the government, political parties or intellectuals for that matter. Here the judiciary body appears to ignore the conventions signed and/or ratified by the state and thus undermines this government s modernist and progressive human rights policy. If sincere, should not this government first and foremost inform and train the prosecuting and court authorities so that they respectfully apply those international documents instead of being influenced by extremist political and church circles?

It would be unfair nevertheless not to acknowledge the government s application of a surprisingly liberal law concerning the legalization of immigrants, which in fact goes well beyond what almost all other EU states have done. In spite of and against a very xenophobic public opinion, especially regarding Albanian immigrants, this government managed to even overcome its reservations concerning the latter, and provided the possibility for all immigrants in Greece to work under conditions of legality and corresponding equality. Of course this is only the beginning in a long process of providing the immigrants with all the necessary conditions of dignified life: education in Greek and in their mother language, social welfare, free associations, and progressive integration of Greek society under conditions of freedom and equality. And this process naturally involves Greek society s acceptance in viewing itself as a multiethnic society.

Unfortunately one cannot be at all optimistic concerning the situation of Roma in Greece in the last two years. This government announced then one of the most far reaching programs in Europe for the amelioration of the living conditions of the Roma people. However, it never took seriously this project and thus never implemented what it had promised. So thousands of Roma still live in the worst conditions one can find in Europe,

A modernist and progressive attitude on questions concerning human and minority rights in a democratic society should above all characterize the mass media and the intellectuals. Paradoxically, in Greece, although a democratic society with media enjoying unlimited freedoms and the freedom of opinion being completely respected even when it provokes the public sentiment, neither the media nor the intellectuals take a strong stand for the defense of human but particularly of minority rights. You don t find in Greece a great movement among intellectuals, academics, media people who take a strong stand against nationalist tendencies in political parties or public opinion in general. In contrast to the Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or Turkish media and intellectuals, in Greece there is no -even minority- vocal opposition to the authoritarian and intolerant practices of the state and sectors of society.

Kostas Simitis is considered to be the most if not the only modernist Prime Minister Greece had in the quarter century since the restoration of democracy. This is someone who, already in the 1970s, had suggested that a European orientation may not be inconsistent with PASOK s socialism and for that was expelled from the party s Executive Bureau. His election to the Prime Minister s post two years ago, nevertheless, did not so much reflect a change in the mood of public opinion or party opinion; it was rather a consequence of internal party politics which led to the victory of the modernist minority within a traditionalist patriotic PASOK. To be able to apply his philosophy, Simitis and his colleagues needed and still need to help reeducate public opinion so that they become more sensitive to and more respectful of the principles of a secular states based on the respect of individual and minority rights. Only then will Greek civil society be able to participate both in enhancing and in supporting modernization practically and in everyday life. Protection of rights is not a project which can be realized by merely signing conventions and formulating laws: "society cannot be changed by decrees" as French sociologist Michel Crozier once said. It is the responsibility of society in general to implement those reforms and often to do so it must be prepared to -often times thoroughly- challenge its own prejudices, misconceptions and untenable positions.

Panayote Dimitras and Nafsika Papanikolatos