LOCAL ELECTIONS IN B&H

RAIDING BACK YARDs OF THE OTHERS

AIM Sarajevo, 15 May, 1997

When on the eve of last year's general elections, the then Chairman of the OSCE, Flavio Cotti, initiated his B&H mission of postponing elections, having in mind the possibility of European protectorate of B&H for a periof of one year, six months in the least, he was supported by hardly anyone in his intention. Through its diplomat Richard Holbrooke ("the elections must be held, even if they were irregular"), Clinton's administration clearly told him not to interfere with what is the immediate interest of the USA, and leaders of the ruling parties in B&H abominated international protectorate more than any of the domestic opposition. It would have been interpreted as power taken over by force.

Indeed, along with the postwar fear and uncertainty, and the election rules which gave them the advantage, and especially the military, police, media and every other predominance in parts of B&H they controlled, for the ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croat Democratic Comminity (HDZ), general elections were the most convenient way to legalize their respective positions of "unquestioned rulers" acquired in the war. This primarily because in re-establishing the tripartite coalition on the state level, they in no way threatened each other. On the contrary. Declarative pre-election criticism of "those over there" was once again aimed at homogenizing around the ruling national cliques in order to reduce the influence of the opposition in their own back yards, and ensure that they would have the same good old tested partners in (non)implementation of peace agreements. How the ruling parties operate well together "on the high level", and even help each other when necessary was best illustrated by the already legendary voting of the deputies of the SDA in the assembly of Republica Srpska for a proposal of the SDS, and against the opposition's persisting demand that the centre of that entity be moved from Pale to Banja Luka. Krajisnik's sudden outbursts of appreaciation of Izetbegovic after their first post-Dayton meetings in B&H belong in the same group of evidence. In other words, general elections have re-confirmed the partnership, after which they thought of the stupid and contrary to the constitution idea about two prime ministers (so-called co-chairmen), then there was invalidation of the Dayton accords, and prevention of the return of refugees, the right to private property, freedom of movement, expression... because there is nothing, however bad it may be, that the partners in power cannot agree about if it is in their joint interest.

But, the forthcoming local elections threaten to disturb the "idyllic" picture of synchronized actions of the SDS-HDZ-SDA coalition, and the perfect non-operation of the state, but full operation of the partisan motors. Contrary to the general elections, in local elections the authorities will have to win power in each and every municipality, with candidates on lists well known to the voters. The aureole of party membership may easily prove to be too weak to keep the local sheriffs in power around B&H. Therefore, the untouchable party clans must this time prove their power in the field - in Brcko, Banja Luka, Stolac, Capljina, Bugojno, Drvar, Grahovo, Vares, Srebrenica, eastern Bosnia, Posavina... And that is makes the partners face a dilemma how to make lists for municipalities they have given up a long time ago, or how to decide where a party needs voters the most. In other words, the severity of the forthcoming elections will be reflected on the one hand in the logic - "we are where we are, but we will get even with the opposition at home", and on the other - "we will go with the voters into the back yard of the others, no matter what".

According to the already established relations in this space, the SDS and the HDZ have quickly agreed about the "right" option with which they will run in the elections. Using the never forgotten Karadjordjevic concept, the past frequent meetings of the leaderships of these two parties may be brought down to only one thing - agreement on non-interference into the territory of the other party, which will preserve the partnership, and the dream about ethnically clean territories and division of Bosnia re-affirmed. For the sake of this "big deal", the SDS allegedly must give up all ideas about return of the Serbs to Drvar, Glamoc or Grahovo, which will not be a big favour for the HDZ, but it may even be a pleasure for them to do it. They are as it is fed up with all kinds of coalitions for return of refugees who are screaming that they want to go home and the "treacherous" opposition which is announcing that it will run in the elections in municipalities of the "other state". The HDZ will, of course, pass over in silence 180 thousand Croats from Bosnian Posavina and "forget" that their representative in Dayton almost lost consciousness when he saw maps of division between entities and the entire Posavina in Republica Srpska. A slightly better position the remaining Banja Luka Croats and Catholic Archbishopric will have from now on, are the additional "help" of the SDS to HDZ amnesia. Of course, the HDZ is expected not to make too strong an agreement with its federal partner, the SDA, in the Federation, especially concerning the issue of Brcko.

