THE CROATIAN UNION OF HERZEG-BOSNIA, VARIANT NO.2

Six and a half years after the first one

AIM SARAJEVO, 22 May, 1997

Only six and a half years, which here seem like eternity, have elapsed since November 18, 1991 when the first Croatian Union of Herzeg Bosnia (HZHB) was established until this May when HZHB was established, but in another form. Nothing is the same, except in the heads of some of those people who on this three-national soil of ours see nothing except for the national element.

"The Study of the Croatian Union of Herzeg Bosnia" which is in circulation these days, offers on 27 Xeroxed pages from the hand of the HDZ B&H authors a closing variant of the policy of one of the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And while the dominating Serbian policy in B&H considers this stage to be over because of the international political situation, the other two policies which are, by force of circumstance (or better said by circumstance of force), sharing the Federation are still demanding the maximum in this stage. In the "Review of the Historical Motives for the Establishment of HZHB" the Croatian political protagonists point to the fact that 98 percent of the Moslems had declared themselves in favour of Islamism in 1991, while today the Bosniacs are trying to present themselves as the only autochthonous inhabitants of Bosnia, in other words, as its owners.

This is disputed by seven "facts" on the Croatian character of Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore the Croats as the oldest nation in B&H as well. Rest assured that some self-styled scientist from the other side had already extolled the two thousand years of the Bosniac nation! And although the historic facts presented in the study stand, if their interpretation perhaps doesn't, it is still unclear how those facts, irrespective of the history, can be invoked as argumentation in a discussion on a topical problem of political relevance. Except, of course, as a means of manipulation which is what brought these nations into a catastrophic position.

We are aware just as those who wrote the second part of the study "The Constitutional - Legal Approach" are, that the Bosniac and Croatian sides differently observe the federalism which is being developed in the B&H Federation, and that that is a source of misunderstandings and reciprocal obstruction of the federal concept signed already in Washington. We are equally aware of the fact that externally imposed federations tend to break up once the external force that held them together vanishes, except in the case of those which were established based on the principles of equality and freely expressed will. With the increasingly frequent stories about the Bosniacs as the oldest, founding, etc. nation, the denial of constitutiveness as an ostensibly communist fabrication, attempts at majorization manifest in the projects of the civic option which the Croats see as "Milosevic's principle" (one man - one vote), the Croatian constituent part perceives federalism in the divided federal rule as a federation of peoples in contrast to the Bosniac federation of cantons.

This actually forestalls a Milosevic-like putsch in former Yugoslavia and is a lament over all that the Serbs have achieved in B&H in the military and political spheres. What other explanation can there be of the statement that after the transfer of functions from HZHB to the newly established authorities, the Croats would be "left without any form of national organization or assembly for the sake of self-preservation and survival" (p.11 states precisely that using the word "organization", which is a cardinal sin in the Croatian language).

That is how things seem on the HDZ side which is offering a concept for the solution of the Croatian question in B&H. But do they view it in the way conducive to resolution of the minority problem in a state? What does the lack of a form of national organization signify? Will not the Bosniacs also lose it when joining the Federation, if and when they transfer jurisdiction to federal authorities in which, for example in the Assembly, there still exists the Chamber of Nations? What about some other organs of the Federation? After all, no case is known of a constituent nation of a state organizing itself as a national community in that state. That is, to put it mildly, surprising. On the other hand, it is understandable if account is taken of the statement of an official of the Croatian people in B&H, who according to the envisaged HZHB scheme should be a delegate to the HZHB Parliament, at a gathering in which he twice referred to Croatia as "our mother country" and thereby contrary to the claims about Croats being the oldest nation in B&H, paradoxically enough, placed a native Herzegovinian in a position of a member of a national minority!?

With such a perception of the Croatian B&H and of itself in that state, the question necessarily arises of the setting up of HZHB. But, claims about the Croatian character of B&H and "justifications" for the establishment of HZHB are at variance, the more so as the Croatian political factor has foregone the constitutiveness of Croats in 49 percent of the B&H territory which went to the Serbs, without having secured a constituent status for its nation in the part of the Federation which is not under its control. Needless to say, the constituent status of the Croats in B&H had never, even formally, been impaired more than now when their strongest party, under the well-known circumstances, controls half of the remaining 51 percent of the Federation.

