RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT

Twelve Proposals for Resolving the Status of Kosovo

AIM Belgrade, 19 April, 1997

In what way and by what means can a generally acceptable solution of the Kosovo problem be achieved is one of the key issues in the Balkans, and even in Europe. Majority of publicized proposals will be presented in this text, which generally refer to state reorganization. These proposals enjoy more or less public or political support, they are official and unofficial, elaborated or just indicated as a possibility

• but all of then put together speak about the severity of the problem and massive obstacles which are in the way of a generally acceptable and peaceful approach to resolution of the Kosovo problem.

Establishment of the autonomy of Kosovo similar to the one it had in 1974 as an attractive proposal is mentioned in the "international community", or rather among its most influential members. Under the influence of the international community, the autonomy from 1974 was accepted by the official Albania as a compromising solution, in other words as the "minimum below which it is impossible to go", or as a "reference point" for Serbian-Albanian talks about Kosovo.

The mentioned proposal has two variants: a) "minus 1974 autonomy" which implies modification of former autonomy in the sense of abolishment of elements of statehood. This variant is familiar to the current authorities, but also to a large portion of the opposition. It would, more or less, actually be a modification of the current autonomy, that is, a combination of the autonomy from 1974 and the autonomy prescribed by 1990 Constitution of Serbia; and b) "plus 1974 autonomy" which is a step further in reference to the autonomy Kosovo had in former Yugoslavia. The emphasis is on reinforcement of elements of statehood, which would be a "transitional solution" on the road to independence of Kosovo which is the ultimate strategic goal. This variant is acceptable for the so-called "soft-core faction" mostly among the Albanians outside Kosovo. Both the Serbian and the Albanian party, when speaking of inacceptability of 1974 autonomy, point to their negative experience: the Serbian party say that such a solution actually leads into separatism, and Kosovo Albanians that such a solution is outdated as proved by the negative experience with its abolishment and repression which followed. "Plus" and "minus" variants are rather extorted offers (by the international community), with a bitter feeling that something is being "given away" or that something is being "taken away" from them, than it is the result of a spirit of compromise and good will for joint life.

By additional or new federalization of the FRY advocated by some "independent" intellectuals of civic orientation, along with Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo would acquire the status of a separate federal unit - a republic, and this is exactly what Kosovo Albanians have demanded by their 1981 demonstrations, but after dissolution of SFRY it is mostly believed to be outdated. The stress of this variant is on internal statehood which would in the future be transformed into creation of an independent state similarly to former republics of SFRY.

Confederalization is a scenario most frequently linked to Adem Demaqi, President of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo and his project of the Balkan Confederation, popularly called "Balkania". Led primarily by the aim to meet the resolute demands of the "international community" not to change borders by force, Demaqi presented the project of the confederation, or the union of "three free, secular and sovereign states- Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro". Each member would have the right to secede from Balkania and it would preserve its seat in the OUN and other international organizations. This project also prescribes that citizens of each of the future members would express the wish to join Balkania by a secret vote at a referendum, while joining of new members would be conditioned by previous agreement of other members of the confederation, reached also by referendum. This project also stresses the high level of independence of member states.

Regionalization of FRY is a concept which was comprehensively elaborated and explained by Miodrag Jovicic, member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts. As he says, in the effort to join "certain good parts of a unitarian and those of a federal state, and at the same time to remove certain weaknesses of both forms of the state system", Jovicic presents the concept of a regional state. He proposes division of the FRY into 13 regions, among which Kosovo and Metohija would be two separate regions. As opposed to other regions, regional assemblies of Kosovo and Metohija would each have two chambers, one being formed "by general and direct elections by application of a mixed majority and proportional system, and the other chamber would be formed by parity of elected representatives of ethnic Albanians on one and other citizens of the region - Serbs, Muslims, Turks, Romanies - on the other side..." For a decision of the regional assemblies of Kosovo and Metohija, agreement of both chambers would be necessary, and some decisions, defined by law and statute, would be valid only if they won support of two-thirds majority in both chambers. What is most frequently mentioned in public as a weakness of this concept is reducing Montenegro to the level of a region, because in the Montenegrin public, but also among its political parties, identification with Montenegro as a state is highly expressed. That is the reason why this proposal, as potentially acceptable one, remains valid only for Serbia, which again encounters the problem of Kosovo. Among all the parliamentary parties in FRY, only the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) resolutely expressed support for the concept of regionalization, while parties of Kosovo Albanians, by nature of their joint strategy directed primarily towards independent Kosovo, reject this concept which essentially does not accept elements of statehood.

