BANJA LUKA - SUICIDE OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Split in the Army of Republica Srpska

AIM Banja Luka, 5 September, 1997

Quite unexpectedly according to the opinion of many, the General Staff of the Army of Republica Srpska got involved in the political and constitutional crisis which is persisting in Republica Srpska since 3 July. Unexpectedly for those badly-informed, but quite expected by serious military and political theoreticians and analysts. Taking sides of parts of the army with one or the other party involved in the political conflict has even further complicated the political situation, difficult as it is. The political and constitutional crisis acquired another dimension and undoubtedly became also a military crisis. What brought about the political engagement of the army General Staff, which is absolutely inappropriate for a military organization?

Involvement of the General Staff of the Army of RS is no novelty, but it is new according to many things. In November 1996, the political and military conflict between the former General Staff (general Mladic) and the political and state leadership was resolved with great difficulties.

Nowadays, there are quite a few of those who will for everything that was happening and what is happening now to the Army of RS blame the President of RS who discharged general Mladic and his staff at the time, and withdrew the then retired colonel Colic, and appointed him head of the General Staff. That was the time of her obedience to Dr Karadzic and Krajisnik who had been the inspirirers of that venture with the Army of RS. President of RS just signed the project conceived by the "authorities" from Pale.

When speaking of the General Staff and the army in general, significant facts should be taken into account which determine their position, status, role and possibilities in all current developments in RS. Whether anyone likes to admit it or not, the Army of RS exists in papers only. Practically disarmed by IFOR back in April 1996, shut in barracks under close supervision of SFOR and prevented in all activities not approved by implementators of the Dayton accords, the Army of RS is neither a military nor in the least a political force of the Bosnian Serbs. Members of the General Staff, chosen solely for their party membership and loyalty to the SDS, and not according to military and professional qualifications, are not capable of successful command of its subordinates. That is why it is obvious that masked divisions had existed in the Army even before the opening of the political and constitutional crisis, which had to come out in the open some day. That is why in every consideration of the situation, it is necessary to start from the fact that the Army of RS, but especially the General Staff, is not a significant military or a political factor of any great importance for the course and ultimate outcome of the crisis in this entity of B&H.

On the other hand, one should not be misled that the General Staff represents the Army of RS. Something like that might have been acceptable before 26 August, 1997, but not since then. On that day the President of RS scheduled a meeting with the team of heads of the General Staff and corps commanders. General Colic forbade members of the General Staff to go to the meeting with the President (commander-in-chief). On that day he himself was in Ilidza (near Sarajevo) where he met commander of SFOR, general Shinsheki, and refused the offered helicopter which could get him to Banja Luka in time for the meeting. This was a classical example of disobeying orders and refusing obedience to the president of the state who is at the same time the commander-in-chief of the army. The head of the General Staff clearly expressed his stand in this way, but another thing happened that day that was more important than anything.

Although general Colic and the General Staff had not appeared, President of RS held her meeting, as officially stated, with a group of officers of the Army of RS who responded. The group consisted of the commander of the 1st corps (general Talic), 3rd corps (general Simic), air-force (general Torbica), centre of military schools (colonel Cavic) and colonel Kutlesic, who is one of the minor assistants of the head of the General Staff. This is indeed a significant group of officers who in the strategic and territorial sense, as well as in respect to man-power and other potentials control and lead 80 per cent of RS. Commanders of the 5th (general Josipovic) and the 7th corps (general Andjic) did not attend the meeting with the President of RS.

This meeting of 26 August with the President of RS in Banja Luka definitely marked the division of the Army of RS into supporters and opponents of the commander-in-chief. The General Staff and the 5th and 7th corps, which form a negligible part of the army (20 per cent) declared themselves against their commander-in-chief, and in favour of the SDS and the political and state leaders from Pale. In order to confirm his political conviction, general Colic sent a telegram on 29 August to corps commands and other subordinates, ordering them to refuse obedience to the commander-in-chief. In this way the final division of RS was completed along all possible seams, which can ultimately have catastrophic consequences for this entity. This is the main argument used by those who predict division of RS into the western and the eastern part, "Dayton 2", and even a possible civil war among the Serbs in this space.

Consisting solely of officers loyal to the SDS, the General Staff could not resist pressures exerted by this party to take sides with it in this political and constitutional crisis. Personal interests of the most responsible persons in that staff played the decisive role in it, since they were fully aware that if it had not been for the SDS they would have never had such posts in the Army of RS. At the basis of these divisions is the antagonism between militarily uneducated officers in the General Staff and the educated officers in the corps commands, and supporters of the SDS and politically undecided professionals.

Responsibility for this division of the Army of RS lies with the head of the General Staff. Guided by personal interests, he did not act adequately in the complex political situation. Unable to grasp the objective position and possibilities of the Army of RS, he tried to present the General Staff and the 5th and the 7th corps as the army of RS, pushing them into the abyss along with the SDS which was outgrown both by the time and the developments.

There is no doubt that the General Staff has committed a military and political suicide, having created all the necessary assumption for departure to history.

Dragan D. Marcetic