ZAGREB-OPERATION BOYCOTT

AIM, ZAGREB, September 17, 1997

The decision of HDZ to boycott local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was immediately after that reversed greatly resembled a tempest in a teapot. Although it was as usual presented in a form of an ultimatum, HDZ did not stop its pre-election campaign which made it quite clear that the boycott was proclaimed without any intention of being realized in practice, i.e. with full awareness that the consequences would most probably include sanctions against and isolation of Croatia (which was soon confirmed by incoming information from the world).

Still, it was obvious that the intention was to keep the USA and other Bosnian sponsors in a dilemma till the last moment whether this was a tactical scam or serious intention on the part of the Croats. The intention was obviously to create a drama, and judging by reactions that is what really happened. The decision on boycott was made at the last moment in order to bring Westendorp, Klein, Frowick and others in a tight spot and, in order to give things greater weight, "operation boycott" was led by the Croatian top men in the Federation (Soljic), and of those few institutions of the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zubak), while the leaders of "Herzeg-Bosnia" assisted them from afar. At the same time, even before anyone had time to ask, assurances arrived from Zagreb that this boycott had nothing to do with the official Croatia, but that it was being carried out "independently" by the Croatian political representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Only after Tudjman - Westendorp negotiations in Zagreb were successfully concluded, did the Croatian statesman admit that he had known about the boycott and had agreed with reason for which it was organized. In order to be more precise he organized one of his favourite study groups of editors-in-chief of all regime-controlled media and gave a collective interview, which he otherwise does relatively rarely, only when he needs to directly address the nation. However, in this address Tudjman did not say anything new, either of his stands vis-a-vis the Bosnian issue or the boycott itself -apart from directly admitting it to be his idea - so that it was clear that he only wanted to address the Croatian voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thereby take a more direct part in the Bosnian elections the he ever did before.

Probably closest to the truth are those Bosnian observers who think that the boycott was organized only in order to again homogenize, i.e. warn the Croatian voters - many of whom at some previous elections (Mostar) stayed at home - that such slackness will no longer be tolerated. Tudjman emphasized the dramatic character of the situation by his claim, which was never before presented so openly - that some international mediators in Bosnia and Herzegovina are siding with the "Moslem extremists". This shows that the situation of B&H Croats is even worse than it was before the arrival of these mediators, when they only tested the strength with their centuries-old rivals from the other side of "civilisational frontier".

However, he did not leave his compatriots without hope. Moreover, he said that same as he was once the initiator of the Dayton Accords (?!), he has now proposed solutions which have provided a way out of the crisis. In this self-praising statement it is possible to discern traces of old Tudjman's tactics - first to invent a problem and then after its resolution, to boast of it being a proof of his immeasurable wisdom as a statesman. Using precisely this pattern the Croatian regime-controlled media have rushed after the Zagreb Agreement to praise the Croatian leader as being practically a miracle-worker in finding a solution satisfactory for all involved. He saved the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a perfidious "electoral engineering" invented to harm them, while he helped the international mediators even more as he "again solved problems of another state" and "saved them from an unprecedented fiasco".

Naturally, these hymns - which one can hardly write sitting - simply, by definition, cannot be all true. Immediately after the Zagreb Agreement was reached Westendorp stated that the only accepted Croatian demand concerned the abolition of the Mostar district as a separate electoral unit, while others had even not been considered. Had he wanted to truly punish the Croatian vanity, Westendorp could have said that the abolition of this district had been also offered to the Croats earlier, but under the condition that they give up their plan to link three Mostar communes into a community of communes, which they agreed to in the end. If anyone was awarded, then it was not only Croats, and if anyone was punished, then it was not only the Bosniacs.

All in all, Tudjman's attempt to "assist" the international community turned out to be a "monkey business", practically an adventure on the brink of an abyss. Actually, the "boycott operation", which resembles a number of previous instances of blackmail, particularly at the time of Koschnik's mandate in Mostar - but not as nearly successful as they had been - only makes more topical the issue of the possible introduction of the harshest measures against the B&H Croats and Croatia itself. For several months now the Republic of Srpska is practically under SFOR's occupation which is openly taking part in inter-faction conflicts between the Bosnian Serbs. Nevertheless, the Croats have declared boycott loudly reiterating the notorious claim that the international mediators in Bosnia and Herzegovina are treating them discriminatively. And if, in addition, these mediators are labelled "pro-Moslem", what could be more logical to expect than, if not this, then some future boycott to be used for the introduction of "occupation" of the other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is not controlled by the Bosniacs.

What effects the boycott had on the electoral results of the Croatian side remains to be seen when the final results come out. However, judging by the turnout of voters it could be said that the extensive media campaign bore fruit inasmuch as the electorate answered to the agitated calls of the Croatian leadership and did its best. However, it was noticed that at the first unofficial announcement of results, Jadranko Prlic stated that the HDZ had scored a "sweeping victory" in parts in which "the Croatian people are in the majority" (the three Mostar communes, Capljina, Naum, Livno, Rama, Tomislavgrad, Odzak, Orasje, Kresevo, Kiseljak, Vitez, Busovaca...). However, he did not say what had happened to places where it was in the majority or lived in great numbers before the war (central Bosnia), nor places in which before the war it represented a negligible minority (south-western Bosnia).

Admittedly, the HDZ, which has of late started to somewhat change its stance in regard to central Bosnia trying to keep the Croats there, most probably will not be too much worried if it does not win local power in places which the Croats had abandoned and which are now under the Bosniac control. But things are quite different in places which are now under the Croatian control, although these were ethnically never Croatian (Drvar, Grahovo, Glamoc). Irrespective of the fact that these are highly unproductive regions, in parts even wilderness, Tudjman considers them to be the greatest geopolitical delicacy, as these regions have finally filled in the "soft belly" of Croatia (which is no longer pretzel-shaped) and helped make the first step in the direction of bannat borders, which Tudjman obsessively aimed at long before he climbed to the Croatian political top.

However, the HDZ, on account of whose policy the number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina has possibly been halved, is now faced with - and will increasingly be forced to face in the future - a significant "deficit" of voters. In short, there are too little Croats for so large a Croatia and it is therefore quite possible that the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to accept "pockets" of local authorities which will not be under its control. But, in all likelihood, the introduction of such pockets, and on all sides, was precisely what the international mediators aimed at as they most certainly did not invest fifty million dollars in the elections just to allow everything to remain in Bosnia as it was before.

MARINKO CULIC