Transformation of the FRY into a classical unitarian state is one of the proposals for fundamental constitutional reconstruction, which does not enjoy a broad public and political support. Apart from the Serb Radical Party (SRS) of Vojislav Seselj, which is considered to be an extremist right party concerning the national issue, not a single parliamentary party in FRY is in favour of this concept, essentially contrary to modern democratic theoretical trends in territory organization of authorities, which imply broad decentralization and self-administration (within its concept of the unitarian state, even the SRS allows the possibility of a broad local self-administration).

The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its coalition partner the Yugoslav United Left (YUL) advocate the status quo in the constitutional and legal sense. They believe that the Constitution of Serbia already includes territorial autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija. Preservation of the status quo, one could say, is indeed the starting point for talks with Kosovo Albanians on modalities for establishment of an operational autonomy which is set as the essential precondition for lifting of the "outer wall of sanctions" by the international community. The ruling party would manifest good will by a noteworthy reduction of repression and general protection of human rights.

There is also the option of creation of independent Kosovo which is not rejected by the international community as completely unacceptable, but it implies taking into account principles of change of borders only peacefully, if agreed by all interested parties. However, in view of the disposition of the public, but also the most significant political actors in Serbia and the FRY which strongly reject such a possibility, effectuation of this option is possible only through conflicts which nobody wishes to happen. Supporters of the "step by step" strategy among Kosovo Albanians, respecting reality, advocate the possibility of giving Kosovo the status of a republic or a confederal unit, which would in the future open the possibility of a less painful secession. An attempt of secession with the status of autonomy would be a precedent which would stimulate minority communities in other states forming a compact majority on a certain territory to follow this example - which would then transform the ethnic issue into a global question of security. Danger of creation of independent Kosovo does not lie only in the fact that the official Belgrade would be opposed, but because there would be the risk that the newly established state would have aspirations to unite with regions inhabited by the Albanians in the neighbourhood, which in itself threatens safety and stability of the region. Nevertheless, this is the option advocated by the most powerful party of Kosovo Albanians - the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK), and the inter-Albanian consensus on joint platform in the talks with Serbia and the FRY in New York was reached on the ground of this option.

Annexation of Kosovo to Albania is the idea supported by the hard-core faction of the Albanian national movement - supporters of the member of the Academy Rexhep Qosja. According to this political opinion, Kosovo would be a part of a united Albanian state in the Balkans. "All Albanian lands" would gather around the parent country - Albania, and these would include all territories inhabited by majority Albanian population such as western Macedonia, part of Montenegro, Bujanovac-Presevo-Medvedja in the south of Serbia, a part of Greece populated by the Albanians... However, after the riots caused by the collapse of the "pyramidal system" of privately-owned banks which the Albanian government was involved in and which brought Albania on the verge of a civil war, this idea is completely pushed to the margins on both sides of the border: the Albanians in Albania faced with the struggle for survival and civil war on tribal and regional foundations pushed Kosovo aside from their priority political vision, while Kosovo Albanians have become less inclined to rush into the embrace of the impoverished and divided brethren in the parent country in the name of a romantic idea.

Division of Kosovo according to ethnic, economic and (or) cultural-historical criterion is the proposal which implies numerous conceptual and practical problems in creation of the acceptable border for both parties and therefore is a highly risky scenario in the sense of possible breaking out of armed conflicts. This proposal has a sub-scenario: creation of two entities by the model of "Dayton Bosnia" which would enable close contacts with "parent states".

The story about the division of Kosovo which is usually linked to the name of Dobrica Cosic, also member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the first president of the FRY, caused commotion on the political scene of Kosovo, but also that of Serbia, and even more broadly, after the speech of the President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Aleksandar Despic, at the annual convention in June

1. The ruling party condemned the idea of a division, but so did the opposition, thinking of the voters in the federal and the local elections which were in sight (in November 1996). The Albanian political leaders assessed the idea about demarcation favourably, identifying it with secession of Kosovo in its present administrative borders with the possibility of minor changes according to the principle "a part of Kosovo for a part of southern Serbian territory".

There is also the idea of the international protectorate as a "modus vivendi" or a transitional solution which would enable a painless integration or separation or a more permanent solution. A transitional solution in the form of a protectorate is a proposal which could so far be heard mostly among Kosovo Albanians. According to this scenario Kosovo would be demilitarized and placed under civilian administration of an adequate international agency for an indefinite period of time, and after that the population of Kosovo would decide by self-determination about their further status. The leader of the DSK, Ibrahim Rugova, also talked about the protectorate, putting emphasis on its comparatively short duration and ultimate goal: sovereign state. The President of the Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo, Mark Krasniqi, also advocated international protectorate, but as "the first step towards a definite and just solution", and advantages of this solution are emphasized also by independent Albanian intellectuals of "pro-European reputation", such as Veton Suroi and Shkelzen Maliqi.

