STRUGGLE FOR SECOND POST

Sarajevo May 8, 1997

UBSD vs. SDP - Split between Sisterly Parties

AIM Sarajevo, 7 May, 1997

In the opposition block which prefers to call itself "alternative", the biggest surprise was caused by seceding of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) from the "Associated List". That is exactly the formulation - about the "SDP's seceding from the coalition", which the remaining four parties from last year's election coalition, especially the Union of B&H Social Democrats (UBSD), tend to use. These parties are running in the elections together again, this time as the '97 Associated List. The SDP, on the other hand, explains the fact that it will run in the elections on its own (as it turned out, as it decided way back towards the end of last year) to its uninformed membership, sympathizers, and even opponents, as the only possibility after the Associated List had "fallen apart". Contradictory declarations of leaders of the SDP ("We shall remain in the Associated List", G. Gojer, 24 April, SDP press conference, "Independently in local elections", Z. Lagumdzija, a day later) accompanied by those of the UBSD, which was still its partner at the time ("the SDP must finally make up its mind what it wants", 23 April, S. Tokic) resulted in the impression that this was a matter only of internal squabbling between the SDP and the UBSD, and even of a personal conflict between Lagumdzihja and Tokic.

The gap between the SDP and the UBSD is much more profound than the explanation about political vanity of its leaders, so that all announcements that the two social democratic party would unite have completely lost their meaning. Moreover, latent differences between the two B&H social democratic parties - or "sisterly", as members of the Socialist Internationale, which both the SDP and the UBSD have become members of, like to devotedly call each other - are strongly cemented for a long time to come, it seems.

The gap, in fact, opened as soon as the Party of Reformists of the last federal prime minister Ante Markovic was founded, which was later succeeded by the UBSD. Indeed, the appearance of the League of Reformist Forces was experienced by former Central Committee of the communists, the remainders of which are still leading the SDP, as treason and a "stab in the back". Due to historical developments, the UBSD still mentions with pride that it follows in the political and economic footsteps of their former party president, Ante Markovic, without hesitating even to speculate with his name for pre-election purposes ("Markovic coming to B&H", Oslobodjenje, July 1996). The current orientation of the UBSD is still explained by the logical development of the reform oriented political option they were created on into - the social democratic one.

The SDP, however, has difficulties in accepting to be called "former communist" even unofficially, trying to suppress from the memory of the public, and its own, the fact that its abbreviartion "SDP" dates back from the first multi-party elections, which then used to stand for "Party of Democratic Changes" which used to stand after the much more prominent at the time - "League of Communists" (SK-SDP). The SDP also cosiders its transformation into the party of social democratic orientation as a logical step after a similar process in the former communists in other states established after dissolution of Yugoslavia. That the theory of mere political giving names instead of political action is untenable is illustrated, unfortunately, by the title of "socialist" born by Milosevic's party even at the time of its extreme nationalist (fascist?) orientation. name

The gap between sisterly social democratic parties was further deepened in the beginning of the war in B&H, more precisely by their relation to the ruling parties, and their exclusive role in defence of the country. The UBSD, for instance, after its leader Nenad Kecmanovic had fled to Belgrade, refused to futher participate in the power in any way, shutting itself into municipal borders of "its" Tuzla. By making "the seventh wonder in the east" of it, Tuzla was supposed to convince the local, but especially the international community that things were not at all bad when the three-party coalition SDS-HDZ-SDA was not in power. The SDP, on the other hand, chose to offer patriotic assistance to the threatened state institutions, at first by taking posts abandoned by the Serbs who had fled, then those abandoned by the Croats, all with the intention to preserve the idyllic image of multi-multi B&H. Not rarely, such engagement of the SDP was presented almost as a specific sacrifice of the party for the sake of the cause of civic B&H. But, in due course, from the ranks of this party and its election lists of candidates, the chairman of the assembly was recruited, then vice prime minister, and even four members of the seven-member Presidency of B&H, a few ministers and diplomatic representatives, which exceeded the good taste of oppositionist behavior, even during the politically flexible wartime period.

And while by election of the then minor leader from Tuzla, Beslagic, for their party head and by wartime transfer of the seat of the party from besieged Sarajevo to Tuzla, the UBSD simply "pushed out" the SDP from the Tuzla idyllic picture of multi-peace, the SDP started paying its first penalty for collaboration with the authorities. Apart from Tuzla, the by now forgotten Vares is also a place where national parties did not win power in 1990 elections, but SK-SDP and with a large majority of votes. But, the SDP objectively could not prevent the Golgotha of "its" miners' Vares which had begun by forcible seizure of military and civilian power by the Croat Defence Council (HVO) and the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) which had its result in a pogrom of Bosniacs and reached its climax in massive banishment of Vares Croats. Durakovic's and Ljuljic-Mijatovic's arm-chair, howeverm, stood side by side with that of then HDZ personnel manager, Franjo Boras, in the Presidency. For the sake of preserving "peace at home", they refused to start any dispute over a "marginal" issue such as Vares.