It turned out that the choice of a single election option is impossible especially for the SDA. This because this party - still chained by its declarative advocating the united and multi this and multi that B&H - is interested the most in regions near the borders which are under its influence or that of the other two parties in power. The logic of coalition exchange like in a marketplace, regardless of the fact that the subject of the exchange are human beings, will most transparently be reflected on the example of Brcko. The SDA is, of course, vitally interested in becoming part of municipal administration of Brcko, especially because results of the local elections will greatly determine the destiny of this city after the end of Farand's mandate. But, without the support of the HDZ, even with the portion of the gathered opposition it can rely on, it will hardly be able to do anything in the city where 18 thousand Serbs used to live before the war, but where 55 thousand of them voted in the elections last year, and where thanks to the notorious clause about the possibility of exceptional voting in municipalities of new residence, the SDS may double this figure, if necessary. On the other hand, decising not to run in the elections in Brcko will bring Izetbegovic's party into the position to publicly admit that this strategically important city for a potential Bosniac state has in fact been given up, along with Srebrenica, Foca, Visegrad, Banja Luka, or even some of the municipalities in Herzegovina dominated by the HDZ at the moment. Therefore, after the ones in Pale and Banja Luka, negotiations can soon be expected between the federal partners, the SDA and the HDZ, all with the aim to make a better offer than the one made with the SDS which preceded it.

Objectively, the SDA is the member of the tripartite coalition which is pressured the most by its opposition at home. The HDZ can quite rightfully brag that there is no alternative in its back yard, and the opposition of the SDS is either too weak or too close to the Belgrade Milosevic-Markovic couple. Along with the most pluralist scene in the part of B&H which it wishes to control, the SDA has since recently the international community on its back which is, after the former completely black-and-white picture of the war in B&H, gradually becoming aware of something quite new - the striking similarity of the three ruling parties. When more and more explicit cries about its own people about war profiteering and nepotism of the current authorities are added, it is no wonder that Izetbegovic himself personally pleaded on state TV that local party leaders carefully choose who would be put on the lists of candidates, because "the people know everything", alluding on various party and family malversations.

The decision to bluntly suggest to the voters to vote in municipalities where they lived before the war would, on the one hand, imply an open conflict in the tripartite coalition because of the unexpected raid in "their back yard", but also dispersion of the electorate, on the other, which is at the moment ideally concentrated in B&H municipalities among which (except perhaps of Tuzla) there is not a single one where the share of the so-called minority nation exceeds 10 per cent.

That is why all three parties are similarly forced to "keep" their voters on the territories about which they are certain they can win power in. In view of interpretation of Dayton accords as a transitional period until division of Bosnia, there is no doubt that the displaced Bosnian Serbs will publicly be forced to vote in municipalities within Republica Srpska. But, votes of the people from Srebrenica, Foca or other former citizens of eastern Bosnia, simiularly like those of displaced persons from Mostar, Stolac or Capljina, will be needed by Izetbegovic's party much more in Sarajevo, Tuzla or even Gorazde, than in places which the mentioned Bosniacs have been banished from. The Croats from Posavina or those from Bugojno, Jablanica and even Sarajevo have at their disposal the safe rocky ground of western Herzegovina or the already mentioned Drvar, Glamoc, Grahovo.

Of course, not even the latest election exchange which awaits us in September would be possible without "a little help of (international) friends". Despite all the statements of the OSCE that it would "correct all the mistakes made in the general elections last year" - which by the way resulted in malversations according to which B&H has more inhabitants now than it used to have before the war - legalization of ethnic cleansing, or humane moving of people, as the authorities prefer to call the trade with people, is still the axis the elections are centred around. The incriminated form P-2 has changed its name and is now called "the possibility of exceptional voting in municipalities of new residence", and it seems that the possibility of this exception will most probably be used by about 90 per cent of the electorate! The main rule of electing will therefore be reduced to ten odd per cent of citizens of B&H. The increasingly confused OSCE does not seem to be able to explain his indeed unique phenomenon of an exception which exceeds the rule. Most probably because it is simply inexplicable.

It is interesting that the American tutors of the Dayton peace accords have not expressed their stand for quite some time (if the punitive telegram which followed izetbegovic's letter is disregarded), especially concerning the forthcoming local elections in B&H. Since it is hardly possible that they are not interested any more in Bosnian delays of implementation of both Dayton and Washington agreements, a statement from the USA can be expected by the end of this month and their stand about local elections in B&H. Last year's insisting of the elections at all costs, in the present conditions, after several years of obstruction of the American solution for Bosnia, which both the Dayton and the Washington agreements are in fact, could this time result in a completely different verdict. Especially because the firmly established Clinton administration now has plenty of time until the beginning of collecting political points for the next American elections. Whatever the American verdict may be, it will neither have to be waited for long nor remain unimplemented (with a little force and some pressure).

Drazena PERANIC