Those who propose consociation, usually theoreticians of civic democratic orientation, believe that in multiethnic and in other sense heterogeneous states, where parties, interest groups, educational institutions, mass communication media, non-governmental organizations and non-political associations are formed along lines of splits among its segments - political pluralism should be enriched by consociative democracy. Consociative democracy is, according to its ideological creators, a form of a democratic system convenient for ethnically, nationally, culturally, religiously or ideologically diverse societies. There are four main characteristics of consociative democracy: a) a broad coalition of political leaders of all significant segments in all important state agencies where important decisions are made; b) the principle of consensus with the possibility of use of veto concerning issues which are determined in advance; c) proportion or the principle of parity in determination of representation in nomination of state officials and division of public funds; d) high level of independence of each segment in decision-making on internal issues.

This concept is criticized by critics both on the Serbian and the Albanian side, who stress that a type of consociation existed in the 1974 consitution and that it proved to be ineffective, or that contrary to countries which are models for it where it is successfully applied (the Netherlands, Austria...) , a completely different social and historical context exists here. However, along with all the complaints which can be listed against this model, it should be noted that absence of democracy was the predominant characteristic of SFRY: republican elites were not constituted according to the will of the people expressed in free elections, so one could rather say that it was a "consociative autocracy" than a consociative democracy. On the other hand, when speaking of "models" it does not always and primarily mean application of a model, but on the contrary its adapting to a specific social and historical context.

Eclectic combination of decentralization (by means of provinces), regionalization and consociation: the author of this proposal is professor of Law School in Belgrade, Dragoljub Popovic who started from the two-member federation of Serbia and Montenegro directing the attention to restructuring of the Republic of Serbia. The main idea is to establish five to seven provinces in Serbia, and in each province three to seven regions with autonomous status. Regions are divided into municipalities which would be much smaller than they are at present... A part of this eclectic construction would be certain consociative institutions such as the possibility of a minority veto which would be used on different levels of territory organizations, but restrictively, only concerning issues which would be determined by the constitution of the Republic or possibly, by documents of the provinces or regions. As a useful consociative advice, the author states participation in the executive power on all levels except the republican for all lists of candidates in the elections which win 20 % of seats in the parliament of the territorial community... This is quite a new proposal (April 1997) so that the critics have not had their say yet, but on the basis of previously presented proposals and criticism on their account, the eclectic structure of the concept could raise complaints concerning each concept it includes along with the general criticism of the concept as a contradictory entirety.

An armed conflict is a scenario which is presented as the last, although not as the least according to the criterion of probability, but according to the criterion of (un)desirability. It is a scenario which is not desired by either the Serbian or the Albanian party, except for extremists who are inclined towards such conflicts by their very nature. The international community does not want an armed conflict either, but it is a highly probably scenario, if the problem of Kosovo is not approached seriously by either of the parties concerned. Indicating to both parties the ways (autonomy within FRY) and means (dialogue) and by offering services (primarily though the OSCE), the international community is in fact "the main fuse in the electric circuit of Kosovo". The peace in this space will greatly depend on resoluteness of its most powerful members, but a temporary or a more lasting solution will primarily depend on political wisdom of the leaders of both the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. Nevertheless, that political wisdom is nothing but an ideal as illustrated by numerous examples in history of this space, especially the most recent one linked to dissolution of the SFRY. Therefore, the possibility of an armed conflict should not be rejected. It could be: a) limited to Kosovo (which is not highly probable) with two variants: in the form of a "parched land", similar to operations "Flash" or "Storm" in former Serb border-lands in Croatia or in the form of a guerilla resistance or terrorism of the Albanians if the former variant fails; b) spread to the broader region of the Balkans (most probable possibility) mostly inhabited by the Albanian population, but even more broadly; c) a conflict of broad proportions which is not highly probable.

By indicating to the authorities in Serbia and the FRY what should be done in order to completely lift the sanctions (high level of autonomy for the Albanians) and to Kosovo Albanians what they can win support for (human rights and autonomy) and what they must abstain from (secession) - representatives of the international community have given a reference framework for future political activities in this space. The sooner this framework is adopted as a political reality, the sooner normalization of relations between the Serbs and the Albanians will occur, as well as between their political elites, and political relations in Serbia and the FRY will be stabilized, which may then lead to creation of preconditions for tolerance and dialogue.

Naturally, the pressure exerted by the international community will play a positive role only if it initiates creation of authentic democratic potentials. The most convenient thing at the moment which might bring about improvement of life in Kosovo is an operational self-administration or autonomy. "Step by step" strategy is more convenient for resolving the problem of Kosovo than the strategy "from the general to the specific", in other words by gradual resolution of everyday problems to reach the global, status problems. In a society such as the FRY, the fundamental political consensus should unfailingly include Kosovo Albanians respecting the principle of respect of the right to be different which is the precondition for peaceful solution of the differences, and stable operation of the political community.

Zoran Lutovac

(AIM)(The author is a research worker at the Institute of Social Sciences of Belgrade University)