TEN CROATS FROM VITEZ EXTRADITED TO THE HAGUE

AIM Zagreb, 7 October, 1997

Extradition of ten Croats from Bosnia & Herzegovina (the so-called "Vitez group") to the Hague tribunal is certainly the most important event ever since the foundation of this court, and most probably one of the major events in the peace process in B&H in general. A group of ten indicted is the biggest group so far extradited to the international tribunal, and among them, contrary to announcements which were topical until the very extradition, Dario Kordic, former president of B&H HDZ (nominated in 1994, therefore, after signing of the Washington agreement, which testifies best about "sincerity" of the Croat policy in B&H) is certainly the most prominent name which has ever appeared in the Hague.

Kordic is at the same time the first politician (whatever that may mean in this case) who ended up in the dock of the Hague Tribunal, and although he will be tried not for political activities but for suspicion that he committed war crimes in central Bosnia, this opens a new dimension of trials in the Hague. So far only military perpetrators appeared at this court, and not politicians who gave orders, although one should not have any illusion that after Kordic's extradition anything radical or essential will happen. As an illustration for this, one could state the case of the Croatian minister of defence, Gojko Susak, who is registered by corroborated chronicles as one of those who directly ignited the war fire, and who was recently invited to the Hague to hand in documents which speak of direct involvement of the Croatian state leadership in the war in B&H.

However, Susak has nowadays been given a completely different role, because he himself had announced in front of the cameras of Croatian Television (HRT) that the ten men from Vitez would be extradited, explaining that the USA had finally given the demanded guarantees that the trial would be "fair" (which is certainly a very free interpretation, because it implies that the Americans admitted that the previous trials had not been "fair") and that it would begin within three or five months. It is quite obvious that Susak's appearance on HRT was intended to anticipate discontent of the Croats from B&H, among whom he is very influential, and the form of extradition was chosen with the same intention. As it was said when the ten were seen off in Split, they voluntarily gave themselves up to the Croatian authorities and at the same time quit the claim to be tried in a Croatian court of law (it was discreetly not mentioned that Susak himself had made the proposal that Croats who had committed war crimes be tried in Croatia.

This means that these ten men, at least formally, did not give themselves up to the Hague tribunal, but that this was done by Croatia. In this way, as it was said, it has charged itself to take care of them and their families, but obviously the intention was to underline also that it deserved the merit that there had been any extradition at all. Probably in order to stress this fact, the ten were seen off by high state officials, since along with the president of the B&H Federation Vladimir Soljic and president of the B&H HDZ Bozo Raic, Tudjman's advisor for internal policy Ivic Pasalic was also present, and the head of the Croatian greatest intelligence service (HIS) Miroslav Tudjman, the elder son of the Croatian President.

As it is seen, the so far largest and most spectacular extradition to the Hague tribunal which will certainly bring significant political points to Croatia and free it at least for a little while of the true nightmare of international pressures, opens some, not at all trivial questions. It is very indicative that, perhaps due to circumstances and perhaps not, just a day after the extradition of these ten, trial to Dobrosav Paraga began in Zagreb, who was accused of slander, because he had accused Tudjman for division of B&H and the war waged over there, in an interview given this summer. This symbolically shows that the arrest of Kordic - as the first indicted who had been a political official and not just a warrior (in this sense he partly resembles Karadzic, and partly Mladic) - should not be looked upon as some kind of a "Copernican" shift in the sense that from now on state leaders will also be tried.

On the contrary, it is more probable that these leaders will use the extradition of B&H Croats, and more and more probably, B&H Serbs too, and Bosniacs, to impose themselves as qualified mediators in extraditions, maybe even some kind of "amicea" of the tribunal in the Hague. This has aready started in Croatia, with a loud campaign in state media, which were very eager after several months and maybe a full year, that they were finally given the opporunity to carry the first praises of Croatia arriving from the world. If this goes on according to certain deja vu patterns, soon newspaper panegyrics to Tudjman should also be expected, as to a statesman who saved the reputation of the Hague Tribunal, if not even the entire peace project of the international community in B&H and the whole region. An adequate favour in return for that will be demanded, of course, and the vice prime minister Borislav Skegro, just a day after the extradition of Kordic and the others, declared that Croatia expected the IMF to unblock the credits it had been promised.

These expectations will most probably partly be met, but the international community by now knows the local states and statesmen only too well to reward them by the greatest prize after the first sign of good will. The reason for that might even be found in the extraditions themselves, by which the leaders admit that they have full control of those indicted for war crimes, although they have so far claimed just the opposite or kept it secret in order to keep them in some kind of a quarantine or even jail (which was, according to independent media, the case with the majority of the group from Vitez). The other reason for which one could say that Zagreb will receive manna from heaven is the realistic possibility that extradition of the Croats from B&H will slow down extradition of the Croats from Croatia.

It has not begun yet, and although the confession of Miro Bajramovic in Feral Tribune led to the arrest of a few Mercep's men, despite assumptions in the media that the circle has tightened around him, the possibility should not be eliminated that the Croatian leadership now says - we have done our part, now it is the turn of the Serbs and the Bosniacs, and until we see what they have done, we will not continue extraditing "our men". Although this argument does not hold because Croatia has signed the contract on cooperation with the Hague tribunal in which there is no article on "tied" extradition of the indicted of all the three parties (Yugoslavia has not even signed such a contract), the international community might find it difficult to object it if Karadzic or Mladic, or both are not arrested soon.

It is true, that it is possible to reproach Croatia that her responsibility is the biggest, because, unlike Yugoslavia (and partly B&H), it has already almost become a member of international associations. But although this was done before, Zagreb has never showed signs of being impressed by it, nor was it especially insulted because international mediators warned it that refusing to cooperate with the Hague tribunal was lumping it together with Belgrade, and even Pale. Tudjman's stubbornness subsided only under powerful international pressure, higher even than during the Croatian-Bosniac war, because at the time Croatia was forced to sign the Washington greement, while now there were speculations about the possibility of unannounced, and maybe even anounced economic sanctions.

All in all, extradition of the men from Vitez, as the so far largest step made in sanctioning war crimes on the territory of former Yugoslavia, it is still a step on slippery and muddy ground and probably will remain that until other aspects of resolving the Bosnian crisis are not summed up and correlated (primarily the one which would completely eliminate stirring it up from the Croatian-Serbian neighbourhood). Because, just as it is unrealistic to expect the crisis to be untangled and resolved solely in the elections, it is even less probable that this will happen only by leaving the judges in the Hague to do their jobs, however efficacious and strict they may be.

MARINKO CULIC