RESURRECTION OF THE CONFEDERATION

AIM Zagreb, 27 October, 1997

"The Croatian leadership is preparing a contract which would mark the return to the Washington agreement and prepare the confederation of Croatia with the B&H Federation. We shall see how the other party will react". This was stated by the just recovering from a serious illness Croatian minister of defence Gojko Susak. Foreign minister Mate Granic immediately backed him by suggesting that Zagreb had the support of America for this policy. "It is not pure chance that President Clinton underlined the importance of the Washington agreement in his letter to the Council of Europe", said Granic claiming that without that agreement it was impossible to implement the Dayton peace accords. Minister Granic surely knows that the American president has mentioned the document from Washington for strictly formal reasons, but he needed this forced argument to corroborate Tudjman's (not Clinton's) sudden reversion to the Washington agreement.

In fact, for revival of the idea about the confederation of Croatia and B&H Federation - which was negotiated almost four years ago but has been abandoned by the later peace agreements - the Croatian leadership got support from noone. Majority of the Croatian opposition rejected the intention. In Sarajevo it was met with hostility. Allegedly unfavourable signals arrived from the international community as well. The official Zagreb then lowered its sights. Instead of confederate, it increasingly spoke about special links. This formulation, though with no detailed explanation, is included in the Dayton accords. Until the Croatian proposal is made public, and this should happen very soon, it is not clear whether this is just a masked substitution of terms or changed comprehension of the contents of mutual relations. Minister of the economy Nenad Porges says that they are relations "a storey lower than the confederate". "This is not a case of a classical confederate agreements, but of arrangement of special relations, with the stress on economic relations", says Porges. The model of Benelux is usually mentioned as the model. It is also mentioned that free flow of people and goods would be connected with working permits.

Three reasons can be discerned for the sudden resurrection of the idea of the confederation. The first is to parry to the Bosniac demand and the American proposal that use of the port of Ploce for the needs of Bosnia & Herzegovina be resolved as prescribed by the Washington agreement. The same agreement also prescribes the possibility of establishing confederate relations. Zagreb believes that the agreement cannot be implemented selectively, that everything in it must be either accepted or rejected. That is why the Croatian party introduced in the talks about the port of Ploce establishment of "special relations" between Croatia and the Federation as an imperative. In fact, renting of the free zone in Ploce is conditioned by the agreement on special relations.

Second, revival of the idea of the confederation is an attempt to pacify resistance in Herzegovina. The radical faction over there has suffered several blows lately. First, allegedly voluntarily ten Croats from central Bosnia gave themselves up to the Hague Tribunal, and then Tudjman had to replace a few of the local "hawks", headed by Mijo Brajkovic. The Croatian president is trying to wrap these painful concessions in an acceptable form which sometimes acquires grotesque shapes. For instance, he said that the indicted were extradited to the Hague tribunal for humane reasons, because they had "lived like hunted beasts". He arranged for Vladimir Soljic, as president of the Federation, to nominate Brajkovic his advisor for cooperation between the Federation and Croatia, so he can continue to stop by the presidential palace. But that everything is in a turmoil in Herzegovina becomes clear from Brajkovic's statement that "something radical will have to be done some day", that "a limit must be set somewhere". Just as he has done so many times before, by offering promises which later turned out to be unfounded, Tudjman is now pacifying those who would like to do something radical.

The third reason for revival of the idea on the confederation is discussed the most. Croatian opposition and Sarajevo believe this initiative to be a new trick conceived to achieve the old intention to divide Bosnia & Herzegovina. If the Federation were linked to Croatia, the Republic of Srpska would be connected to Yugoslavia in the same way. Zagreb does not deny this, after all, the presidential palace has claimed for a long time that creation of Little Greater Serbia was inevitable. A secret document made public by weekly Globus also speaks in favour of the interpretation that confederation is just a new screen for Tudjman's fixed idea about division of Bosnia. This document is a strategic analysis of interests of Croatia in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Globus quotes its anonymous source from the Croatian government who claims that this document greatly coincides with state policy.

The analysis starts from the conviction that Bosnia & Herzegovina as a united state will not survive, so it is suggested that Croatia take measures in order to protect its state interests in this sphere. The territory of the neighbouring state is divided into three, for Zagreb different, spheres of interest. The bordering regions in southern and western Bosnia & Herzegovina, being the hinterland of the Adriatic coast, are marked as the zone of state survival. Central Bosnia with the eastern border along the line Vukovar-Dubrovnik, is less important for Croatia, its interests over there are mostly economic; Zagreb does not consider the eastern part of Bosnia its sphere of interest.

"Croatia must find new methods to ensure its clear and legitimate strategic interests", the analysis says and proposes three possibilities for protection of the zone of state survival. The first is its full demilitarization, but leaving the right to Croatia to intervene if a conflict arises in this zone. The second possibility is establishment of bases of the Croatia army in places of strategic significance, Bihac, Kupres, Prozor ans Stolac. The third possibility is purchase of the entire zone along the southern and western border with Croatia. The document confesses that current generations do not know of trade in territories, but it reminds of its rich tradition.

The new proposal of Croatian policy towards Bosnia & Herzegovina does not suggest annexation of Herzegovina, so in this sense it is a step forward. But it shows that territorial aspirations to parts of the neighbouring country are still lively and kicking. Resurrection of the idea on the confederation fits in the context of such strategic plans. In fact, one could say that Croatia has started buying Herzegovina a long time ago. During all this time it has financed Herzeg-Bosna. It is an established fact that during the war Croatia sent three million German marks every day. The expenses have not diminished much to this day. After all, it is not a coincidence that Vladimir Soljic, commenting on resurrection of the confederate idea, felt the urge to say that "the needs of the inhabitants of B&H are so great that cooperation with Croatia is indispensable".

JELENA LOVRIC