THE CRETE SUMMIT AND MACEDONIA - A SHORT-LIVED HISTORIC GLORY

AIM Skopje, November 9, 1997

The Summit of the Heads of State or Government of South-East European States on the Greek island of Crete was historic - while it lasted. Historical were also mini summits on the bilateral level, although they were held on the margins of the main meeting. Some of these meetings were also ascribed romantic attributes, as each encounter between the Balkan neighbours should represent something extraordinary, historical, although it is clear to everyone that meetings of this kind should have become a matter of routine a long time ago. Especially in Europe and especially now.

No sooner than it was over, and the analysis wherefrom to draw a negative conclusion on the results of the Crete meeting finished, than the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, among the first if not the first, "cooled the things down" and warned that the historic character of the Crete Summit should not be so much insisted on. Expressing his reservation as to the historic nature of the meeting, Gligorov said that things should be kept under control since the results have yet to be seen. According to the Macedonian President, the important thing was that the conclusion was reached on the necessity of cooperation and that the Balkan leaders proved capable of conducting dialogue on controversial issues on their own, without mediators.

Thus restricted, practically forced to move in a rather small area, the local observers, especially those close to or in the service of the authorities, tried to base the importance of the Summit on the fact that it was held after all and that it dealt with something. It has to be admitted that this is not much of an argument in favour of first estimates that events on Crete will turn the wheel of history in this part of Europe. Nevertheless, probably imprecisely briefed, the euphoric, pro-regime and state-owned daily "Nova Makedonija", in its two-column editorial claimed that the Balkans have disappeared on Crete!

Serious analysts would find it hard to agree with this the more so as Gligorov's warning about the overpraising of the Crete Summit was interpreted as an attempt to prepare the public in advance not to expect anything spectacular, even less anything new. The analysts, especially those close to the opposition, also fear the possibility that something that could put Macedonia at an even greater disadvantage both in the Balkans and Europe, had happened or, what is worse, had been agreed at parallel bilateral summits held on Crete.

On the contrary, albeit reservedly and in fear of being once again reprimanded for partiality, the opposition analysts nevertheless warn that, being the most competent person to do so, on several occasions before the Crete meeting President Gligorov disastrously relativized some basic, fundamental points of the Macedonian strategic position. They claimed that it was impermissibly irresponsible of him to have gone to Crete without a platform which only intensified fears that at secret "historic" meetings negotiations proceeded, just like before, without any direction or responsibility. They say that that is the reason for his subsequent restrained attitude.

It is true that at the domestic "summit" with the opposition party leaders Gligorov received general support which he used on Crete. However, the main shortcoming of the summit he had at home, as well as of that on Crete, was that none of the participants either had or even tried to offer something, nor had a mandate to accept a platform of any kind. The Crete Summit was brought to a conclusion without a Resolution or a binding agreement, except for the statement teeming with general observations regarding international relations. A minimum of text was adopted which is not particularly binding on anyone and which could ultimately be applicable to Rwanda and Burundi.

Four major issues in the sphere of Macedonian relations with its neighbours, which treat them as issues of vital national interest, figure as a problem. These are: the undefined borders - with FR Yugoslavia; language problems - with Bulgaria; autonomy of the Albanians in Western Macedonia - with Albania; and the name of the Republic of Macedonia - with Greece. Several months before the Crete meeting with his colleagues from the neighbourhood Gligorov relativized all these issues.

In Poland President Gligorov treated the problem of Macedonia's name as relative in two ways: first by agreeing after all to pay a visit to Warsaw and not to sign state protocols since Poland had "problems with the name". Namely, according to the Poles they did not want to risk displeasing Greece since they were just about to join the EU. Alexander Kwasniewsky sent a clear message to Gligorov that agreements with Macedonia could be signed only with the name FYROM, under which this state is known in the UN, and especially in the EU. Finally, as Kwasniewsky said to Gligorov, Macedonia itself had accepted that name.

Faced with this choice Gligorov tried to absorb the shock and readily and quite irresponsibly answered that the Macedonian people "chose the name of its state at a referendum" and after that wrote it down in the Constitution. He had, thereby, actually definitely relativized the name of the state and, what is most important, the solution of the dispute with Greece. It is no longer a secret that in its communications with the world Macedonia has to abide by the rules imposed by Athene's ultimatum, which the EU has accepted to be in the Greek national interest. Namely, it has to accept the term FYROM in international political and other communications.

By stating that the name of Macedonia was chosen at a referendum and written down in the Republic's Constitution, Gligorov treated the entire dispute with Greece as a matter of agreement. Also, if the name of the Republic was chosen arbitrarily, by a political decision, it means that it can be changed in the same way.

This caused much excitement among the public which tried to absorb the shock. In vain. By wounding himself in the leg, Gligorov set out for Crete to a "historic" meeting with Costas Simitis, the first high-level meeting between Macedonia and Greece. And the meeting occurred.

As soon as it was over it ceased to be historic. What is more, one of the participants, Gligorov, hastened to deny it its historic glory claiming that it was necessary to see the results first. There was nothing else he could do.

Apart from having met, Gligorov and Simitis had nothing more specific to show as a result of that meeting. Apart from the the Greeks taking advantage of this opportunity to mention that negotiations regarding the name would continue and the Macedonians to reiterate their relentlessness. Very little to be historically important, substantially significant.

By relativizing the name, Gligorov was caught in his own trap and weakened Macedonia's position as regards its current dispute with Bulgaria, which is denying the existence of the Macedonian language.

