KOSOVO IN THE SERBIAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

AIM Pristina, 24 May, 1997

The last time Kosovo Albanians took part in the Serbian elections was in late 1989. The delegates of the Assembly of Kosovo elected at those elections were selected according to the strictest criteria of moral and political suitability. Therefore, both the opposition and non-communist Albanian public considered them to be the most pro-Serbian parliament to be elected in the last 30 years. It seems that this made the Belgrade authorities very happy, but the fact that the Albanians had turned out at the elections made them even happier. Namely, it was thought that this signified a definite legalization of the new state introduced by the anti-bureaucratic revolution and the 1989 constitutional amendments whereby the autonomy of Kosovo had been formally and practically revoked.

Carried by the wave of general enthusiasm, the Serbian public practically did not notice that the Albanians received these constitutional changes with much opposition to which the Serbian authorities responded with extensive repression and use of fire arms, while the relations with the Albanians practically came on a verge of a historic rupture. The Serbian public and its official authorities interpreted the last expression of Albanian opposition to such an act (participation in the 1989 election) as the green light for an uncontrolled final show-down with the Albanians. Almost contemptuously they rejected the last possibility of reaching a compromise, although it might have prevented developments which led to the situation which exists for already seven years. There is practically no Albanian who has not been affected by drastic Serbian measures whereby the Albanian community was excluded from the political, economic, educational, cultural and general public life.

The short-sighted and brutal Serbian policy brought together all the Albanian political and social strata. Finally, everyone realized that Belgrade would stoop at nothing in establishing the absolute power of the Serbs and Serbia in Kosovo and relations in which they will, according to circumstances, give the Albanians and others in Kosovo with their rights as a present. The Albanians could not agree to such relations and finally decided to break off the relations and start a process which entailed much danger and uncertainty for the future of both sides. Consequently, the most Serbian Parliament became the most Albanian one in only three - four months. In early July 1990 it adopted the Declaration on Self-Determination of the Albanians and after that declared the Kosovo Republic in the beginning of September that year.

Political pluralism which emerged at that time changed nothing in the matrix of relations established in the 1989-1990 period. In fact, it only confirmed, but in a different political configuration, that Kosovo is of vital importance for Serbia and the Serbs. The same goes for the Albanians. That is why accusations exchanged between the Serbs about the sale and betrayal of Kosovo were only an expression of new methods of political competition, especially in the period of the most intensive electoral and pre-electoral calculations.

The Serbian approach to Kosovo at the times of elections may be viewed from different angles. Chronologically observed, there is a marked difference between the approach at the 1990-1993 elections and that at the last year's elections. During the 1990-1993 electoral campaign all Serbian parties used almost identical political categories. Political competition over Kosovo boiled down to the amount of used curses, given promises about introducing even stricter measures against the disobedient Albanian population and readiness to change overnight national structure of Kosovo by all possible means. At that time unrealistic, but now ridiculous, sounded promises about the settlement of 500 thousand to one million Serbs in Kosovo, about the construction of 500 thousand flats for the Serbs in only few years and on the non-violent expulsion of several hundreds of Albanians, allegedly foreign citizens.

After Dayton the time came to settle, at least the political, scores. It turned out that not only had the Kosovo question not been resolved, but rather deepened with even poorer prospects of one-sided solutions being imposed as the lasting ones. That was the real reason behind reciprocal accusations of treason which were heard during the last year's campaign for federal and local elections. But, this was obviously a dishonest electoral instrumentalisation since none of the Serbian parties, not even those which were most zealous in exchanging accusations, showed essential difference in their approach to the Kosovo question.

The nuances in the mutual accusations of the Serbian parties exchanged in the course of the electoral campaign, as well as anti-Albanian harangues the Albanian representatives and analysts interpreted as a confirmation of the Serbian failure and willingness to accept any initiative which could lead to the breaking through the Kosovo blockade. A unified fundamental approach to the Kosovo question does not mean that the Serbian side should have an integrally elaborated approach or programme of solutions. What everyone is offering at the moment is a slight modification of the current situation, which not only the Albanians and the international factors, but also some Serbian, admittedly less influential, segments consider to be far from a solution. Therefore the Albanian side is closely following all the Serbian nuances, including the pre-election ones.

It is considered that the ruling SPS has a very firm stance vis-a-vis Kosovo. For years it has been advocating the consolidation of the existing situation, with possible cosmetic improvements. During electoral campaigns it shifted the emphasis, mostly towards greater insistence on the results achieved, multiplying the promises given to the Serbs and announcing readiness to more severely punish the Albanian disobedience and relentlessness. Among those larger and better known parties, the Serbian Radical Party has more stable position than the SPS.

Other opposition parties show greater flexibility which is partially or mostly influenced by electoral calculations. In the pre-election atmosphere these parties mostly evade any specific statements or resort to vague promises. The Serbian opposition found the best suited pre-election prop-word in the formulation on guaranteeing rights to minorities according to the highest world standards. Albanians mostly interpret this as cynical provocations. Lately, after the recent three-month demonstrations, partially supported by the world, the most famous Serbian opposition leaders present to the Albanians the democratic Serbia as the key to the Kosovo solution.

This thesis, which prominently featured at the New York meeting, may become the main slogan in addressing the Albanians. But, this doesn't mean anything for their aspirations. Generally speaking, in the Serbian pre-election campaigns Albanians are treated as a common electoral masses, exclusively in the function of the Serbian political parties. When the Albanian representatives address the Serbs, as it happened recently during three-month demonstrations, they demand to be accepted as partners in efforts aimed at finding democratic solutions for difficult Serbian-Albanian disputes. But, the Serbian politicians of all orientations interpret these offers only as the return of the prodigal sons to the warm Serbian embrace. Thus Vuk Draskovic presented Demaci's letter of support to the democratic Serbia during winter demonstration and when in Pristina an Albanian teacher was beaten to death in the police premises.

It is in this context that the constantly present subject of the Albanian participation i.e. non-participation in the Serbian elections should be reviewed. All Serbian parties as well as the authorities would like the Albanians to take part in the elections as, essentially, that would put an end to all Serbian-Albanian disputes. Above all, that would legitimize the state introduced with the use of violence in the 1989 - 1990 period. Further more, that would mean that the Albanians renounce all their fundamental political aspirations. It is therefore quite unrealistic to expect an one-sided participation of the Albanians in the Serbian elections. No pressure on the Albanian leadership would help here, as it is not up to the leadership to decide. Anyone who would agree to such one-sided solution would be instantly expelled from the Albanian political scene in disgrace.

However, the participation of the Albanians in the Serbian elections should be observed from the angle of a simple struggle for power between the Serbian parties. In that sense, some parties are not on the level with their invitation to the Albanians to turn up at the elections. This is primarily true of the SRS. The calculation is simple. By not participating in the elections regions which are populated by the Albanians automatically secure 30 percent of deputy seats for the SRS. The SRS would lose that if the Albanians were to vote, which means that it could possibly lose power. It is mostly from this angle that the Serbian opposition observes the Albanian participation in the elections. It wants to use the Albanians but in return does not even give empty promises. The Albanian representatives are aware of these relations. The last they would want is for Milosevic and his party to remain in power. But, the fate of their principles and essential commitments is at stake.

AIM Pristina Fehim REXHEPI