BELGRADE - AGREEMENT TO AGREE ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS

Beograd Sep 23, 1997

Meeting Milutinovic-Granic

Signatures of two ministers on several agreements are primarily the result of international pressures, but also much more than that. The regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb wish to demonstrate quite clearly that without them - such as they are - not a single significant problem in the region can be resolved, so they readily offer each other support when needed by either on the internal political scene.

AIM Belgrade, 19 September, 1997

Meeting of foreign ministers of FR Yugoslavia and Croatia, Milan Milutinovic and Dr Mate Granic in Belgrade on 15 September and signing of six interstate agreements, were as customary esteemed as "very meaningful" and a "large step" of "exceptional importance". The agreements refer to border crossings, local border traffic, social insurance, legal assistance, and railway and road transportation. A few days later, when the ink on the said documents dried, the question which remained was what it meant to ordinary people?

    It is clear that refugees - as a category which has

the greatest expectations of normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations - have been left empty-handed again. Heads of Yugoslav and Croatian diplomacy have omitted, like for who knows how many times before, to clearly and unambiguously regulate the right to return and use of houses and property of refugees. Everything has remained on the level of platitudes: "We have especially insisted that Croatia and its administration truly enable accelerated organized return of banished Serbs and refugees" (Milutinovic), and "the need to accelerate return of the Croats to Croatian Podunavlje" (Dr Granic).

It is not clear, however, what principled accepting of the proposal "to reduce the burden on the administration and with a more flexible attitude help the people to resolve issues of property on their own initiative", "as part of the efforts of the joint commission of the inter-state committee on implementation of Article 7 of the Agreement on Normalization, which concerns property of citizens in the neighbouring state". Two things are possible: that the refugees will be left to try to solve their problems in endless and expensive lawsuits, but also that their property will not be included in the mass of property subject to succession.

Another issue is that although the Agreement on Social Insurance in principle enables refugees in FR Yugoslavia to receive pensions from Croatia, it is impossible to carry it out in practice, because there are still no payment operations between the two states.

When speaking of the rigid system of visas, there have been no shifts for the better concerning it either, and there will hardly be any in any foreseeable future. Among other, this is certain because it is a highly profitable source of income for both states.

Nevertheless, the ministers have signed an agreement about eight border crossings for international road traffic: Batina - Bezdan, Erdut - Bogojevo, Ilok - Backa Palanka, Principovac - Sot, Principovac - Ljuba, Tovarnik - Sid, and Bajakovac - Batrovac. For local border traffic, the following crossings were determined: Bapska - Berkasovo and Stosinci - Jarmena, as well as the ferry-boat crossing between Vukovar and Vajska. It is evident that Siroki Brijeg near Herceg Novi is not on the list, as well as the fact that the ministers have not even mentioned the status of Prevlaka peninsula. This can be explained by the forthcoming elections in Montenegro, or more precisely, Zagreb's decision to meet Belgrade's request not to additionally unsettle and compromise Momir Bulatovic who persistently claims that "neither have the Croats got Prevlaka, nor have we lost it".

Zagreb Vjesnik writes about a "great victory of Croatian diplomacy" stating that "Serbian diplomacy for the first time recognizes the Croats in FR Yugoslavia as a national minority". However, there were no clear indications about the manner in which the status of Croatian minority would be regulated. Indirectly it is possible to get an insight into it from the agreement on local border traffic which prescribes that the population of bordering municipalities will be permitted to cross the border with a pass, and without a passport and a visa. In FR Yugoslavia this refers to municipalities of Apatin, Bac, Backa Palanka, Backi Petrovac, Beocin, Novi Sad, Odzaci, Ruma, Sombor, Sremska Mitrovica, Subotica, Sid, and villages Beska, Golubinci, Stari and Novi Slankamen. As one can see, many of these towns and villages are not at all by the border, but they are inhabited by citizens of FR Yugoslavia of Croat nationality. When speaking of Croatia, passes will be issued to inhabitants of Vukovar, Beli Manastir, Bilje, Bogdanovci, Borovo, Darda, Draz, part of Drenovac municipality (Djuricici and Racinovici), Erdut, Ernestinovo, Ilok, Knezevi Vinogradi, Lovas, Nijemci, Popovci, Stari Jankovci, Tompojevci, Tordinci, Tovarnik, Trpinje, Vrbanje, Klis, Mirkovci, Sarvas and Tenja.

Milutinovic bragged that the agreements on border crossings and local border traffic were "a large step towards realization of the concept of 'soft' border" which FR Yugoslavia had advocated, but immediately after that he admitted that this was not "a replacement for dual citizenship", in other words that the initiative of Belgrade to resolve the latter by a bilateral agreement was rejected. Therefore he announced that "in the foreseeable future all Serbs and Montenegrins in Croatia, as well as in other former Yugoslav republics will be enabled to get Yugoslav citizenship". This is in fact acceptance of the Croatian proposal that each state should regulate this issue within its own national legislature.

The mentioned agreements are the result of international pressure, but also much more than that. Regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb wish clearly to demonstrate that without them - such as they are - it is impossible to resolve even a single significant problem in the region, so they readily offer support to each other when need arises on their respective internal political scenes.

That is why there are no postwar elections in either Serbia or Croatia without a diplomatic "breakthrough". Just before the last year's federal elections in FR Yugoslavia, mutual recognition was arranged. Before presidential, local and elections for the Chamber of Districts of the Assembly in Croatia in April this year, Milutinovic visited Zagreb promising the Serbs in eastern Slavonia dual citizenship and appealing to them not to emigrate. Finally, elections in Serbia have come and Dr Granic arrived and sat down in the stylish arm-chair in the White Court (Milosevic's "new" office building)...

Nevertheless, one should not be cynical: any improvement in relations between until recently bitterly inimical and warring states and nations should be welcomed, although true negotiations between FR Yugoslavia and Croatia have practically not even begun. It is essential that this process will not be so slow and take so long as to become irrelevant for all those it concerns and those who expect so much from it.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)