IMPLEMENTATION OR PROTECTORATE

Two Months After the Elections

AIM Sarajevo, 10 November, 1997

It was probably the English diplomat Owen who was the first to note that no politicians in the world lie as they do around here. They will readily sign anything, but the very next morning break everything signed. That this is true is evident whenever something should be implemented. The turn has come for implementation of the municipal election results that took place in September this year. Two months have passed since the elections, but the authorities in municipalities have not been constituted yet. Of course, this does not refer to municipalities where there are no problems, where the elections were not needed at all. When speaking about implementation, nobody refers to municipality of Grude populated only by the Croats and the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ), nor Sokolac where there are only the Serbs and the Serb Democratic Community (SDS), or Celic where only the Bosniacs live and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). The elections were not at all organized because of these municipalities.

The key problems of the elections in B&H are evident in places where the Dayton accords were seriously tested, in places where they were seriously questioned or at least where ethnic cleansing could have been seriously questioned and where a possibility existed to nullify the results of the war, therefore eliminate consequences of the war at least in the political sphere. The most typical such places are Brcko, Banja Luka, Mostar, Srebrenica, Velika Kladusa, and regions of Posavina once with the Croat majority, municipalities with the Serb majority in the present canton number ten (Drvar, Glamoc and Grahovo), Herzegovina municipalities in which the Bosniacs would like to achieve the prewar situation (Stolac and Capljina) or the municipalities in the river Drina region which are also significant for the Bosniacs, and the central Bosnian region important for the Croats. Judging by the still powerful propaganda, it appears that the Serbs do not wish to return to large cities in the Federation.

The election results have reflected just slight changes which are known to the public. The influence of the international community is also evident. Now, when this small step should be taken, it turned out that all the three parties are obstructing the implementation, as always, and according to the well-established rule, by accusing the other one or the other two parties, although all three had promised on the eve of the elections that they would carry out the results. These elections and putting their results into effect in the political reality is a test for all the three parties, for the international community and not at all less for the people themselves who are increasingly leaving, but gradually also in the elections, by voting, manifesting what they do not intend to do. But let us start from the people. In Sarajevo, for instance, among the refugees, one can hear that they have no intention to return to Srebrenica or Rogatica, but why should they when they have been day-dreaming for years about the ways to get to Sarajevo. It is better to be safely in somebody else's apartment, than in the uncertainty of Srebrenica, Rogatica or Visegrad. Political leaders know that and are using the time of "their" respective peoples who are either leaving to the third countries or are like, transplanted plants, adapting to the new ground. The international community is also counting on the effect of time, and by these elections and perhaps new ones, wishes to shirk responsibility for what happened in Srebrenica, Brcko and similar places.

And while Serb political leaders are manifesting the least willingness for cooperation in implementation of results, they are even openly saying that they are against "their" people returning to the Federation or against anyone coming to them, the Croat political leadership is somewhat mellowed by the latest journey to the Hague. Heads of the SDA are finespoken and all in favour of return, but they have neither passed the law which would actually enable people to return to their apartments nor are they, for example, ready to give up power in places where they lost in the elections. However, they demand from the others what they themselves are not ready to do and show that they are exactly the same as the former and the latter, but are just in a worse position and cannot afford to be against either in the Croat or the Serb way.

Brcko which was constantly mentioned as the key to B&H, that is both the Federation and RS, seems to have definitely ended up in Farrand's hands, because he recently threatened that his words and competence exceed all interpretations of the Serb party. It is possible that he will implement election results to the last detail, and even constitute multiethnic administration according to the prewar composition of the population, as he had promised. Mostar, about which the Bosniac party has always claimed to be the key of the Federation, is in a specific stalemate situation because over there, regardless of who over there wins and with what results, the power will for a long time to come be shared only by the SDA and the HDZ, or equality of the people will be effectuated.

By making a big fuss about Mostar, the Bosniac party was concealing other usurpations such as for example the ones in Vares, Bugojno, Travnik. Now the HDZ is paying it back by saying that Travnik is the key to the Federation. Implementation is also obstructed by murders which are repeatedly occurring in Travnik and its surroundings. Mostar with its stalemate position is following Vares where the HDZ and the SDA received the same number of votes, that is, seats in the municipal parliament. It will probably not be difficult to implement election results over there either. It is interesting how the SDA will constitute the authorities in Srebrenica, and the Party for Drvar in Drvar, or Abdic's Democratic National Community (DNZ) in Velika Kladusa. These three places probably are the real key to B&H.

