Supporters of Chetniks Dividing Together

Split in the Coalition

Differences between the coalition partners are increasing everyday, and the elections are approaching. The possibility of dissolution of the coalition such as it is is more probable than ever, as well as organization of some new alliances, or establishing of "confederations" among coalition partners, in which every one of them will pursue its own policy.

AIM Belgrade, 13 May, 1997

Fifty six years after the young king of Yugoslavia, Peter the Second Karadjordjevic left the country in front of the invasion of Hitler's bombers and sought refuge with his suite (and a heap of gold, as the opponents of monarchy would say) in London, ideas about restoration of the monarchy and return of the Karadjordjevic family to the throne are coming back to life again. After liberation of the country from the invaders, new communist authorities forbade the king and his family to return, confiscated their entire property and deprived them of the right to the throne, and then established a republican system. In view of the fact that the first Yugoslavia was ruled by a Serbian dynasty, members of non-Serb nations did not have a lot of difficulties in overcoming this change, and the Serbs, like during the war, split into supporters and opponents of the dynasty. It is clear who has lost in this war and postwar struggle (without underestimating, of course, the role of the famous "blind ballots"...), so that for this generation of the Serbs, monarchy is nothing but a romantic myth, experienced by some with thrill as the time of the Old Fame, while the others are indifferent or even feel a repulse aversion to it.

Ever since the establishment of the post-communist multiparty system, the best defined political force which built its image on sentimental feelings towards the past and the Karadjordevic dynasty and flirted with the restoration of the morachy, was the Serb Revival Movement (SPO). This is at the same time the power and the weakness of this big opposition party: with the idea about rehabilitation of the movement led by Draza Mihajlovic as antifascist guerilla which waged war on the side of the foreign (western) allies and the program of restoration of royalism, the SPO quickly attracted and permanently tied to itself a large number of the Serbs who had for decades felt as war losers and victims, passing these feelings on to their off-spring, and those who have always experienced the partisans and the regime which developed from that army as usurpers who would sooner or later leave, and everything would be like before.

At the same time, such rhetoric and iconography of the SPO and its charismatic leader Vuk Draskovic, for years the most beloved and the most hated Serbian opposition politician, was intensely repulsive to all the Serbs (and nothing to say about the other citizens of Serbia) who were not inclined towards restoration of monarchy. That is how this party was constantly "the biggest opposition party in Serbia" (which its leaders never fail to stress), but with an "innate error": its iconographic and ideological rigidity and regressiveness prevented it from broadening the circle of its supporters and winning the majority of votes in Serbia. Without winning the majority, there can be no change of the regime, and without the change of the regime, there can be no change of the system (therefore, the question: republic or monarchy? cannot seriously be considered), without the change of the system, Serbia remains an autistic island in Europe which is emerging... that is how the fruitless walking round in a vicious circle continues in which the authorities are cunningly and deliberately doing their best to identify the entire opposition with the "greasy, bearded, primitive" Serb Revival Movement, and any possible idea of a change is immediately destroyed in the consciousness of an average voter with the following question: You think Sloba (Milosevic) is bad, would you like Vuk (Draskovic) to come to power?!

Although he would never have admitted it, Vuk Draskovic was aware of this image he had, and that is why, ever since the traumatic defeat of the SPO in 1990, always ran in the elections in some kind of a coalition, in order to buffer the odium created among the average Serbian voters against the SPO and Vuk Draskovic himself by combined effects of the regime propaganda (which was always cannibalistically merciless to Draskovic) and numerous errors of the SPO made in conviction that persisting in the most vulgar anti-communist rhetoric could impress the Serbs. Coalition Together was with no doubt the happiest combination of oppositionist uniting in the history of post-communist election competitions, and it has managed, despite poor results in the autumn federal elections, to wim power in almost all the cities of Serbia and in this way gain a considerable advantage for the forthcoming republican parliamentary and presidential elections. The autumn - winter "yellow revolution" organized by the opposition and (impressive) performance of the entire civil and pro-European Serbia for the first time created a real precondition for the democratic opposition of Serbia - at that moment undoubtedly personified in coalition Together - to seriously shake up the rule of personal (or marital) regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The opposition took wings because of the unseen awkward and farcical election theft, and Milosevic was for the first time in serious trouble.