On the other hand, what does that HZHB signify or may signify from the aspect of a federal partner, as the Moslem-Bosniac side is likes to call itself. It is indisputable that for it this is a pressure of sorts or a reserve "just in case" variant; in other words a response to a reserve variant which is constantly being promoted by the Moslem-Bosniac political protagonist. Here the term "reserve" probably denotes the first one which will spring up at the moment the "external forces" vanish. On the other hand, "the reserve variant" is naturally a substitute for the already defeated variants better known under the names of HZHB and HRHB, as well as the variant on the annexation of a part of B&H to Croatia, which in various forms have been negotiated between Tudjman and Milosevic from the times of Karadjordjevo till now. There is also a third dimension or for that matter, God knows which one, which for all the participants in the already mentioned HZHB Assembly includes a trap of having to share the guilt for the wrong policy and crimes committed in the name of that policy, retroactively. In other words, the transfer of guilt to the collective entity in which HZHB would under new circumstances be represented by the expanded Croatian National Council and which would not only grant pardon, but also give approval for all future political moves.

Where do these reservations towards the statutorily most important factor of the Union's organization come from? Namely, the Assembly would be composed of "the legitimate representatives of the state, federal and cantonal institutions of government", every single one a HDZ politician, representatives of that party, of the HVO, and only after them would come representatives of other structures such as the Croatian emigrants, the Association of the Patriotic War, other Croatian parties, the Bishops' Conference, the Mostar University, "Progress", Central Croatian Society, associations of scientists, writers, journalists, fine artists, political prisoners, sport associations, economic chambers, the Croatian Emigrants' Society, etc...

We do not see the reason why not also representatives of, lets say, two Franciscan provinces, seminaries or...if those from the Association of the 1941-1945 Regular Army Forces are so important? In such a structure, even if it proves sustainable, HDZ would politically dominate while all the others would only serve as a cover for each political move to be made and not only in the future, but also retroactively, for all that has been already done: starting with the loss of Fojnica and Kraljeva Sutjeska, Vares or Travnik, Bugojno or Posavina, up to the heliport and the destruction of the bridge, Stupni Dol and Ahmic. Is the Bishops' Conference ready to accept in this way the practical weakening of the Vrhbosna or Banjaluka Bishoprics? Or amnesty of suspect criminals by the Hague Tribunal. And that would be done if there is an agreement to participate in the project which does not only resemble HZHB or HRHB but actually is that, although now formally with a different face. All the abovementioned aside, with the burdensome legacy with which the HDZ is concluding that marriage, and with which it had threatened others even before, it is courageous if not reckless to enter any union with it be it even so pathetically Croatian and well-meaning as the "Programme Principles" of the mentioned Study state.

Apart from the eminently political reasons for the establishment and existence of HZHB which would again suspend the true centers of power, i.e. institutions of the system (assembly, government, presidency, etc.) or would represent a threat in that respect - all the other reasons still hold and could earn the support but in a completely different form, e.g. as the Cultural Parliament of the B&H Croats. The remaining elements, rightfully emphasized as open problems, could be resolved within the system: halting the emigration of the population and return of refugees, securing of social rights for families of killed fighters, invalids, social care of children, demographic renewal, planning of the economic development, political shaping of the cultural identity of the nation, etc.

It is obvious that activities regarding the setting up of the Croatian Union of Herzeg Bosnia are in full swing. The first rally has already been held in Mostar. A new one is scheduled for May 24 when the formal establishment of HZHB is to be proclaimed. It is interesting that both the decisions as well as the Articles of Association mention Mostar as the venue. As we have said, Mostar is also the center of these activities. And Article 3 of the Articles of Association states that the seat of the Union shall be Sarajevo. Were it not paradoxical it would be symptomatical and would excessively resemble of that union of six and a half years ago, which so unexpectedly moved to Grude and started denying the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, etc. even humanitarian aid brought in by Caritas and negating those same Croats both as people as well as fellow-countrymen.

The problem of remembering, but not of bearing a grudge, is still quite strong, too much present to swallow the same bite once again. Or, perhaps things could be differently put - the federal partner has a solution for that too and will help HDZ homogenize the Croats once again in return for a similar homogenization of the Bosniacs. At any rate we have never been closer to having three closed ghettoes. The Serbian syndrome is so seductively attractive. Can Adam refuse to bite the apple when Eve has already done it and is so benevolently offering it to others? Worse than this would be for Bosniacs to attack this act with their notorious terminology now when things are much clearer than they were in 1991, at least as regards the survival of that part which still exists as Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, does anyone in the world in which a nation is the first and foremost value, understand this?

Zeljko IVANKOVIC