RESOLUTION AS A REVOLUTION

AIM ZAGREB, July 20, 1997

Although everything pointed to the contrary, the Croatian Prime Minister, Zlatko Matesa as well as Ministers of Defence Gojko Susak and of Reconstruction Jure Radic, seemed rather crestfallen last week at Osijek Airport, near Klisa. Namely, after six years, on July 15, the UNTAES military component, a peace forces contingent composed from armies of various countries, started the so much desired withdrawal from Eastern Slavonia. The Croatian political leadership, especially after the "Flash" and "Storm" operations, became increasingly irritated by the presence of foreign troops irrespective of the fact that they had come precisely in response to desperate calls for help sent from Zagreb during 1991, at the time of aggression on Croatia when due to YPA's supremacy things were far from good for Croatia on the military plane.

Matesa, Radic and especially Susak had a good reason to beam with joy seeing the departing battalions from Pakistan and Jordan, as well as the unit from Argentina whom the Transitional Administrator Jacques Paul Klein had lined up on the runway of the Osijek Airport to thank them for what they had done for the mission and to wish them a happy journey. In contrast to Matesa, who spoke in a confusing manner and obviously totally unprepared, Klein took the trouble to thank the troops in their own mother tongues, so that there was a simply glaring disproportion between the degree of Klein's gratitude and the half-baked one of Matesa. Susak did not say a word, although it would have been only logical for the Defence Minister of a country which at a moment crucial to its survival was helped by foreign troops bearing blue UN helmets, to at least formally thank them. But, things turned out the way they did.

The reason behind the sullen mood of the two Croatian ministers and the Prime Minister certainly was the fact that the evening before the Security Council had adopted Resolution 1120, a document unfavourable for Croatia to such an extent that the few foreign correspondents of the Croatian media were totally at a loss as to what to report to their news desks. Anyone who for any reason had had to read resolutions written on the East River in the past, considered this one the scourge of God. Boring formulations, diplomatic platitudes, vapid legalese and the masterful art of using many words and saying little, all this disguising various undisclosed political interests, which are precisely behind the wording of such resolutions - has characterized all past resolutions and driven all conscientious journalists to desperation in attempting to recount their content in simple language.

However, this resolution was quite something else. Already the preamble must have given its readers in the Croatian mission to the United Nations, as well as diplomats in the Foreign Ministry at Zrinjevac serious heart palpitations. Resolution 1120, which deals with the situation in UNTAES, a Croatian region under the provisional administration of United Nations, could perhaps best be compared to what happens in sterile and boring papers when a young, ambitious and incorruptible editor assumes the helm. The style and the content of Resolution 1120 differ to such an extent that it appears that Kofi Annan in person, having replaced Boutros Boutros Ghali, also brought his resolution writers along.

In the end some Croatian papers (after it was first done by the independent "Novi List"), albeit two days late, published the full text of the Resolution. The fact that there were no vitriolic comments from the harshest state-controlled authors, is probably the results of hints from the very top that, given the straining of relations with the USA, European Union and the Council of Europe, the UN should not be antagonized. It was probably assessed that the recent arrest of Slavko Dokmanovic, the war Major of Vukovar, and the withdrawal of around 2,300 UNTAES troops may countervail in the public eye the calm, silent and painful stomaching of this quite indigestible Resolution.

By way of illustration let us just quote some of the introductory phrases and then touch upon some of its most important 19 points. Croatia is reminded of the need to "promote mutual trust, the protection and security of all the inhabitants in the region"; reference is made to "the importance of the bi-directional return of all displaced persons in the Republic of Croatia"; it warns with concern of "the lack of conditions necessary for the return of displaced persons to the former UNPA areas from Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in any significant number, the return of those displaced persons who wish to return to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium from other areas of Croatia". If that were all, it would be more than enough. But, it isn't.

The Resolution goes on to express "deep concern over the absence of progress in respecting the human rights of persons belonging to minorities in Croatia and, in particular, in the former UNPAs" and deeply regrets "the recent incidents of ethnically motivated violence in Hrvatska Kostajnica and similar incidents". Croatia is also criticized "for the Government's failure" fully to cooperate with the International Tribunal for the Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia and reminded that, in keeping with its undertaken obligations, it should surrender "to the Tribunal all those who have been indicted".

But, the worst is yet to follow. The Resolution, namely, stresses "concern over the continued uncertainty in respect of the implementation of the Law on Amnesty, which has adversely affected the building of security and confidence among the ethnic communities of Croatia". Having, thus, listed all this in the introduction, the Resolution coolly concludes that "the situation in Croatia continues to pose a threat to international peace and security". This painful assessment that Croatian politicians, in reality, despite all publicly proclaimed principles of peacefullness, continue to practice dangerous brinkmanship along a thin line separating war from peace, concludes by UN's resolve "to ensure the security and freedom of movement of all UN peace-keeping staff in the Republic Croatia", and intends to continue to act in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nation's Charter. Let us emphasize in this context, although this is quite well-known after the six-year presence of UN troops, Chapter VII of the Charter is also called its "war part", which clearly impresses upon all those whom it may concern that, if need be, military force will also be used to fulfill the mission's objectives.

As far as Croatia is concerned, this was said quite explicitly, just in case: item 12 of the Resolution literally says that, if the need arises, the UNTAES "will take all necessary measures, including close air support, to defend UNTAES and, to the extent necessary, aid the withdrawal of UNTAES". When all this is borne in mind and compounded with some other parts of this unusually harsh text - which we will discuss a bit later - the long face of the Croatian Minister of Defence as well as of his colleagues who came to bid farewell to the departing soldiers, is quite understandable.

