NEW YORK AND CORNBLOOM DICTATING MOVES

AIM Pristina, 19 April, 1997

After the Serbian-Albanian round table held in New York (from 7 to 9 April) and the visit of American Assistant Secretary of State, John Cornbloom, to Pristina, stances of parties concerned in resolving the problem of Kosovo have become clearer and more determined than ever before even to the broadest public. Briefly and in a somewhat simplified form, stances of directly opposed parties stated in New York can be presented as complete denial of any solution within Serbia on the one (Albanian) side, and complete denial of any solution without Serbia on the other (Serbian) side.

Cornbloom's visit to Pristina, and especially his views, were a logical and compatible continuation of the talks in New York, showing that these two events were just two parts of a single broader American action in this space, the accomplishments of which can for the time being only be guessed.

Cornbloom had short separate meetings with the Serb and the Albanian representatives in Kosovo. But it became evident that he would not have come to Pristina only in order to introduce the new American envoy for former Yugoslavia. He must have had something very important to say to his interlocutors, even if it were very short. His hosts were not quite clear about what their American guest had told them. But, Cornbloom himself was very clear at the press conference held in the seat of the American Cultural Centre in Pristina.

Cornbloom assessed the current situation in Kosovo, as unsustainable and because of that demanded that the Agreement on Education be implemented as soon as possible, but also that further specific steps be made towards promotion of human rights in other spheres of life. He stressed a few times that this should be done "step by step, by patient negotiations". Without an essential progress in this sense, the USA would not remove the so-called outer wall of sanctions, nor normalize relations with Serbia. All this was more or less known before. However, in his address to members of the press, Cornbloom also stated the stances which at first sight gave the impression of something new or clear that the broad Albanian public has not been familiar with so far. It can also be reliably claimed that many high Albanian political circles had not been acquainted with these stances either.

The American official told the journalists that the idea of independent Kosovo did not contribute to resolution of the issue of Kosovo, that the solution for the time being should be sought within Serbia, but concerning the elections which are being prepared by Kosovo Albanians he did not directly state his stance. He also declared that the USA would remain highly engaged in this region and that he did not believe that its formal mediation would have been more fruitful.

What Cornbloom said in Pristina is similar or even identical to what the document jointly coordinated in New York in the presence of American observers contained. Due to a deep gap between stances of the Serb and the Albanian representatives, the orientation towards seeking an intermediate solution was adopted, which would not influence the ultimate result. International mediation which the Albanians insisted on was defined as an international encouragement and assistance in establishing contacts and conducting talks. As a compromise, the formulation of the Albanians about a dialogue without preliminary conditions was adopted, as well as the statement about adherence to Helsinki principles on borders that the Serbs insisted on, but also the formulation about democratic Serbia.

The Albanian participants were seen off to New York with more or less unconcealed hopes that the round table could mark a breakthrough of the long-lasting Kosovo blockade. It was well known, though, that being a meeting of representatives of parties and independent experts, the round table in New York was not conceived as a framework for seeking specific solutions. But, in view of the reputation of the participants, it was expected that with their authority they could at least prepare the ground for the so greatly desired political and diplomatic breakthrough.

However, it turned out that at the moment not even political or psychological preconditions exist for pacifying the Serb-Albanian atmosphere, and that the reason for this was not only the absence of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) from the talks. Both parties came forward with extremely firmly established maximalistic positions, and "on site" the official Serbian television initiated a propagandist war in the style of programs from the past decade, but this time satanizing not just the Albanian movement, but also the Serbian opposition gathered in the Together coalition. Obviously big things are at stake: the forthcoming elections and the merciless struggle for power.

Discrepancies expressed in New York were smoothed by joint coordinated stances which present the round table in New York in a moderately positive light. That is why the return of the participants, who were also received in the American Department of State after the round table, was expected with great interest. It so happened, however, that Cornbloom had arrived in Kosovo before they did, and simply deluged results of New York with his statements.

Cornbloom's clarifications or declarations in Pristina were in a sense hinted at during formal and unformal talks in New York. But, before his arrival they were obviously not well understood. Both the Serb but especially the American participants publicly expressed obvious surprise because of the uniform stance of the Albanian participants at the round table. It was interpreted in Pristina either as a lack of knowledge of the Albanian political trends, which should be doubted, or as a failure of someone who had counted on inter-Albanian divisions and had expected to build his stance on Kosovo on them.

A farther-reaching and clearer hint was the discussion about democratic Serbia as a precondition for resolving the issue of Kosovo. This question was initiated by Serb participants and in the discussion about it, the Americans abandoned their neutral role of observers. From statements of the Albanian participants it can be concluded that the question of democracy in Serbia was put as the question of coming to power of the Together coalition. This would, of course, be done in the elections in which the Kosovo Albanians were expected to hlep the coalition with their votes.

In unformal contacts, the Americans indeed did demand from the Albanians to participate in the Serbian elections. Adem Demaqi marked this as a strong American pressure on all Albanian participants of the round table, which was resisted, among other because the Serbian opposition, just as it was undecisive about Kosovo before the elections, could be equally undecisive afterwards.

If we leave aside the several times in the past few years considered issue whether the Albanians could, even if they wished to, help a Serb candidate in the Serbian elections, it should be said that the Albanians have so far had a very firm stance concerning participation in the elections. Although it seems that they have never been put in such a politically and diplomatically tight spot, it is not realistic to expect that this stance could easily be changed. It is more the matter of disposition of the people than of a formal decision of the political leadership.

However, a lot of things have still remained unclarified, just as it is not clear why America has chosen this moment to come out in the open with its stances which almost annul political credibility of the current Albanian leadership. Indeed, it is believed that after elimination of Albania, the forthcoming Serbian elections are one of the most significant elements of the latest diplomatic and political game. In a document published in Skopje on recent talks of Macedonian hosts with the Greek foreign ministry, it was stated among other that after the developments in Albania, the Albanian issue was not the problem of an integral solution any more, which was very dangerous for the Balkans.

There are assessments in Pristina that American diplomacy could take a significant turn in the direction of a firmer relying on the Serbian opposition in the election year in Serbia. The Albanians could play a significant role in this scenario. But it is questionable how and by what means they could be induced to play the role intended for them. Promises at least when speaking of the Albanians, are not worth much, and when speaking of the Serbs, making undesirable promises in the election year could be very harmful.

The Albanian parties and organizations which have so far publicly commented on this change, have without exception rejected Cornbloom's stances. The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo which dominates the political life of the Albanians, has not declared its view concerning it. It will have the worst time doing it, because it was the one which had dictated the policy pursued until now which, according to certain assessments, after the latest American declarations, appears to be more a failure than a success.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI