WHO WILL BE THE THIRD IN THE SUPREME COMMAND

New Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of FR Yugoslavia

AIM Belgrade, 25 July, 1997

Speculations that general Momcilo Perisic, head of the general staff of the army of Yugoslavia, would be discharged or sent to early retirement by Slobodan Milosevic have begun practically ever since the moment he was "installed" at the leading position in YU general staff. Now that Milosevic became the head of the state a few days ago, the story about the "unstable" general has once again come into the focus of interest of analysts of domestic developments.

Among the few names which have appeared in speculations about who could be nominated in Perisic's commanding place - that of Dragoljub Ojdanic is the most frequently heard. Even if it may be true that Ojdanic is ideologically inclined completely to the "left", that is, towards Dr Mirjana Markovic, which is considered to be an advantage over Perisic, the latter, apart from having incomparably "richer" war record - belongs to the very core of the Serb nationalistic elite, and the price of this "quality" on Milosevic's political pricelist is going up again.

The question how the new supreme defence council will operate is by far more important than that of the head of the army, his replacement or survival. According to the Constitution of the FR Yugoslavia, its members are the president of the federal state and presidents of the federal units. Since commands of the federal president become valid only if founded on decisions of the supreme council, it is essential that the idea of the supreme commander be supported by at least one of the remaining two members of the supreme command. Although in previous operation of Milosevic's power the army was not even mentioned as an indispensable factor, so far it was easy for him to be the absolute master in the supreme command, since both Zoran Lilic, as the former nominal supreme commander and the Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic were unreservedly loyal to him. But, will supreme commanding in FR Yugoslavia be operational and efficient by measure of Milosevic's needs, if in the scheduled presidential elections in Serbia and Montenegro presidents who are not in Milosevic's good graces are elected?

Indeed, why has the army of Yugoslavia all at once become important for the leader, why has the "military issue" been moved from the margins to the centre of the domestic political process?

Ever since Milosevic's staff has opened the possibility of Milosevic moving to Lilic's post, the army of Yugoslavia was raised to the rank of a "cohesive" and "stabilizing factor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". On the psychological level, this raised the level of the federal president from the former Lilic's protocolar anonymity to the level of a post of "vital significance" for the federal state.

In order for the Serbian-Montenegrin federation to survive and function, by logic of Milosevic's expert team, it is necessary to discipline the Montenegrins who have suddenly become self-willed. And this job cannot be done by the federal police (because Montenegro has the police of its own), although Milosevic has moved the centre of police in Serbia to the federal level. That is where he is also putting the army of Yugoslavia with the already mentioned alleged role of the cohesive and stabilizing factor of the federal state, and in the background of it all is still the threat by armed force, the force ready at any time to "run to the rescue of the state" from "destructive union of the external and the internal enemy".

Therefore, military analysts do not exaggerate when they tend to observe all tactical and joint tactical drills of the units of the army of Yugoslavia taking place lately on the territory of Montenegro (from the last year's "Laser-21" to the recent "Jump-97") in connection with the described thesis. Especially when one knows that parts of the special units of the army of FRY have taken part in all these drills, and that the "other eye" of the two-member federation was usually closed down from the north (airport in Golubovci) by an airborne landing, and from the south by a maritime landing.

Both Milosevic and the generals know perfectly well that without the federal state the Army of Yugoslavia cannot survive (neither because of its size, nor because of its organization, nor with its formations, nor in anyway else), and that Milosevic, however skilful and ruthless he may be, would be able to find a new mode of preservation of power, so that in this point, interests of the generals and the new supreme commander coincide.

For the time being, the Socialists of Serbia have resolved their greatest problem: partly by force and partly by deception - they have found a post for Slobodan Milosevic. The evident hesitation with the nomination of a candidate for the presideent of the republic was finally interrupted by the official nomination of Zoran Lilic for the candidate of the left coalition in the forthcoming elections. All things considered, the "spare" candidate of the Socialist Party of Serbia, judging by the tolerance of the ruling party towards fascistoid incidents he cuauses, is the head of the Radicals, Vojislav Seselj.

One should not doubt that this, according to Slobodan Milosevic, "most likeable politician" from the Serbian opposition, would be his desirable associate in the "trio" of the supreme command, in case he wins the presidential elections. In that case it would be almost unimportant who won the presidential elections in Montenegro.

It is also interesting that Vojislav Seselj (according to certain findings) has quite circumstantial strongholds among the professional (mostly young) cadre of the army of Yugoslavia. This phenomenon has not been seriously studied by anyone yet, but superficial analyses point out to several points of contact between officers of the army and the leader of the Radicals.

First and foremost, certain commanding officers of the army of Yugoslavia and the "Chetnik duke" are connected by "firm war comradeship" dating back from the time when Seselj, in the uniform of a "fierce Serb warrior", with a Kalashnykov in his hand and accompanied by army commanding officers, roared on the ruins of Vukovar: "I am not a leader, I am an army leader". His chauvinist credo seems to have fallen on fertile ground among the frustrated by the defeat, and materially and socially pushed to the margins, professional part of the army of Yugoslavia indoctrinated by nationalism. Perhaps only in that context is it possible to understand when, for example, a young mayor in an unofficial conversation, ardently defends the latest Seselj's "accomplishment" - maltreatment of the Zemun family Barbalic who are of Croat origin.

Finally, it seems that among the officers there are quite a few of those who are convinced that the rigid Vojislav Seselj, even if "only" as a member of the supreme defence council, could help them regain the vanished "honour and dignity of the profession". And at the centre of this attachment of the officers to "duke" Seselj is the firm belief that he would by all means prevent extradition to the Hague tribunal of the known "officers' trio" (Sljivancanin, Mrksic, Radic) indicted for war crimes.

It seems, therefore, that wishes of a part of the officers' and (generals') corps of the army of Yugoslavia to see Vojislav Seselj elected president of Serbia and member of the supreme command are not at all unfounded.

Stipe Sikavica (AIM)