Some two months ago the Macedonian President stated that "the process of de-Bulgarisation was over". Naturally, this one in the series of blunders did not pass without public criticism. As usual, in vain.

But, if the "conclusion of de-Bulgarisation" is put into the context of Gligorov's statement that his state acquired its name at the 1991 referendum, then the Bulgarians can rightfully claim that Macedonia was Bulgarian up to that time.

The public here rightfully condemned Gligorov for making such blunders in his public statements even to the extent that some maliciously commented that such moves of the President "represent the greatest contribution to the Bulgarian cause on the Balkans".

Namely, ever since Macedonia disassociated itself from the SFRY, Bulgaria is persistently attempting to win recognition for its thesis that Macedonia and Bulgaria are two states of one and the same nation. Just like Germany and Austria. Or, in order to avoid any dilemma, the example of Romania and Moldova is being increasingly forwarded as of late. Moldova has been accepted as an example of the Comintern's nation-building attempts and is now established in the international community as just another state of the Romanian nation. Since the Bulgarian historiography persistently claimed and has recently intensified claims that Macedonia is also a creation of the world communist organization, a parallel is drawn as well as a typically syllogistic conclusion that the analogy is also applicable to the case of Bulgaria and Macedonia. The conclusion that this is also a case of two states of one and the same nation artificially created by the Comintern which will in time conditions permitting be rectified by their natural unification.

This thesis is best defended by the establishment of identicalness of languages which is why the official Bulgaria persistently maintains that there is no Macedonian language. Same as with Poland, a whole package of agreements on cooperation with Bulgaria are waiting to be signed. This time on account of language which does not exist in a state which Bulgaria was among the first to recognize under the name Macedonia.

Consequently, somewhat less "historic" Gligorov's meeting with the Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov also did not produce any tangible results. The language dispute remains and in the name of peace on the Balkans is indefinitely postponed, just like all other disputes.

Nothing less spectacular and "historic", both in the eyes of state propaganda and as regards the lack of results, was Gligorov's meeting with the Albanian Prime Minister, Fatos Nano. Truth to tell, the Albanian Prime Minister agreed to, at least publicly, an ostensible concession in the current Albanian policy towards Macedonia. It was reflected in the first place in a declarative withdrawal of support to non-institutional methods ethnic Albanian parties resort to in the political life of Macedonia. He promised his support to Gligorov in the resolution of the problem of higher education of Albanians in Macedonia.

As it was announced, he supported the Macedonian policy on the education of Albanian teaching staff at the Teacher's Training College in Skopje. It is no secret that the education of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia in their mother tongue is nothing else but a way of manipulative realization of the strategy of radical Albanians in the Balkans aimed at gaining the status of a condominium, nation-building people. The idea is to legalize the bilingualism of Macedonia through the problem of education. Such bilingualism is an introduction in the creation of a state of the Macedonian nation and a state of the Albanian nation, in other words, a second Albanian state in the Balkans. Just like with Bulgaria, Macedonia should this time be a second state of the Albanian nation - two states of one nation.

The independent Albanian intellectuals are against such manipulation of the public and insist on the improvement of the quality of overall education.

With the concession he has granted Gligorov Fatos Nano tried to get closer to moderate Albanian parties and intellectuals, but President Rexhep Mejdani did not miss the chance to practically fit this concession of the Albanian Prime Minister into the framework of Macedonia as a civil state. This convinced some analysts on the right wing that they have the same objective in mind, but that Nano's tactical version is more pragmatic.

It is a question what mandate Fatos Nano has, as well as what he had promised Gligorov during their meeting? It is feared that moderate Albanian politicians in Macedonia, especially the coalition partner in the Government - the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) - might demand the introduction of parallel instruction in the Albanian language at the Skopje University "St. Cyril and Methodius" which will not be to the liking of the Macedonian national forces in this institution of high learning and of the public.

The circle of Macedonian problems with its neighbours closes with the issue of its border with Yugoslavia which has taken too long to define and is far from being finally settled. This problem is open and its intensity varies depending on the needs of FRY and Milosevic. Although clear, the borders have not yet been defined but rather relativized, same as other problems, because of the impotence of Kiro Gligorov's regime. It seems that from the very beginning the objective of the present ruling elite was not to define the state in such precise terms that would require it to have a border on the north. Finally, Macedonia was the last to disassociate itself from the SFRY, at the time when it not longer existed. The Gligorov-Milosevic meeting, just like all other mini "summits" of a limited and short-lived historic character, produced nothing tangible. Simply, this opportunity was used to confirm once again that there are some open issues in relations with Macedonia. Same as with other Gligorov's collocutors.

In the name of the dialogue Macedonia agreed to discuss all vital issues at the Crete Summit. Thereby it opened up all controversies, but unfortunately, failed to resolve a single one.

For Macedonia the Crete Summit was the crown of relativization, as it was the only country willing to talk with everyone about problems which are actually caused by these same neighbours, but it failed to open up any issue which is of importance for its interests. Such as, for example, the guaranteeing of borders, rights of its minorities in those same neighbouring countries and finally, the establishment of cooperation based on principles of mutual recognition but on lasting basis, and not with Macedonia as a provisional state that appeared with the disintegration of the SFRY - "an entity created by the political will of others and inhabited with the minorities of its neighbours".

Such an outcome on Crete was obvious. It will be measured on the global Balkan level, not on the bilateral, despite all "historic" meetings which unfortunately produced nothing but kind words.

AIM Skopje

SLOBODAN CASULE