When he finally realized that he must return what he had stolen, the regime did itself the biggest possible favour: faced with the victory, the tactically united democratic opposition did not know what to do with it and how to preserve at least a minimum of "action unity" until the elections on the level of the republic. The old jealousy between the Serb Revival Movement and the Democratic Party (DS), and especially between their leaders Draskovic and Djindjic, was restored in full intensity soon after whistles had become again the exclusive property of traffic police. The biggest stumbling block was the "creative" attitude of coalition partners of the SPO towards the interpartisan agreement on division of posts after victory in the republican elections (which reminded the cynics of the wise slogan about hunting the hare, and cooking it), which prescribed that the SPO should put up a candidate for the president of the republic, the DS for the prime minister, and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) for the chairman of the Assembly of Serbia. The SPO, of course, nominated Vuk Draskovic for the president of Serbia, but the coalition partners did not show much enthusiasm about it. Now, the SPO acts as if offended because of the "treason" of its partners (which strictly and formally speaking, really looks that way), but Zoran Djindjic has the undisputable counter argument: "We need a candidate who can win in the elections, and this can hardly be the satanized Vuk Draskovic; we will not go embraced into defeat just in order to preserve the coalition".

The SPO has no reasonable answer to this argument and that is why it is evidently (and with defeatism?) going back to its "roots" and the story about return of family Karadjordjevic to the throne, rehabilitation of the movement of Draza Mihajlovic and vulgar anticommunist resentment which, in the lack of power on the level of the state, wears itself out in changing names of streets and other manifestations of infantile revanchism, which majority of the citizens are indifferent to, since they are concerned about much more urgent matters than the names of their streets.

The story about re-establishment of monarchy in Serbia and bringing back the dynasty of Karadjordjevic may appear as a convenient way for symbolic disassocition from the unpleasant communist past, but the defect of this school of political thought which cannot be eliminated is that it has no chance of being accepted by the majority of the citizens of Serbia. It is true, as the monarchists repeatedly stress, that modern European monarchies are progressive, rich and democratic states, but it is also true that monarchy is a matter of continuity, and where it is once interrupted and a republic established (which need not at all be communist - see, for instance, France, Germany, Austria, Italy...) there can be no return to the old system. Believing that they are fighting against consequences of the October Bolshevik revolution, Serbian neo-monarchists are in fact waging war against another revolution - the French ... It is also true that the communist historiography has simplified and ruined many aspects of activities of the movement led by Draza Mihajlovic during the Second World War, but serious politicians must take into consideration indoctrination of the citizens which lasted for decades during which they were raised on scenes from films of Bulajic (famous for his romantic picturing of the partisans), even if they were not altogether in accordance with the (always disputable) historical truth.

Differences among the coalition partners are increasing every day, and the elections are approaching. The possibility of dissolution of the coalition such as it is is becoming more probable, as well as of organization of some new alliances, or formation of a "confederation" among coalition partners, in which every one of the parties will pursue its own policy. In this constellation of forces, the SPO may expect a kind of isolation which would split the Serbian opposition into two: the SPO on one and all the others on the other side. This would in the final result, be a considerable benefit for the regime, and the party of Vuk Draskovic would continue to tread down the glorious road Draskovic's wife Danica defined by the thought: "We will continue losing until you get tired of it".

An increasing portion of the opposition believes that losers should become tired of losing and not the winners. As concerning the regime, the "Chetniks" and neomonarchists are the biggest preelection gift which will prolong the period of rule of the current regime long into the third millenium.

TEOFIL PANCIC (AIM)