WHOM DID THE KOSOVO SERBS VOTE FOR
AIM JUNIOR
AIM Pristina, October 28, 1997
In recent years the SPS had a stable and indisputable majority in Kosovo which it ensured by fulfilling the necessary conditions demanded by the local electorate, i.e. personal and proprietary security of each individual. The basic precondition is securing a minimum subsistence level, together with the impression that the authorities are truly Serbian. Naturally, there is also a tacit precondition that any step in the other direction in a form of a compromise or any agreement with the Albanian side, is undesirable.
Namely, since the end of World War II till 1968 cadres from Belgrade and Montenegro dominated in these regions using it only as a stop on their way to higher levels. They did not show any particular interest in resolving problems, not even those of the Serbian population. From 1968 to 1989 the Kosovo Albanians had the main say in the highest structures of power. Only with the arrival of Slobodan Milosevic have representatives of the local Serbian population taken over practically all the power.
Apart from personal and proprietary security, an average voter from around Pristina now has a road leading to his village, a health center, a phone line and a job in the town. Typical problems of the electorate of Serbia bothered the voters here too, but no other either political or economic issue could have jeopardized the supreme importance of conditions necessary and sufficient for the survival of the Serbian population in these areas.
That is why Socialist for years pointed to Kosovo and Metohija as an example of the success of their politics. As a rule, the electoral campaigns were brought to a conclusion here, in the region of Kosovo. The Kosovo branch of the SPS became very influential and its power was reflected when it reduced the local presence and influence of the JUL to a minimum. In the meantime, two parallel realities, the political and the actual one, have taken root. They came into contact only when it was unavoidable. Inter-ethnic distribution of the powers and functions, at least formally and according to quotas, became a thing of the past. While the Albanians refused to have any part in the authorities demanding their own independent state, the Serbs have grown inseparable with the state firms and institutions in Kosmet.
What an average Serbian voter sees as a cataclysm is even an indication of any compromise or political agreement with the Albanian side. The existing concept of life topples down as a sandcastle in the head of an average voter. For many of them the agreement between Milosevic and Rugova and the formation of the Commission for the Normalization of Education (The Three Plus Three Group) was a sufficient signal, irrespective of the fact that it did not produce any results for quite a while. No matter what compromise is struck with the Albanians it will endanger the required and sufficient precondition for the survival in these parts. The Serbs in Kosmet watched with their own eyes the Serbs loosing their positions in Bosnia and Krajina under the pressure of world powers. A reason more to demand the freezing of the existing situation.
That the SPS has lost a major part of the electorate in this region as a result of this, was attested by a noticeable absence of applause at Lilic's pre-election speech in Pristina, each time he mentioned the return of the Albanians to the political life of Serbia and any participation of the Albanians in the institutions of the system.
The Kosovo Socialists are well aware of this and strongly resist any agreement and compromise despite pressures from the Belgrade SPS Headquarters and Slobodan Milosevic personally. That is why the Kosovo Socialist are called radicals and nationalists behind the Belgrade SPS scenes.
This is the reason for a noticeable difference in the messages of Lilic and Vojislav Zivkovic, President of the Provincial SPS Board, at the mentioned rally. The difference is very clear: abolition of the province and mention of the Albanians only in connection with separatism.
What alternative did a voter, who decided not to cast his ballot for the SPS, have?
The SPO conducted a classical Christian Democratic campaign with the leitmotif - "One for All" which is a paraphrase of the Christ's message to the Apostles that the one who wants to take the lead has to serve all. This political message did not much concern the Kosovo electorate as did not the TV picture showing the followers of the Serbian Revival Movement gathered at squares all over Serbia. The SPO's campaign was most seriously organized in the technical sense of the word in Kosmet. The SPO even won the war of posters in the Pristina electoral unit. Vuk overcame the complex of the "Kosovo Polje welcome" and in late August walked the streets of Pristina in the company of members and followers. However, decisive was his main course
- i.e. Serbia turned to the West, respect of the Dayton Agreement, i.e. constant contact with the West and consequently, susceptibility to pressures. The fact that Vuk appeared at negotiations on the problems of Kosovo in New York should also not be disregarded. An average voter didn't care what he had said there, the important thing was that he dared go.
The Serbian Revival Movement became active when it became obvious that Milosevic was neglecting the stands of the Kosovo Socialists and that not a single official from these parts attended talks about Kosovo. This was the case with the Prefect of the Kosovo District as well as members of the Commission for the Implementation of the Agreement on Education. Their political message was: "We shall never recognize any negotiations on Kosmet conducted without legitimate representatives of the Serbs from Kosmet".
However, conflicts within the leadership, insufficient activities in the field and only in Pristina and its surrounding convinced an average voter that a deputy of this group to the Assembly of Serbia would be able to talk about problems only in the Assembly but would not have the true political power to resolve the problem of maintaining the existing concept of life in Kosovo. Late inclusion in the electoral race, contrary to the decision on boycotting the elections, stirred up suspicions that the objective was to take over those SPS voters who were closest in opinion. The cruel mathematics of the electoral system proved that to be true.
Vojislav Seselj fully demonstrated his political talent at these elections. In early stages, when TV duels were still on, he fell upon his main opponent Zoran Djindjic successfully broadening the split within the coalition "Zajedno". The objective of Vojislav Seselj was to pass from the positions of radical nationalism to a position of radical stateism. He projected the position of radical nationalism to the future, to the following 30-50 year period when the conditions will be ripe for the Serbs to claim back the lost territories. This was very important for an average voter in Serbia. Many voters suppressed in themselves the complex and paradox of the side defeated in the war in which, as they insisted, they never took part. This state was manifested in the national apathy. Parties of democratic orientation offered facing the reality and adaptation to the existing situation. The SPS behaved as if nothing had happened.
Only the Radicals offered a possibility of pseudo end of the entire national project at some point in future. Without going into details regarding possibilities and true intentions of Vojislav Seselj to create a state of law , it is estimated that he absolutely deserves the highest grades in political kinematics as regards his choice of the direction and strength of vectors of his political message. And the message read: "You are an average Serbian voter. The water is over your head for some time and you are drowning. I am offering you a possibility to raise you head above the water and take a deep breath". This is a message of short-term measure of radical stateism. The introduction of an efficient, cheap and well organized state which will save money and time here and there, and increase the efficiency of the existing system without any major interventions. Naturally, with the elimination of corruption, illegal accumulation of wealth, crime, etc.
A Serb in Kosovo also received an additional message that the Radicals would naturally continue with the process which Milosevic and his Socialist have started here, but with a more conciliatory tone of radical stateism which was a far better articulated message which reached the majority of electorate. In the famous TV duel in which he attracted at least 50 percent of Vuk's voters, Seselj had additionally strengthened his positions in Kosmet with his statement that he would allow a self-financing parallel Albanian University. He ridiculed its role and diplomas, with a remark that state bodies would only recognize a diploma of the state University. For the Serbs in Kosovo, who had grown into one with the state, this was more than enough.
AIM Pristina
Slavisa MARIC