In fact, the difference in understanding patriotism - which is according to former reformists close to the motto "as far from the power as possible, but as fiercely as possible against it", and on the other hand the slogan of ex-communists whose slogan in compliance with the fifty-year old habit is "take as much as possible from the authorities, and then you might create something positive" - will finally define future relations between the UBSD and the SDP.

Latent disagreement between the two social democratic party reached its climax immediately after signing of the Dayton accords, concerning the most sensitive issue - communication and possible cooperation with the opposition in Republica Srpska which was just emerging. And while the UBSD even before signing of the accords, partly secretly and partly publicly, had meetings with Banja Luka opponents to the policy created in Pale (Perugia, June 1995), the SDP was sharply against such communication marking it as a meeting with "prohibited, terrorist, Chetnik gang" (Nijaz Durakovic, Ljiljan, August 1995).

Last year's joint appearance in the Associated List may therefore be understood as the last attempt to sweeping all unresolved differences between the UBSD and the SDP under the carpet. But, election results showed the defficiency of such an idea. Indeed, after losing its membership in the collective head of the state, loss of the post of the chairman of the assembly, and the image of the opposition which has influence on the authorities, the SDP experienced election results of the Associated List as a complete fiasco. Along with its by now defended position in "its" Tuzla, the UBSD accepted the election results of the Associated List as a step forward, illustrating this by the fact that it had entered all parliaments, form the level of the cantons to the state, by spreading the idea on democratic alternative on the territory of the Federation of B&H, but also by increasing cooperation with the by now differentiated opposition of Republica Srpska.

Despite all the evident disagreements, different views of the rising/declining political path of the Associated List resulted in insisting of one social democratic party (UBSD to reinforce the opposition block by forming the shadow government and connecting both entities, and efforts of the other (SDP) to make away with the Associated List, but so that other coalition parties participate in its dissolution - the Republican, the Muslim Bosniac Organization, and part of the Croat Peasants' Party. It probably would not have been much of a problem for the SDP to win over leaderships of these parties for such a goal, if establishment of the Alternative Council of Ministers in which key personages of the mentioned parties participated had not preceded publicizing of the several month old decision of the SDP to run independently in the elections. The remaining part of the Associated List, but especially the SDP, were placed before an accomplished fact - to remain in the coalition or step out of it.

Of course, once again it will prove that the answer to the question who gains the most by this split in the opposition block is simply - the current regime. With its decision to run in the elections on its own, the SDP shifted the focus of political struggle against the ruling structure to the internal opposition lobbying for "the most powerful in its category". In other words, the struggle for the change of the regime was replaced by the struggle for the second best, since the first should again belong exclusively to the SDA, the HDZ and the SDS. Izetbegovic's party will, of course, be thrilled by this logic. The latest quite identical activities of the SDP and the SDA concerning bitter condemnation of the international community because of their (and not of B&H!?) failure to implement the Dayton accords may be the first step towards new rapprochement of comrades from wartime presidency. Merciless "affinity" both the SDP and the SDA cherish for Tuzla, or rather for taking over power in this city, may also give tribute to allegations that Izetbegovic will try to overthrow Beslagic by means of his deputy in the city, Sead Avdic, who is also the Vice-President of the SDP. ("SDA is not concerned about power, but about Tuzla. That is why it is considering the possibility of offering an arrangement to the reasonable SDP through a coalition and the future post of the head of the city in the person of Sead Avdic", Zmaj od Bosne, August 1995). On the other hand, the UBSD will be left with the role of the leader of dwarf federal parties, if their "plotting" with the international community does not develop from the current inclination, expressed by the USA, for instance, into actual support. Only results of such a support, either via the already mentioned independent bank, or via political channels well-known to the Americans, would give the UBSD and the Associated List back its position of a fighter for change of the regime instead of the position of those who fight for "the excellent second position".

In fact, the latest regrouping in the coalitions, both of parties in power and those in the opposition block point out that we will have elections even before the actual elections. Manipulation with wartime patriotism will hardly be a sufficient screen in the time of peace for political variations in the triangle formed by the nationalistic, the profiteering and the truly democratic orientation. Parties and their leaders will previously, according to their affinities, choose each other, in order to finally enable the voters, instead of in their happy-go-lucky fashion as before, to assume responsibility of choosing the leadeship which will be of service to them, be it in the municipality or the state.

DRAZENA PERANIC