ELECTIONS FOR ELECTION OF TUDJMAN

Zagreb Jun 6, 1997

AIM Zagreb, 1 June, 1997

"If I become the president of the state, I will go on living in my basement flat, I will visit the same coffee shops, and I will completely change the atmosphere in the Presidential Palace", Zdravko Tomac had declared before he set out on his election campaign in a humble van in which he intends to tour the whole country. At the same time, Franjo Tudjman organized first on the occasion of his 75th birtday, and then of the Day of the State, and finally of the opening of the election campaign, several fancy receptions for clientele of several hundred associates, relatives, friends and flatterers he is surrounded with. His election program is extremely simple and can be brought down to continuation of the former state policy, and his election strategy approximately corresponds to it. He will mostly spend it at home (the exception is the visit to Vukovar, conceived as the highlight of the campaign), but he will be on television every night, at least for ten times longer than the other two "challengers" put together.

It is quite certain that in majority of European countries the former candidate would be awarded for his campaign, however clear it may be that it is on the verge of demagogy, while the latter would be punished for arrogance and lack of good taste. In Croatia, however, this rule does not apply at all, and therefore it is quite possible that Vlado Gotovac (colloquially known as "Croatian Havel") and Zdravko Tomac (who proclaimed himself a follower of Olaf Palme), even put ogether, can neither threaten nor even force to run in the second round, the "Croatian Bismarck" (as Tudjman was named most probably by his own choice, by the regime-controlled press).

Indeed, perhaps these nicknames best illustrate how completely uninteresting the forthcoming elections will be, and even their impracticability and futility in the present circumstances. It is obvious that the two opposition candidates are competing not with the classical head of the state, but with a powerful ruler who is not backed only by his party but also by the entire mechanism of the state (which is mostly engaged in keeping the Croat Democratic Community-HDZ in power, and which just with the remaining force resolves economic, social and other problems of the country). What is even more important, the public does not seem to have any major complaints against all that, one might even claim just the opposite. A recent investigation showed that as much as 75 per cent of Croatian citizens would gladly put their signatures in favour of the stance that "a nation without a leader is like a man without his head", and even more of them, 84 per cent, believe that "everybody needs a powerful state". It is evident that the Croats are still in an acute, patriotic fever, which is confirmed by 87 per cent of the subjects who agree with the offered stand that "each inch of Croatia is sacred for us".

Recently published in an independent weekly, this poll seems to be ridiculing the opposition candidates who are quite unnecessarily wearing out their voice chords and vehicles of their parties. These are not classical elections, but a kind of re-inauguration on the highest post in the state, and however discouraging it may sound, gala festivitivies organized by Tudjman for his flattering guests are indeed more adequate than appealing of his rivals for legal order and social justice by loudspeakers. In such a situation, the elections have some sense just in order to determine which one of Tudjman's counter-candidates will get more votes, which is important in order to establish the momentary rating of opposition parties and their leaders, and due to the hope of "challengers" that the one who is the second now can one day be the first.

    Weighing out forces of the two opposition candidates

reflects almost everything that at the moment marks the Croatian opposition scene. Zdravko Tomac appears as a candidate only of his own, Social Democratic Party (SDP), although the SDP is the only one of the large parties which has declared a year ago that it would give up its own candidate if the opposition agrees about a joint candidate. Finally, majority of parties (two biggest ones, the Liberal and the Peasants', and another eight) indeed supported the joint candidate Vlado Gotovac, but the SDP was not among them. The split appeared already in the local and regional elections held the month before last when the Liberals and the "peasants" separated from the until then comparatively monolithic opposition alliance and when for the first time a sharp ideological disassociation from "reformed communists" occurred in the ranks of the opposition.

That is how the SDP was left alone, although not long after the elections, the idea about foundation of the group of "left centre" appeared, which would gather several medium-sized and minor parties around the SDP. The idea was given up though, partly because of the fear of the SDP to take over the job of the "leader" in the opposition - which it had already been severely attacked for - and partly because its disappointment with the other parties and doubts that anything can be achieved with them. In the local elections, the SDP experienced the biggest success, bigger even than the predominant winner the HDZ, by having created (like the ruling party) a comparatively stable electorate. This will be its secure support in the presidential elections as well, and it is quite probable that this body will continue to grow at the expense of rival parties in the opposition majority of which have fared depressingly badly in the local elections, and after that cheaply sold the hardly won mandates and formed a series of coalitions with the HDZ on the local level.

As concerning Gotovac, as many as nine opposition parties gathered around him, which is the largest group which has ever gathered at a joint job. But this is more of a perfunctory, hastily patched up union than a carefully composed association joined by some solely in order to avoid nominating their own candidate, and by others because they do not have a candidate of their own, and yet by others in order to disassociate themselves from the presidential aspirant of the SDP. In such a diversified company, Gotovac would stand a chance only if Tudjman would lose the inclination of the public. As it is, it is more probable that their possible voters will disperse, because hardly anyone has a clear motivation why he should vote for him and noone else. Nevertheless, it seems that the HDZ fears Gotovac who could unite the greatest portion of the opposition parties more than it fears Tomac who would remain alone like he is now. Besides, the HDZ already has a fully prepared arsenal of ideological weapons against the SDP's candidate who would be accused, like in the local elections, of an attempt to restore communism, which simply cannot be linked with the name of Gotovac.

In the more than narrowed manoeuvring space, two opposition candidates chose election programs which seem more confused and extracted by force than carefully elaborated. Tomac lays stress on social justice as presented in the program of SDP, which was evidently the condition for his nomination (the Social Democrats decided to do so in the minute to twelve, because they seem to have feared of his becoming more popular than the party itself and when he did - more inclined to the centre than to the left as he is - that he would detach himself from it). Gotovac concentrated on the classical "basket" of civic freedoms, depoliticized state, local self-administration, concern for socially most vulnerable groups etc., obviously trying to meet wishes primarily of the diversified party electorate which nominated him.

    Both candidates insist on dismantling enormous power

of the current "semi-presidential system", and although there is a great deal of demagogic talk in it - they also insist on urgent transfer of authority to the Assembly, and the HDZ has more than comfortable majority in it - this is nevertheless the most convincing item of their campaign. But, in the light of the mentioned reception of the "leader" in the public, this is not a firm enough foundation for building great election plans on it. Especially because in some key issues - return of the Serbs, national "reconciliation", bringing war criminals to justice - Tomac and Gotovac show that they are not a true alternative to the authorities.

MARINKO CULIC