BELGRADE - IS A STORM BREWING?

Milosevic Transfers Centre of Power to Federation

When he failed to obtain approval to add power to his present post by constitutional amendments, Slobodan Milosevic decided to take a series of steps behind the scene to accomplish the same goal. If he succeeds in his intention, the price will be high, but he will not be the one to pay it and that is why he is not concerned with the developments in Montenegro and Republica Srpska, nor does he pay much heed to the fact that introduction of sanctions against Yugoslavia is announced all over again

AIM Belgrade, 9 September, 1997

The climax of the campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia is overshadowed by other political developments in the country, which due to their consequences can largely reflect on the quality of life in Yugoslavia. Deceived by inertia that crucial political and legislative decisions are reached in the republics, the public seems to pay little attention to what is going on in the federation, so the impression is that it has been "forgotten" that Slobodan Milosevic has moved to the federation, although he has literally represented the centre of power for the past ten years. As if the post of the president of Yugoslavia has pushed Milosevic to the margins of political decision-making and practically removed him from public political activities. Although it was clear that a politician of his profile, who is used to having "the world rotate around him", would not settle down to the role of a politically retired official, hardly anyone had expected that he would begin making moves towards transfer of the centre of power from Serbia to the federal state before he was even elected president of Yugoslavia.

The intention to complete constitutional amendments which would enable election of the head of the federal state in direct elections in hot haste, which would bring about his broader authority, was rejected because Montenegro did not show understanding for the change of relations in the federation. Since Milosevic belongs among politicians who enter through the window if the door is shut, his commitment to carry the centre power along wherever he goes, has not ended because of it. The only thing that did change was that the public attempt to amend the text of the federal constitution was replaced by secret political games. In return for having been so bold as to oppose him, Montenegro got the political conflict which has shaken it ever since the day its parliament rejected the draft amendment of the Constitution.

Led by the principle that the end justifies the means, the new president of the federal state could not just sit back and watch what is happening on the Montenegrin political scene from a distance and leave it to its institutions to resolve the controversial issues, but found a "catch" how to enable the federal administration to interfere. The matter was transferred to the competence of the Federal Constitutional Court, although the process of nominating candidates for president of Montenegro is not at all regulated by federal legislature. Those who perform such tasks found a pretext for the interference in the alleged violation of human rights of Momir Bulatovic who was not permitted by the Montenegrin election committee to run for the office of the president of Montenegro as a representative of one of the factions of the divided Democratic Party of Socialists.

The reason for the engagement of the constitutional court of Yugoslavia is to force the federal state upon the member-republics, even in the case when they had not delegated this right to the federation. Along with the involvement of defenders of the constitution, preparations were made for usurping rights and responsibilities in other fields as well, such as state security and the army, because the regime cherished by Milosevic feels best when relying on secret police and force. His inclinations were also discovered by foreign negotiators who respect Milosevic the most because they are aware that secret police and the army are subordinated to him, and because he also has financial support to back him. By amending the law on state security service which prescribes their abolishment on the level of the republics, the head of the federal state wishes to reinforce his position in relation to the federal units, although he himself had previously made a coup in the federal secret police and destroyed it completely, so that the competence of the once powerful service was reduced to guarding of the federal administration buildings.

At the time when he was president of Serbia, it was convenient for him to move the police under the republican roof, but now that he has gone to the federation, he wants this service back on that level. This intention was observed back at the time of establishment of the new federal government, when one of his most loyal men, Zoran Sokolovic, was appointed minister of the interior, and this was at the same time one of the most reliable signs that Milosevic was moving to the federation. This personnel change had taken place eight months before Milosevic's election for president of Yugoslavia, and those who had predicted Milosevic's intention by Sokolovic's movement had not been wrong. It is evident in his political activities that his partners learn his true intentions with a considerable delay. Once they become obvious it is usually too late to act.

Apart from the secret police, the army is also sending signals that it would be more convenient for it to have a commander-in-chief instead of the current collective body. The initiative for constitutional amendments which would enable the head of the state to be the commander-in-chief originated from the army ranks. This move is also aimed at weakening the position of the federal member-republics which at present have their representatives in the Supreme Defence Council, the highest army institution in the country. Immediately after the initiative, the President received representatives of the army, promised them a better financial position, resolving of housing problems, and in general a better social status for the army.

