POSTELECTION REARRANGEMENTS

AIM Zagreb, 17 June, 1997

When immediately after publication of the results of presidential elections Vlado Gotovac said in a statement for television that Zdravko Tomac fared better (over 21 per cent of votes) than he did (below 18) thanks to the disciplined support of his party - spontaneous laughter sounded in the election headquarters of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). "We had not known that we had a few hundred thousand members", they commented gaily, quite content that their party was getting support of an increasing number of citizens, especially in cities.

    Nevertheless, the observation of Vlado Gotovac is

quite close to what actually happened in these elections. Franjo Tudjman triumphed in these elections, and his party has the largest number of members who proved to be the most consistent in all elections so far, and these same attributes, although reduced approximately three times, may since recently be applied to the SDP as well. On the contrary, the poor result of Vlado Gotovac in the elections is the expression of the deep crisis the coalition of opposition parties is going through, which has been abandoned by almost all the voters. This is the punishment for disunited appearance of the opposition parties in the recent local elections, when it had been expected that they would run with a joint list of candidates and in this way crown the very successful parliamentary coalition from the 1995 elections (the new assembly), and the even more successful coalition in Zagreb where the union of seven parties won a big majority that same year.

However, the opposition not only failed to remain on this fruitful track, but completely ruined it, because after the local elections numerous elected councilmen started going over to the HDZ bringing it power past the election results. Councilmen from parties which resisted united running in the elections of the opposition led the way, mostly those from Tomcic's HSS and Gotovac's HSLS. The result was that Gotovac fared exceptionally badly especially in places where defecting had the most destructive consequences (Zagreb, Zadar, Bjelovar, Osijek...). In places where the opposition had remained united and preserved or won power, Gotovac won the majority (Istria) or achieved quite a good result, sometimes even better than Tomac (Split) and sometimes just as good (Rijeka).

Success achieved by Gotovac produced an effect which may have a far-reaching meaning, and perhaps have a decisive influence on the entire political scene of Croatia. His candidacy was directly supported by nine opposition parties (and indirectly, a few others), the two greatest parliamentarian parties inclusive (HSLS, HSS). When such a large group of parties attracts only about 17 per cent of the voters, it is not at all exaggerated to conclude that the bulk of the Croatian opposition has been removed from the scene and that only two relevant parties have remained on it (HDZ, SDP). Gotovac himself, as the first victim of this sudden and feverish reduction of the opposition, declared with disappointment that "the political centre" did not operate as he had expected, although it would have been much more appropriate to say that it has completely dissolved and ceased to exist.

    This was, after all, implied by Gotovac when he said

that there was the danger of creation of a bipolar political system between the HDZ and the SDP, which in the longterm is quite suitable for the ruling party, since it can always keep this only opposition in its power by means of the already verified repertory of ways to alarm the public against the new "communist threat". But, longterm projections are not even necessary. It is clear that lining up for parliamentarian elections in 1999 has already begun, as they will be fatal because they will be a test whether HDZ will continue to rule without Tudjman. Only the SDP is capable and ready for this line-up, while all the other opposition parties are torn apart by internal divisions, so that some are struggling for bare survival, and the others will very soon be in the similar situation.

But, not even that is the worst thing of all. It is evident that some opposition parties which have the largest number of turncoats who have joined the HDZ and subsequently changed election results, are beginning to take part in generating a deep political crisis in the country equally as the ruling party. That is why it would perhaps be better if some of them disappeared and gave up their places to new parties which will more readily wait for new challenges. Indeed, it should not be expected that anyone in these parties would agree with this. But this by no means diminishes the impression that if the notion has been true that the Croatian opposition scene has practically dissolved and that the possibility of building another, a completely new one should be considered - it is here and now.

The larger than ever number of abstainers in these elections also speaks in favour of this thesis. For more than forty per cent of them, it can without any doubt be said that they were mostly recruited from among the disappointed and disgusted supporters of the opposition. On several occasions they had offered high support to the opposition, and even given it power, like in Zagreb, but it did not know how to take it over, and ended up quite openly putting the won mandates up for sale. Every sense of going to the polls was destroyed in this way, because it is becoming clear to everyone that, with or without elections, nothing changes. Not only at the top echelons of the authorities, but even on the lowest, most commonplace levels of local self-administration.

It is, therefore, not at all surprising that immediately after the elections, the press controlled by the regime made a big effort to prove that such high abstention was no problem at all. The same is happening, they claim, in many western countries, the USA inclusive, where the number of those who vote in the elections at times drops below fifty per cent. Of course, it is quite clear that comparison with these old, well run-in democracies, where rotation of parties in power has a long time ago become routine, has not much sense. Moreover, this is probably intentional throwing dust into the people's eyes, aimed to hide the fact that, when the number of voters who supported the opposition is added to the number of abstainers, the support Tudjman got drops to only one third of the electorate (in absolute figures, this number amounts to about 250 thousand votes less than in the previous elections in 1992, but expressed as a percentage it turned out to be a few per cent - more).

Even the endlessly faithful and obedient state media should know that this fact in the autocratic model of power such as ours will cause even further straining of political tensions and antagonism (presidential systems are "hard" only thanks to the alibi of direct election of the president, but when that begins to crumble, they can rely only on the alibi of naked force). The tensions will by no means be eased by further destruction of opposition parties, nor by drawing more and more power from the same, but decreasing electorate. Therefore, it can be said that despite the so far most convincing victory won by the HDZ (or its candidate) in the elections, this type of power has drawn a full circle which is impossible to step out of.

It is possible, of course, to draw up other scenarios in which the number of votes won in an election will not play any role whatsoever. And it is possible that the Croatian political saga has already started in that direction, and that the ruling party has disarmed some of its last opponents which had stood on its way. But then it will without doubt be forced to enter a duel with its external opponents who are much more powerful than it is and who could apply methods on it which will not at all be more gentle than those it is applying in the country.

MARINKO CULIC (AIM)