NORMAL AND THEN SPECIAL RELATIONS

AIM Zagreb, 17 November, 1997

The leaders of Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic exchanged packages of proposals on mutual relations between the two countries. About ten days ago a draft contract on special relations between Croatia and B&H Federation was sent from Zagreb to Sarajevo. In the presidential palace they admit that this document implies "confederate relations without a formal confederation". There are, it seems, two reasons for skipping formal confederate relations. The international community firmly warned Zagreb that the Dayton accords eliminated the possibility of a confederation. But, even more important could be the fact that it would be necessary for the Croats to declare their will about creation of a confederation in a referendum. For somethiing like that Tudjman would not get support in Croatia, and for ratification of the contract on special relations all he needs is a parliamentary majority which he has at his disposal.

Tha draft contract sent from Zagreb to Sarajevo and certain international addresses, the following objectives of special relations - which would gradually be raised to a higher level - were listed: creation of a free trading zone, a customs tax union, joint market and finally monetary union. It also prescribed joint appearance of Croatia and the Federation on the foreign political level, primarily with European and other international integrations, then there is military cooperation including formation of a joint command in case of war, terrorist and other threats. The model conceived in Zagreb would enable domination of the Croats over the Bosniacs and practical jurisdiction of Croatia over the federal part of Bosnia & Herzegovina. For example, formation of a council for cooperation between Croatia and the Federation is proposed, as well as that of an advisory assembly, in both of which the ratio of the Croats and the Bosniacs would be three to one in favour of the Croats. Joint secretariat of the Council would be seated in Zagreb, and all the committees would be chaired by the Croats.

The proposal sent by Izetboegovic in a "personal letter" to Tudjman, objectives of special relations were not explicitly listed, as it was done in the Croatian document. But the formulation that good neighbourly relations between Croatia and the Federation, that is Bosnia & Herzegovina, should be developed "in accordance with sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" of the two countries contains the main difference from the Croatian proposal. Izetbegovic does not accept Tudjman's offer of confederate connections between the Federation and Croatia. In this context all the other similarities and differences should be observed. The stress in Izetbegovic's proposal is also on economic cooperation, but between two sovereign countries, and therefore a customs' or monetary union is not even mentioned. Like in the Croatian proposal, the chair of the council for cooperation between Croatia and the Federation would be given to Croatia, but the council would have two secretaries, one from Croatia and the other from the Federation. Of course, constitution of a parliament is not even mentioned.

In the agreement on good neighbourly relations between Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Izetbegovic proposes establishment of an inter-state council for cooperation. It would be engaged in strategic planning and coordination of cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, primarily in relation to European integrations, cooperation with the international community in reconstruction and development, and succession of former Yugoslavia. An inter-state council would be formed of the same number of members from Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, but the Bosnian members would reflect the ethnic composition of B&H. During the first year it would be chaired by the president of Croatia, and then by the first man of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic's proposal is not as ambitious as that of Tudjman; he agrees with the international community that Bosnian entities cannot establish relations with the neighbouring countries which would encroach the statehood of Bosnia & Herzegovina. He also agrees with the message of the Council of Europe that it wishes to receive in its membership united Bosnia & Herzegovina and not its parts. Croatia believes the opposite. It wants to drag the Federation along with it into European integrations, but it would leave Republica Srpska behind, probably to ride on coat-tails of Yugoslavia. Contrary to Izetbegovic who prefers an agreement on cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Tudjman lays stress on special relations with the Federation. These two data make it clear that the Croatian concept would increase centrifugal force in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

It is difficult to assess whether the proposal from Zagreb actually aimed at division of Bosnia & Herzegovina, that is at annexation of a part of that state, or whether it is just an attempt to buy time. The Croatian party has started to insist on special relations when it was pressured to finally agree to give up the free zone in the port of Ploce for the needs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Zagreb is now demanding that the talks about this arrangement be interrupted until the agreement on special relations is reached. The American ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith claims that negotiations on special relations must take place separately from the resolution for Ploce. Izetbegovic goes along these lines - he too demands that these negotiations be continued without delay.

With the document that it offered, Zagreb has objectively presented itself again as the advocate of division of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Tudjman's model can in fact have two outcomes; it leads either into dissolution of B&H or establishment of a new Yugo-community. This is also stressed by representatives of the international community. The Americans are especially explicit. Besides stressing that they will not allow division of Bosnia, they warn that linking Croatia to the Federation would ultimately result in inidirect connection of Croatia with the present Yugoslavia. Ambassador Galbraith literally says: "America does not wish a new Yugoslavia" and cynically suggests that the official Zagreb is actually pushing in that direction.

Tudjman's hangers-on resolutely deny this. Their argument is that Croatia wishes to establish special relations only with the Federation. In favour of this, they also point out the latest initiative of Croatian president to incorporate the ban of association of Croatia into any Yugoslav or Balkan state alliances into its Constitution. Although Zagreb rejects any arrangement which involves the Serb entity, the Croatian proposal on special relations with the Federation was also handed to Momcilo Krajisnik. This can be understood only as an attempt to stimulate him to support this Tudjman's concept when it is put on the agenda of the three-member B&H Presidency. The Zagreb draft contract on special relations, just like the attempt to win Krajisnik over to support it, implies the intention to divide Bosnia & Herzegovina.

After Zagreb and Sarajevo exchanged proposals, the tedious process of according them lays ahead now. If it depended on them alone, the result would as so many times before be very meagre. Although Croatian media which are close to the regime have at first sharply reacted to Izetbegovic's rejection of Tudjman's package, later they came down off their high horse. Perhaps this is an attempt to conceal the fact that the Croatian president has once more dicreditted himself on the international scene with his proposal, or it is a sign of growing awareness that by stirring up mistrust and animosity towards the Bosniacs it is impossible to win them over to agree to any kind of relations. In order to establish special relations it is necessary to establish normal relations first. Whether awareness of this has grown in the presidential palace too - remains to be seen.

JELENA LOVRIC