Belgrade-demilitarization of Slavonia?

The Serbs and the Croats on the Danube

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DEMILITARIZATION OR FORCING THE DANUBE

AIM Belgrade, 17 July, 1997

The plan of withdrawal of the remaining UNTAES forces from eastern Slavonia (the first part consisting of two thousand soldiers left Slavonia on 15 July) which was elaborated by the man who was until recently the administrator of the UN transitional administratiion in the region, Jacques Klein and which was approved in the seat of the world organization, consists of two phases: the first will last until 15 October by when most of the three thousand soldiers and officers should be gone, and the second which will end on 15 January next year, when the remaining 720 members of UNTAES are expected to leave Slavonia. This would mark the completion of the process of peaceful reintegration of eastern Skavonia, Baranja and western Srem into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

And what then: will the bordering regions on both sides of the Danube - fifteen kilometres both of the territory of Croatia and of Yugoslavia - be demilitarized as Jacques Klein had proposed and as it was approved at the palace on the East River, or will the two parties watch the Danube only through the sights of their guns?

Having been put in the service of nationalistic frenzy, the armament of former Yugoslav army, the remaining two thirds of which have changed their name into the current Army of Yugoslavia, has left indelible dishonourable traces especially in eastern Slavonia. The psychological burden of the essentially great defeat of the mentioned armament has not disappeared even after six years, and with different prefixes and with unequal intensity they may appear on both sides of the river and as an obstacle to the idea of demilitarization.

In the project of "Greater Serbia" which has again proved to be disastrous for the Serb nation (but which despite everything and unfortunately has not been definitely buried!), eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, apart from having economic significance on both sides of the Danude, of course, played the strategic role of a bridge-head which has served the local geo-politicians and army leaders as the foundation for quick penetration by means of "armoured spokes" towards Zagreb via highways down the Drava and the Sava river valleys.

Nowadays, when there are no bridge-heads any more, when the forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have been withdrawn to the other side of the Danube and when respective forces of Croatia should take the position vis a vis these forces - any expansionist idea is completely irrational and militarily illogical, so that it would make no sense even in interpretations of such nationalistic extremists such as, for example, Vojislav Seselj. That is why fear mostly of Croatian nationalists of an "aggression from the east" is quite unfounded.

Chances of the other, Croatian armed forces to undertake an aggressive raid across the Danube are even poorer and they truly belong in the sphere of pure science fiction, so that probably not even the former ardent supporter of "Croatia all the way to Zemun", Dr Sime Djordan, would dream of such a sucidal move. The rumours around here, however, especially popular among the military circles of expressed nationalistic provenance, about alleged danger threatening Serbia, i.e. FR Yugoslavia, from the Croatian side - are in fact something quite different.

In the annals of foolishness of the military establishment of the dead and buried former Yugoslavia is the "gem" made up to justify "levelling Vukovar to the ground", according to which the Croatian side of the Danube river valley was supposed to be some kind of a "platzdarm" of Germany for its expansion down the Danube towards the south, so it was necessary to beat the Germans and their Croat servants to it. After operations Flash and Storm of the Croatian army, when the Croatian forces in full swing were ready to wipe out even the then most powerful 11th corps of the army of the so-called republic of Serb Krajina and all its legal and illegal supporters in special and other units of the Army of Yugoslavia - the thesis about "Broz's borders" from the time of after the Second World War was reactivated in official Belgrade and supported by the media, which not only went along the river Danube itself, but "included both banks of the Danube from Batina to Apatin". itself

And what will happen when the Croatian army comes to these borders? "Military experts" loyal to the regime and "experts" in the service of the "national cause" claim that nowadays the "security architecture on the territory of former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans has radically changed": in mid 1995, "downtown Zagreb was (still) just 27 kilometres from Serb cannons and rockets", and nowadays, military facilities in the vicinity of Sombor, on Fruska Gora, and even the army airport in Batajnica are "controlled by Croatian cannons and rockets".

Roughly speaking, that is where according to official interpretations "raison d'etre" should be sought of the exit of certain units to the border with Croatia, which should at the same time be a valid reason why the Yugoslav party is making up various conditions for Klein's initiative on demilitarization of the region and "tightening the rope" whenever it can.

As concerning Croatia, it is more cooperative concerning demilitarization of the Danube river valley. This is probably dictated primarily by interests of Croatia, that is its wish to reintegrate eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem under its "state roof" and to brighten up as much as possible the mostly black image of the Croatian regime the world has acquired especially after operations Flash and Storm and crimes committed against the Serb population.

The Serb, i.e. the Yugoslav party is objctively in a completely different position. It has no more "estates" across the Danube in eastern Slavonia and believes that by giving them up it has made the biggest possible concession to the opponent to peace and security in the region. That is what Milosevic is exploiting now. In a very limited manoeuvring space, except for haggling, prolonging and conditioning demilitarization of the Danbe river valley and Prevlaka, Slobodan Milosevic practically has no other trump card in the game with the international community, which is becoming more and more difficult for him.

It is possible that this is the reason why the recent declaration of the spokesman of the foreign ministry of Croatia, Zeljko Trkanjac, that "Croatia will not and cannot agree to unilateral demilitarization of the region along the border with Yugoslavia", has hardly been registered in the media here, more precisely, only on the margins of certain independent newspapers.

The statement was made after the official Zagreb had found out the results of negotiations Jacques Klein conducted separately with the head of the general staff of the army of Yugoslavia Momcilo Perisic and with, by now his formal, commander-in-chief, Slobodan Milosevic. Although Klein spoke about the results of negotiations in diplomatic gloves, it could easily be concluded that demilitarization had not been approved by either Perisic or Milosevic. General Perisic is, indeed, an insignificant personage and just obeys what he is told. But, in this case, by conditioning and prolonging demilitarization of the mentioned bordering area, and by expressing this as his own stand, he is creating the illusion about his significance, or rather the significance of the army of Yugoslavia, and this is the image which suits Milosevic just fine.

It is, therefore, obvious that in this case demilitarization is in the gap between two parties which with equal energy compete for the primacy of military force in the region. It is possible that Jacques Klein and the international community will compel both parties to consent to demilitarization. But, from compulsion to good neighbourly relations, cooperation and mutual confidence, a lot of waters will pass under the bridges over the Danube.

Stipe Sikavica

(AIM)