But this is not all that shows that a storm is brewing. While in Serbia political parties and their leaders are competing for entering the republican parliament and for the post of the president of the Republic, the President of Yugoslavia, who is recently intensely studied on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the known and fatal eighth session of at the time his communist party which brought him to power, is at the same time active on two fronts: domestic and foreign. By the moves he is making at home he is doing his best to establish the centre of power around him according to the already tested recipe which he applied in the former SFRY, which after that tumbled down like a house built on sand. In view of the fact that Montenegro can hardly operate without the Serbian market, barricades were erected at the republican border, just as once a blockade was introduced for sale of Slovenian goods in Serbia. In this way Slovenia was pushed to accelerate its departure from Yugoslavia. What will happen to Montenegro remains to be seen, because political controversies in it have not reached their climax yet. These very controversies which at the time did not exist, at least not openly, among the Slovenians, are the foundations of a tactic which is expected to enable transformation of the official parliamentary system into the unofficial presidential one on the level of the Yugoslav federation.

The other front which Milosevic wishes to neutralize in order to carry out his intention at home, refers to the outer world in relation to which he is in a subordinate position, because as a signatory of the Dayton accords he has very delicate obligations. Recently, his strategy to change his duty to obey, that is to avoid to meet the requirements he had signed, has become evident. The American party which is exceptionally keen on implementation of the said agreement because its entire administration headed by President Clinton staked its authority because of it observed the change and it has already marked Milosevic's game as dangerous which might cause re-introduction of the sanctions or lead to abolishment of privileges it had got from the European Union. Hardly anyone thinks that this threat has scared the Yugoslav President, not because he does not believe in re-introduction of the sanctions but because they do not concern him at all.

Not even before this shift was Milosevic respected as a truthful partner in negotiations, but the change of attitude towards the Dayton accords is, nevertheless, a surprise, because it was believed that a large number of refugees from Bosnia was an economic burden for him which the weak Serbian economy could not endure. It seems that selling of a part of Telecom, and the interest of foreign partners for the purchase of electric and oil industries, as well as communication infrastructure, made him believe that he could get hold of money by a sale of domestic wealth. Some analysts believe that Milosevic has decided to show his teeth because of the firm stand of the USA to maintain the outer wall of the sanctions. It is hard to believe the thesis that Milosevic thinks that he can better the position of his country in the international community by refusing to cooperate. It is more likely that those are right who claim that Milosevic together with the Croatian President Tudjman has not given up on the initial intention to divide Bosnia & Herzegovina and that his behavior is in fact opposition to the idea of united B&H as prescribed by the Dayton accords.

No matter which of the mentioned theses is correct, it is certain that the Yugoslav President has decided to play with fire again. It has already been ignited by controversies in the leadership of Republica Srpska, with the risk that by application of his invention of organized rallies the conflict might spread and bring about an epilogue Milosevic has not expected - instead of division of Bosnia, cause dismemberment of Republica Srpska. If he has set out on this new adventure with Tudjman again, he has no guarantees that he will succeed in his intention, because experience has shown that he has always come away empty-handed, contrary to the Croatian President.

There is also the third conviction due to which Milosevic has decided to strain his relations with the outer world. The explanation consists of his key preoccupation to establish his personal power on the level of the federation, just as he had done while president of Serbia. In that case the outcome of the elections in Serbia will not be as significant as they would have been if he had been satisfied with the humble constitutional power at the present post. In that case his power would have relied on the position he holds in the SPS, on condition that his party wins the elections. Milosevic does not believe in taking risks and that is why he is doing his best to reinforce his position regardless of the outcome of the elections in Serbia. Although the public is getting goose pimples from the very idea of having to face the sanctions again, the authorities are not at all concerned. Indeed, the impression one gets is that they would welcome them, because it is easier to keep citizen submissive and obedient under sanctions.

Ratomir Petkovic

(AIM)