BILJANA PLAVSIC'S WEAK POINTS

Belgrade and Local Elections in the RS

Banja Luka, September 23, 1997 (AIM)

First thing to notice was that Belgrade did not show much interest for the local election results in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. the Republic of Srpska. There was surely a reason why these elections were commented on with more consternation in Washington than in the capital of Serbia. The most obvious one is that the pre-election campaign for the parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia were drawing to their close while the results in the Republic of Srpska were such that they could not be used in the finish without much complications.

Opening the motorway Feketic-Subotica a day after the local elections in Bosnia, the FRY President, Slobodan Milosevic said that "the interests of the international community, interests of the people of the Republic of Srpska and interests of the FRY coincide" in the Dayton Accords. Remaining neutral in "his own way" he specified that "the first task for the RS leadership was to remain united and not fight among themselves for power". How was this to be done Milosevic had no doubt: "The people of RS should elect a leadership that will remain united... That unity is essentially in the interest of our people".

Several days later Zoran Lilic, the SPS presidential candidate commended the people of the Republic of Srpska for turning out at the elections in such great numbers because they understood all the complexity of the political crisis and possible, even more serious, consequences". Now: "It remains for the leaders in charge to see that too." Because: "no one has the right to bring the destiny the Republic of Srpska in question for the sake of his political position, and even less his interests or vanity." In conclusion, Lilic said that "elections are a truly democratic solution. Both parliamentary and presidential ones. Everyone should test his legitimacy with the people."

Changes and Hopes

Milorad Vucelic, a high SPS official, gave a more concrete definition of the relations of the ruling party of Serbia with Biljana Plavsic: "The way SDS nominated Biljana Plavsic for president was wrong. There is always a problem when someone is appointed to a certain state position to be used just as a puppet." Concerned over the fact that Ms.Plavsic now became a puppet in the hands of other forces, Vucelic nevertheless concluded that even the Americans do not want to divide (the RS), since the Dayton Agreement does not mention the division of the Republic of Srpska and that "all our hopes must be along those lines."

Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the radicals saw the elections in RS as an obvious defeat of madam President Biljana Plavsic. It was a continuation of an extremely consistent policy which, as far as the radicals were concerned, proved rather efficient. Although the inflow of SDS votes to "radical bags" was not as great as it was expected, the gain was, nonetheless, such to make the criticism of Plavsic's mutiny worthwhile, although it sometimes went even beyond any measure and limit. Irrespective of the fact that their coalition partner SDS was practically driven out of the Krajina part of the Republic of Srpska, the radicals have remained for the time being the only connective tissue in the Serbs' state on the west bank of the Drina river.

Not one of the direct supporters of Biljana Plavsic in the FRY was heard after the local elections in Bosnia. They were so preoccupied with their dilemma - the elections or the boycott.

Certainly most interesting is what these results mean for the FRY President, who - apart from being on that function - is also a signatory of the Dayton Agreement and a politician with the most direct influence on many important developments in the RS. Thus the impression that Milosevic can be satisfied with the situation the results of these, at moments, dramatic elections, can bring.

SDS's wings have been clipped, the radicals have grown stronger, but not enough to be of a decisive importance, while the Socialist Party of the RS is obviously on the rise. The advantages of the two accompanying parties can realistically increase in the future. Primarily because following the road paved by Pale, the SDS has become a practically criminal (so to speak a terrorist) organization in the eyes of the international public and political circles. No one respects the SDS any more, but only tolerate it. Punishment (and even retaliation) will come after the first slip. Also, the SDS's internal structure is rather damaged, on account of which its attractiveness for those who like to be with the strong, will decrease.

Milosevic's way

In which way could this prove good for Milosevic's role and influence? Because Milosevic is best in such stalemate situations. His position is now much improved in comparison to the pre-election period when he maintained contacts with Krajisnik and avoided pressures of the American State Secretary, Madeleine Albright, to extend full support to the President Plavsic. It turned out later on that the Americans also needed to be on good terms with Krajisnik if they wanted to save the elections. Consequently, although he disregarded Albright, Milosevic was later commended as a man who (together with Tudjman) helped at a crucial moment.

Election results have shown everyone what Milosevic "had bet on" - that the range of Biljana Plavsic's actions is rather limited. She truly shook the SDS so much that she reduced that monolith to a form and strength of a political party, and instead of preserving the original enthusiasm and trust of the people, allowed it, no matter what her wishes were, to turn into a dangerous territorial conflict between the east and the west of the Republic of Srpska. Her apparent closeness and dependence on the SFOR brought her into a position similar to that in which she found herself as a nationalist: only extreme nationalist were able to follow her, just as today only those who "have no fear of the future" can follow her suit. In other words, according to the election results the extent to which Ms.Plavsic, fleeing from Pale, takes into consideration the fears of the Serbs in the RS for their national status, seems to the majority of them excessively "flexible".

The fact that the impulsive madam President of the RS, partly for emotional reasons, did not find a way to establish a contact as a partner with Milosevic, will prove to be a serious problem. When squaring the circle of the Serbian national problem, no matter from which side you approach, you always bump into Milosevic.

But, anyone who thinks that the FRY President will now place all his cards on Krajisnik and Pale, is wrong. No sooner had Robert Frowick and the OSCE computers counted the local election votes than Milosevic sent his chief of Secret Police, Jovica Stanisic, to Banja Luka. This is the beginning of a new election race. Can Biljana Plavsic loose the position of a judge and be forced into joining the presidential electoral race, in other words is that the only objective of the propounder of that solution? In the days to come such questions will successively open up like the Russian dolls-within-dolls (babushka).

The will of the people of the Republic of Srpska is a process with a number of unknowns for many activists in today's Bosnia. And only at first sight is the part of FRY and Milosevic in that process only active. The future of the RS is actually being made in Belgrade, but the future of the FRY is also almost certainly limited by the developments in the RS.

Petar Reljic