Susak understands perfectly well the meaning of the double warning about the possible use of military force in the event the country which "is a continuing threat to international peace and security" decides to end by military means what Klein has persistently been trying to achieve in a peaceful way. A country which still has hopes that the door to the Partnership for Peace, the door which makes it possible to dream the sweet dream of accession to NATO at a certain point in the future, is at least ajar as far as it is concerned, would not be well advised, even for a short while, to antagonize that same NATO.

There are at least another two things in the Resolution which dangerously raise the adrenalin level in the blood of top Croatian politicians. Those are item 8, which says that the mandate of UNTAES will be extended until January 15, 1998. The difference between the word extended and ended is so evident that it must be a thorn in the side to even the absolute political novice. The mandate of UNTAES, at least as far as Resolution 1120 is concerned, namely does not end on January 15, next year, it is only being extended until that date. And where exactly the shoe pinches is best seen in item 11 of the Resolution, which literally says that "the speed of the gradual transfer of executive responsibilities" will depend on "the demonstrated capacities of Croatia to give assurances to the Serbian population and to successfully complete peaceful reintegration". If one needs translate this at all, it could be more or less translated in this way: Dear Sirs, the Danubian area will not be given to you and how and when you will enter it, depends on your preparedness to respect the rules of the game". This translation is here just for the sake of recognizing in it that American handwriting, the handwriting that even without the aid of an expert graphologist can be ascribed to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright with certainty.

But, as the Americans have realized that even so clearly formulated Resolutions could be read here quite differently from what they say, they sent to Croatia Bill Richardson, the American representative to the United Nations who has replaced the current State Secretary at her previous post. He has spoiled President Tudjman's summer holidays on Brioni forcing him to finally give up his stubborn pre-election position that there would be no massive return of the Serbs to Croatia.

Accompanied by Peter Galbraith, Tudjman's favourite "tractor diplomat", he visited Vukovar on Sunday, July 20, where Galbraith with undisguised pleasure read to journalists a statement the Croatian President gave to Richardson a day earlier. This statement, quoted by Galbraith reads as follows: "Considering the fact that peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian area will be completed within the following six months, Croatia now agrees to the return of all the Croatian Serbs who wish to return and accept the rights, responsibilities and legal obligations stemming from the Croatian citizenship". I do not think it necessary to explain the importance of thus formulated message, concluded Galbraith finding it hard to hide his pleasure at showing Tudjman what a "tractor diplomat" can achieve.

And while the Croatian officials - still unaware that only a few days later the President will finally capitulate before the Americans regarding the most sensitive question of his "firm" policy against the wide-scale return of the Croatian Serbs - sullenly observed the small military parade staged on the occasion of the departure of the Pakistanis, Jordanians and Argentines, the Serbian leaders, Milos Vojnovic and Vojislav Stanimirovic, did not hide their exaltation over the Resolution. He "welcomed" its contents as "an extremely important act which instills optimism among the local Serbian population" (Vojnovic), while Stanimirovic considered its highest value to lie in the fact that it spoke not only of "the bi-directional return of refugees to and from the UNTAES regions, but of all displaced persons, to the places of their previous residence". Stanimirovic thought the part of the Resolution which speaks of the reduction of the UNTAES military component, particularly important.

"It is a fact that military forces will be halved by October 15", says Stanimirovic, "but it is also a fact that a new report will be submitted to the Security Council at that time on the situation in the UNTAES region, on the respect of human rights, implementation of the Amnesty Law, as well as the assessment of the success of the return of refugees". And, according to the SDSS President, that will be crucial in deciding whether the UNTAES mandate should be only extended till January 15, 1998 or ended on that date. Being a practical man, the departing Transitional Administrator Klein, arranged the signing of the Agreement on the Joint Council of Communes (ZVO) on that same day and at the same place where Susak, Matesa and Radic were sullenly bidding farewell to a half of the contingent, which the Croatian side constantly avoided till then.

Although it is probably not fully clear either to Vojnovic (who is the ZVO President) or to Stanimirovic, who is the author of the idea, what will this body with "legal frameworks" really mean and what authority it will really have, the opposition of the Croatian Government to put its signature on such an insignificant document, actually speaks of the obstruction of the obligations undertaken. ZVO, as originally conceived by the local Serbian leadership, should have served as a substitute for their desire for the UNTAES region to remain territorially and politically integral, instead of being divided into two districts. However, after the April elections and the "loss" of some communes the Serbs had counted with, as well as the electoral defeat in Vukovar, that substitute of the "integral territory" lost its sense to such an extent that no one really understands its meaning.

Saying good-bye to a number of soldiers with whose help he completed an important part of the task, but also packing his own suitcases, Klein took advantage of the opportunity to hint at "the two critical months" ahead. He said that in front of Susak, Matesa and Radic, and probably at the top Croatian level also. But, obviously not only to them. Before the Resolution 1120 was distributed, Klein had a good chat with Kofi Annan which was probably the reason why Croatia was reminded of the closeness of NATO. Unfortunately, not in the sense the current Croatian authorities eagerly hope and desire, but in the sense that the mention of the "close air support" in the Resolution did not come out of the blue sky which is - what a coincidence - here too controlled by NATO.

DRAGO HEDL

(AIM)