RHETORIC PART OF MARKETING

Beograd Apr 28, 1997

Autonomy of Sandzak between Sarajevo and Belgrade

Special status of Sandzak is not a utopia, but its autonomy of "the highest order" at this moment is feasible just as much as the former so-called Republic of Serb Krajina

AIM Belgrade, 24 April, 1997

Dr Sulejman Ugljanin, President of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, a few days ago publicly declared that conditions had been created for a demand of "the highest degree of autonomy" of this region and that he would not present these demands to the institutions of present Yugoslavia any more, but to the international community which he expected would offer him big help to achieve this. Such a stance is a great deviation from declarations he used to make last year after he had returned to the country under "strange circumstances". Four years ago, he was indicted for alleged subversion against the system and territorial integrity of FRY, and for terrorism. In all states ruled by law, if such indictments are proved to be true, it implies the severest punishments. Last year Ugljanin returned to the country without any problem, which caused speculations and guesses that he had made a "political deal" with the authorities. At the time, he often made declarations claiming that the issue of Sandzak could be resolved solely within the present Yugoslavia and the institutions of its system. In the past month, however, he has often changed his declarations; first he insisted on autonomy, then on regionalization of Serbia and finally, on "special status" for Sandzak. Such variations obviously are not aimed at "deceiving the enemy", but are primarily a reflection of broadening of the topic and in a sense of an attempt to satisfy everybody's taste, at least when speaking of the inhabitants of Sandzak.

It is hard to believe that Ugljanin, being a deputy in the Assembly of Serbia, has not realized before that institutions of the system in this country operate to the extent which the political or the state leadership sees fit at a specific moment.

The local Muslims - Bosniacs fear that he is involved in the perfidious political game aimed at slowing down to the maximum the official proposal of "rump Yugoslavia" to establish full diplomatic relations with B&H. The draft agreement, that is the Memorandum on Understanding, was sent as result of the last year's declarations of Alija Izetbegovic and Slobodan Milosevic made in Paris, in which it is explicitly said that the two states would establish full diplomatic relations. The greatest obstacle is, of course, that the FRY demands from B&H to withdraw the accusation against Serbia and Montenegro for "aggression and genocide". As far as it was possible to learn in Belgrade, Sarajevo will not withdraw the accusation, because by doing it, all the victims and destruction would be disregarded too lightly.

By insisting on the autonomy of Sandzak "of the highest order", Ugljanin is further straining the already strained relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo, diverting attention from much broader diplomatic strategic interests of B&H and FRY. The former state is greatly interested, as the last year's visit of Vice-President of the B&H Federation, Ejup Ganic, showed, in relieving tensions with the neighbour, without forgetting what that same neighbour, directly or indirectly, had done to it during the four-year war. This is part of the new political reality. On the other hand, the FRY is greatly interested in establishing full diplomatic relations with the B&H Federation in order to have the agreement on special relations between Pale and Belgrade ratified by its parliament, which otherwise can have no leagl value pursuant criteria established by the peace agreements from Dayton and Paris.

To a question whether Ugljanin is taking advantage of the opportunity to have the issue of Sandzak put on the agenda before the announced meeting of Izetbegovic and Milosevic in Zagreb, well-informed people in Novi Pazar express great doubt. In fact, majority of them believe that by doing it he is attracting attention more to himself than to the problem. They also express doubt concerning his allegation that he will get "great help" from the international community. As an illustration, they give the example of the decision of the manager of the cultural centre, Azem Hajdarevic, who is also the head of the group of deputies of the List of Sandzak of Dr Sulejman Ugljanin, that the President of the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak, Dr Rasim Ljajic, could not use the rented premises in this building, although he paying all the dues in time. A sharp protest was expressed by American diplomats who had allegedly visited Novi Pazar concerning this case. Ljajic has no intention to leave the premises, but as he said for AIM, he would not make a "political issue" of it either, but find another solution.

Connoisseurs of developments in Sandzak claim that respectable western personages believe that Ljajic is a politician of civic orientation which is illustrated by their numerous contacts with him. This is the reason not only for envy, but also for Ugljanin's attemt to eliminate Ljajic from political life. Apart from that, Ugljanin's "coalition" has discharged all members of Serb nationality from the leading posts after it had come to power in several towns in Sandzak. In doing this, they have imitated other coalitions in Serbia which have relieved of duty members of other parties in companies and institutions, but it always conveys a more powerful and risky connotation in Sandzak than it does elsewhere. Not only because it is a multiethnic environment, but because such moves always revive the issue of "Islamic fundamentalism" and other "isms", the severest consequences of which are felt by ordinary people who are concerned mostly about how to make ends meet. It is no secret that in towns where the Bosniac coalition has won power, the police is extremely "busy", and that this part of the authorities has remained in the hands of the old cadre.

The question of the status of Sandzak will certainly remain open until B&H and FRY do not sign the agreement on protection of rights of ethnic minorities in their respective states. Since the Muslims-Bosniacs are not mentioned at all in either the constitution of Serbia or that of FRY, in other words since they do not have the treatment of an ethnic mionority nor that of an ethnic group, law-makers on this side of the Drina will have to find out that they exist and register them as such.

Since the process of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo has already begun, with all its uncertainties, it seems that giving priority to autonomy of Sandzak of the "highest degree" at this moment might be counterproductive. Instead of giving sharp declarations with no foundation whatsoever, maybe it would be wiser to wait and see what type of autonomy the Serbs in eastern Slavonia will get, in view of the fact that they came to the polls in great numbers. Because, after all, some kind of universal criteria for treatment of ethnic minorities in the newly-established states will have to be established, not because local politicians of any of the parties concerned wish to do it, but primarily because their behavior is conditioned by the Dayton accords, as well as because of certain pressures exerted by key countries. The intensity of the pressure will mostly depend on personal contributions to the war tragedy.

Ejub Stitkovac