FRY FACING A DEEP INTERNAL CRISIS

After Milosevic's Nomination for President of Yugoslavia

Relations in the two-member federal state are approaching a phase which is resembling the beginning of the definite dissolution of the former SFRY

AIM Belgrade, 11 June, 1997

With its demand that Montenegro agree to constitutional amendments in order to enable Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to be elected president of Yugoslavia in direct elections, the Serbian regime has created a new dimension of the Yugoslav political crisis questioning the very existence of the federal state. When back in 1991 he realized that former SFRY was splitting along all its seams, in order to preserve Yugoslavia in any possible form, Milosevic was generous in his offers, and by the known "Belgrade initiative" invited Alija Izetbegovic to be the first president of the newly-formed federation, and gave the possibility to Montenegrin leaders to make their miniature state, 20 times smaller than Serbia, equal with the latter in administering the federal state.

Izetbegovic refused and chose to scheme with Franjo Tudjman instead, and the "three war comrades" from Montenegro swallowed Milosevic's hook. After the experience Izetbegovic had with Tudjman, and Montenegrin leaders in the meantime with Milosevic, probably both the one and the others feel they had made a big mistake. Privileges Montenegro got with the Constitution made on mount Zabljak, that is to enter with Serbia into the Yugoslav marriage on equal terms, are now coming down on them like a ton of bricks, because the Serbian leader, used not to have to account to anybody for his moves is asking to carry out the duty of the president of Yugoslavia without the control of the federal parliament, which is violation of the equal status of the Montenegrin state in the two-member federation and a risk that it will have to pay the bill for Milosevic's political failures.

So far the Serb nation had to pay these bills, and this destiny was shaped for it in the future as well, because Milosevic made it clear to US Secretary of State, Medeleine Albright that he was resolute to continue to sacrifice his people by having refused to meet the obligations taken by signing the Dayton accords, convincing his guest from the USA that the Serb nation was ready to continue to endure the outer wall of sanctions, which completely paralysed Madeleine Albraight. Ten days after that the American administration prolonged duration of the sanctions for another six months. This means that until the end of this year, doors of international financial institutions will remain closed for Serbia which needs foreign capital for moving production from the standstill as badly as a thirsty man a drop of water in the desert.

Because of the shortage of foreign loans, the Serbian regime has decided to sell the most valuable resources, such as the telecommunications, and since the promised money is not sufficient, it remains to be seen what will be next. Whether it will be electric power generation plants or roads and railways. Communications will be taken into consideration only when European centres of power decide which directions will be considered as strategic. If they do not pass through Serbia, interest of foreign buyers will diminish.

Whether Montenegro will join Serbia in this unfavourable international environment depends on the decision of its leadership to offer support to Milosevic to take the leading and unquestioned post in the federal state or not. The key issue which demands an answer is whether small Montenegro can resist big Serbia. A similar question was put before dissolution of the SFRY when it was assessed that small Slovenia would not be able to break away from Milosevic's intention to win for Serbia the key role in controlling the then federal state. Milosevic's concept of one man-one vote was beaten by Slovenian formulation according to which a citizen of a republic cannot be represented in the federal state as an individual, but solely as a member of the collectivity of his parent state.

Slovenia which had always enjoyed a special status in former SFRY, because with eight per cent of the total Yugoslav population it created 15 per cent of the joint social product and had 50 per cent influence in federal decision-making and sometimes even more, wrenched free from Serbian hegemony and pulled majority of the other federal units along with it, so that the Yugoslav federation was reduced to just two members. FRY still has not succeeded to return to international political and financial institutions, but it is not exposed only to foreign suspicion. It has practically not been recognized even by Serbia itself, and the best confirmation for that is the fact that the text of the Serbian Constitution has not been adapted to the federal.

This results in the for years established practice that Milosevic, although president of only one of the two federal republics, represents FRY in majority of foreign affairs, and he has achieved this thanks to the unwillingness of the Montenegrin leaders to oppose him. When quite open warnings and disagreements began to arrive from Montenegro due to Milosevic's practice to exceed authorizations, the Serbian regime jumped down the throats of critics from Mntenegro, primarily Milo Djukanovic and his supporters.

That is how Slovenia got into the position Slovenia was once in, exposed to insatiable campaign of the Serbian regime in which only Milosevic is considered to be worthy of the post of the president of FRY, with the explanation that he is the guarantor of stability of the country and its good position in the international community. This is repetition of the practice of merciless destruction of anybody who thinks differently, and this confirms that the Serbian regime has not learnt the lesson from the past ten years which were probably the most difficult for the Serbian nation in its history. The recipe according to which the former SFRY was destroyed is being repeated, although the Serb nation fared the worst in it. The regime is again announcing readiness to bear the new burden of isolation because of it, and everyone knows who will in the end have to pay the bill.

Montenegrin leaders, who once enjoyed privileges approved by Milosevic himself are nowadays mostly experienced by him as a threat to his political career. The constitution of the republic prevents him to run for president of Serbia for the third time, and Montenegro is not ready to enable him to act politically independently from the post of the president of Yugoslavia. It would approve of his becoming president of FRY under the condition the modest list of authorizations Zoran Lilic had is not broadened. With such modest range, even as president of the FRY, Milosevic is less dangerous than the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) who keeps the keys of the federal state treasury.

The Montenegrins still have not forgotten one of the greatest world superinflations from 1993, nor this year's monetary shock in January which amounted to several hundred million dinars. That is why they resolutely refused to accept the offered Serbian candidates for the post of the governor of NBY. The Serbian regime proposed Jovan Zebic and Nikola Stanic, but both were rejected because, it was said, they did not to enjoy confidence due to their previous moral credibility. This smack on the face is the result of the monetary shock Serbia caused also back in 1990 when 2.5 billion dollars for pensions was put into circulation from the primary issue. This was a classical financial knockout for the then prime minister Ante Markovic, from which he was not able to recover. Obviously the Montenegrin leadership has not forgotten this.

In view of the fact that the international community distinguishes Serbia from Montenegro, because the latter can count on certain privileges, it is understandable that its leadership is primarily eager to preserve monetary stability, that is to prevent Serbia to transfer capital into its empty funds. That is why the Montenegrins find it easier to settle down for the proposal for Milosevic to be the president of FRY, as long as his men stay away from monetary policy as far as possible. This is not good enough for the Serbian regime, though, because it wants it all - both the power and the money.

Ratomir Petkovic (AIM)