TO ACCEPT OR TO DISAPPEAR

RS in "Equip and Train"

AIM Banja Luka, 6 November, 1997

Between Scylla and Charybdis the Dayton accords are going through, two things are certainly the worst. The first are parties in power which are still successfully obstructing their implementation, despite all the efforts of the West. And the second is the lack of confidence among the constituting nations (the Bosniacs, the Serbs and the Croats).

Such a situation is primarily generated by historic heritage and consequences of the past war. However, generators of mistrust are also certian factors of a later date, which appeared after the end of the war. One of them is the controversial operation "Eqip and Train" implemented by the USA and the NATO for quite some time already in the B&H Federation. It caused much fear and suspicion in the Republic of Srpska towards not only the B&H Federation but also towards the USA.

The operation was conceived as the basis for establishment of the balance of military power on the entire territory of Bosnia & Herzegovina. There is plenty of criticism, doubts and polemics about the nature of the operation in the USA themselves. Countries of Western Europe, with the exception of Germany, are almost unanimous in rejection of the operation believing it to be "sowing of the seed of a new war". All the controversies are the outcome of a few basic dilemmas: what is the nature of the balance to be achieved, when will the classic military balance be achieved by this operation, how is it possible to make the character of this operation defensive when it is an established fact that there can be no defensive without an offensive and vice versa, how is it possible to arm an army with defensive weapons only, when every defensive weapon is at the same time offensive? How realistic are guesses of Mr. J. Perdew (special US envoy for military issues on the territory of former Yugoslavia) stated on Worldnet that the army of B&H Federation will not use its increased power against the RS?

Regardless of all these questions, one should be quite certain that once the USA have decided to carry out this operation in B&H, they will certainly do it. That is the reason why to occupy oneself with these and similar controversies about it in RS is quite futile. Something else is much more important. The USA have recently offered RS to join the operation "Eqip and Train". Does RS need such an operation? Can this entity meet the requirements? And finally, what would this mean for the USA and RS, and therefrom for the post-Dayton B&H?

There is no doubt that answers to these questions (doubts) are primarily determined by the general situation in RS and its army. The entity is shaken up by a political and constitutional crisis lasting ever since 3 July this year. Regardless of whether anyone wishes to admit it or not, RS is divided into its western and its eastern part. The entity is ruled by two centres of power, or more precisely by anarchy. The army is also divided, so there is nothing left to divide. The General Staff, the 5th and the 7th corps, back the Serb Democratic Party-SDS (Pale), and the 1st and the 3rd corps and the air force support the President of the Republic who is at the same time the commander-in-chief of the army of RS. That is the reason why the 5th and the 7th corps have not participated at Autumn '97 drill in Manjaca on 8 October. The economy of RS is half-dead, and the general situation in the entity is additionally aggravated by masses of unprovided for refugees. Due to obstruction of the Dayton accords by the SDS, RS is almost completely deprived of economic aid by the international community. This has put RS into a profound political and diplomatic isolation. From the military and political aspect this makes RS ideal - for aggression.

The army of RS has been reduced to the capacity of the existing military barracks and practically disarmed, so that it is not a military force in the true sense of the word. The system of command is threatened not only by the current crisis, but also by the inadequate military qualifications of the General Staff.

The army of RS had started and ended the past war with means of war equipment and armament of the former Yugoslav people's army (JNA). Except for M-84 tanks, war equipment is old-fashioned and dilapidated. The difficult economic position of RS has affected its army. There is no purchasing of war equipment, and even provision of fuel, lubricants and spare parts has become a problem, as well as repair of combatant and non-combatant vehicles. It is obvious that the army of RS badly needs modernization of its war equipment and armament, except for M-84 and T-55 tanks, which can successfully resist Abrams and M-60A3 tanks of the army of B&H Federation. There is no military science in the army of RS (with the exception of a few individuals). Preparations and execution of combat action, as well as training and drill of soldiers, units, commands and staffs are still carried out according to the rules, instructions and textbooks of the former JNA.

With such a general situation in RS and its army, it is completely absurd to even consider the need for the operation "Equip and Train". If the swift development of the army of B&H which would ersult after completion of the named operation is added to all this, all doubts should disappear. If RS is not involved in the said operation as soon as possible, in a year at the most, its army will become profoundly inferior to the army of B&H Federation.

According to the words of Mr. Perdew, conditions for the involvement of RS in this operation are return of refugees, freedom of moovement and democratization of media. All these requirements have not been fully met by the Federation either and it has still become part of this operation. However, the process of democratization will, after the western part of RS, certainly expand all over the entity. When that happens, RS will not be far from meeting these conditions.

The recent offer Jacques Klein made to President Plavsic for involvement of RS in the operation "Equip and Train" was one of the best military and political moves of the USA since their arrival to this territory. Both the USA and RS would obrtain much by it. Controversies started by this operation in the USA would end. It would also eliminate the main pretext of the opponents of the Dayton accords who are presenting this operation as an obvious example of double criteria applied by the USA in this part of the world. The entire market of B&H would be opened to military industries of the USA. Quite certainly, RS would become more trusting and more cooperative in relation to the USA and the NATO. Tensions in this space which were the cause for the operation "Equip and Train" would greatly be relieved. And in the end, initial conditions would be created for formation of a joint army ob B&H in a foreseeable future.

Apart from modernization, involvement of RS in this operation would procure a series of conveniences for it. The army of RS would ensure for itself in this way a higher quality development than it could have reached on its own in the next five or ten years. The supporters of the militant option in B&H Federation would change their attitude towards a possible aggression against RS. In such conditions, the general relation of military power in B&H, which is at the moment 2:1 in favour of the Federation, would cease to be so unfavourable for RS as it is now.

The operation "Equip and Train" in RS is the best way for attaining lasting, firm and stable peace in B&H. This offer of the USA should be accepted without hesitation and further manoeuvring. Along with the Dayton accords, this would be another warranty of survival of RS. That is the reason why no attention should be paid to the exteremely negative reactions of the dying SDS to this offer. RS will either survive or disappear. There is no third possibility. The road to survival leads through implementation of the Dayton accords and joining the operation "Equip and Train".

Dragan D. Marcetic

(the author is a master of military science)