In Prijedor, the Serb authorities have at the very beginning squeezed out Bosniac representatives from the Coalition for United and Democratic B&H. And although this coalition has won 37 per cent of the seats in the parliament, it demanded only 22 to 25 per cent. The Serb authorities there are offering them ten per cent, but at the inauguration of the authorities the old Serb anthem "God have Mercy" is played after which the Bosniac representatives leave the hall. The other complaint is that B&H is not even mentioned in the text of the solemn oath of allegiance. However, This is an improvement in comparison with last time when the Muslims had to pledge allegiance on the Bible or leave the building. Prijedor is the black hole of RS!

In this phase, the HDZ is manifesting benevolence concerning constitution of majority Serb authorities in Drvar, and in Glamoc they are offering the post of the vice chairman to the HDZ which won only one mandate over there! But this is all still on the verbal level, and it remains to be seen whether this is the result of some new Serb-Croat agreement, since the Croats have also won just a few votes in Posavina where they had counted on the possibility to return. Has the international community helped them to reach an agreement there too, like in Dayton, when the USA did not allow any discussion about Posavina, since Tudjman and Milosevic had already agreed about it.

The Bosniac-Muslim conflict is another story. And it is no mistake! Because Izetbegovic's SDA talks about its people being Bosniac, and Abdic's DNZ about its being Muslim. Izetbegovic's authorities control Kladusa, while Abdic's, according to the elections results should do it. The daily SDA Dnevni Avaz of 6 November reports that the SDA will not hand over power to the DNZ until a clear evaluation about Abdic arrives from the Hague, in other words until Croatia extradites him. Although the SDA claims that they do not mind DNZ deputies, but their "ideologist", it is not clear why the authorities should not be constituted when power in absolute majority was won by this party. After all, the DNZ is a parliamentary party, legal and legitimate, and that is what it had been before the elections. Why not recognize its victory now, and demand that authorities be constituted in Srebrenica? They could equally say that they have nothing against deputies of the SDS, but they do against their ideologist, and that this is the reason why the authorities in Srebrenica will not be constituted. It is interesting that this is claimed by the party which unanimously elected Ostojic to the commission for human rights. As increased pressure exerted on this party, this has begun from the moment its deputy in the parliament of the Federation, Djedovic, was arrested and investigation launched against him and charges raised for everything they would gladly blame on Abdic himself. It is interesting that for example Izetbegovic is sitting at the table in the Presidency with Krajisnik, while deputies of the DNZ have no right to exercise their election right.

After pressure exerted on Croatia, the HDZ has softened, then there are also dismissals in Herzegovina. The SDS is seriously shaken up and will probably be forced to obey. New pressure will start against the SDA by the arrests of some persons and their extradition to the Hague, revelation of financial abuses and probably because of Kladusa which Izetbegovic will not be able to avoid, like the pressure which is exerted now because of the law on housing units which is contrary to the demand of the High Representative's Office.

The international community is in no hurry, although Westendorp listed implementation among the eighteen obligations of the authorities in B&H. But since elections in RS have been scheduled, it can easily happen that elections will follow one after another before results of the previous ones are implemented. And implementation is just a precondition for the beginning of operation of any kind. And the way things operate in B&H is clear from the example of the parliament of B&H, of RS and the Federation. That is how B&H is becoming a country of permanent elections which seem to be less and less obliging for anyone. Westendorp and the international community seem to be finally aware of this, and with their eighteen ultimatums most of which are linked to the dates and obligations from Sintra (implementation of everything agreed there had been either postponed or obstructed), they are probably starting on an offensive after which Westendorp's mandate and that of IPTF will be reinforced, and the role of the military be reduced since the military parts of the Dayton accords have mostly been effectuated. It seems that it will be easier for the international community to implement a protectorate in B&H, however hard it may have wished to avoid that name and meaning of the word, than to force the political protagonists in B&H to implement the agreed. Ferrand seems to be the destiny not only of Brcko, but of whole of B&H. And what can Westendorp or Klein do will soon be seen, or more precisely, leaders of the SDA, the HDZ and the SDS will see.

Zeljko IVANKOVIC

(AIM, Sarajevo)