BETWEEN DILEMMAS AND UNCERTAINTY

MILITARY MISSION IN ALBANIA

AIM Tirana, April 14, 1997

Operation "Alba", which the joined forces of eigth European countries have launched in Albania in their effort to provide aid in the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the country caught up in chaos, will carry the eight-star flag. The neighbouring Italy will be leading the operation with the participation of soldiers from Greece, Turkey, France, Spain, Austria, Rumania and Denmark. From the moment Albania sent its alarming request for military intervention to forestall the civil war, until the first Italian units disembarked, a long diplomatic campaign ensued including major international institutions and capital cities of the West. In the treatment of the so called Albanian crisis there was much reluctance, efforts to avoid the intervention, conflict of interests, and even rivalry.

Although the demand of Tirana was very clear, namely, it demanded military action, NATO was the first to reject any possibility of military intervention. The fact that Albania was one of the countries which signed "Partnership for Peace" and was considered a valuable NATO participant, had no effect. According to the statement of Solana, NATO's Secretary-General, the Alliance considered the Albanian crisis an internal affair and rejected any possible military intervention. It seemed that the quick, negative reaction of the Alliance reflected the fear that interfering in internal affairs would set a precedent, which Russia would use as another argument in its well-known opposition to the expansion of NATO.

The American administration made it clear that it would not implicate itself in a possible intervention in Albania, although, in principle, it was not opposed to it if it had a clearly set target. The reasons that made Washington act this way are primarily linked to the fact that after Bosnia, it would be very difficult for Clinton's Administration to again engage troops in another Balkan country. A new peace-making operation in Europe would be too much for an average American and could cause unpredictable problems in the Congress. On the other hand, severe criticism of Berisha coming from Washington could cause hostility towards the American mission.

However, the American refusal to take part in the international forces was also linked to Washington's dissatisfaction with the policy of the major European countries vis-a-vis Berisha, i.e. this refusal was a message to Europe that it should on its own resolve the crisis it helped create. In other words, the ball was definitely in the European court, where two countries, Italy and Greece, threatened by the increasing waves of refugees, insisted on the speediest possible intervention. Although it was clear that European Union would not be able to turn its back on the crisis developing in Europe, it was by no means easy to strike an agreement. The Albanian crisis also brought to light disagreements within the Union itself.

Germany, the most ardent supporter of the Tirana regime, unexpectedly refused to take part in a possible military action, same as Great Britain, which was unable to avoid the question of "Albania" during the electoral campaign because of the unreserved support of the Conservatives extended to Berisha. On the other hand, France and Spain immediately joined Italy and Greece, by expressing their readiness to partake in multinational military forces.

Naturally, the card of multinational forces with eight starts cannot be considered incidental, same as the absence of the German star or the British one. The German refusal should be viewed bearing in mind both Bonn's disagreements with Italy, the country which, although weaker than Germany in both economic and military sense, will be leading the operation, which Germany finds difficult to accept, as well as German fear of being dragged into an operation which is an equation with several unknowns and unforeseeable result. It seems that Bonn is treading more carefully after its first problematic implication in the Balkans in connection with former Yugoslavia.

The EU decision to take over the OSCE mandate in case the multinational forces are sent to Albania is also reflected on the divisions within the EU. The infringement of the OSCE jurisdiction and the subsequent authorization of that act by the Security Council also reflects the fact that neither the USA nor Russia accepted to be left aside the diplomatic negotiations, although they refused to send the troops.

The ball was in the wide OSCE court which, although a large family, soon overcame reluctance and gave the green light to the first military mission in the history of this organization. The former Chancellor of Austria, Franz Vranitzky, a special OSCE envoy for Albania, managed to force his report upon even the greatest sceptics within the organization and persuade them. Russia was most persistent among them as its stated clearly that it considered military action unacceptable and reminded that such a decision had not been adopted by the UN Security Council. All records were broken in New York when several hours before Good Friday, the Security Council adopted the submitted request, with 14 votes in favour and one abstention. China, a former historic ally of the communist Albania, looked the other way and did not put a veto on the request, although that was contrary to its well known principle on non-interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

It is interesting to note that on the map the eight countries participating in the "Alba" operation represent a combination of the Mediterranean countries (Italy, France, Spain) and the Balkan countries (Greece, Turkey, Rumania). On the other hand, one cannot but note that the majority of participating countries had, in one way or the other, been involved in the history of Albania in this century, since it won its independence till the present day.

For the first time in its post-war history, Italy will be in charge of leading an international military mission. This coastal neighbour to Albania will give major contribution to the international mission, since its soldiers will make one half of 6,000 men and military command staff planned for the operation. But, while Italy was exerting pressure on international institutions, unpredictable problems arose in Rome. The drowning of some 80 Albanian refugees who were heading for Italy, in an unexplained incident with the Italian frigate, has placed a large question mark over the Italian role in this operation. The waves of anti-Italian sentiment have appeared in Albania, but fortunately only temporarily.

Later, the refusal of the Bertinotti Foundation to back up the military intervention in Albania jeopardized not only the participation of Italy, but the very survival of Prodi's Cabinet. And, as a cherry on the top of this whole Italian jumble, came statements of the Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Fassina, who demanded the removal of Berisha, causing harsh reactions of Tirana. For the first time since World War II, an Italian Prime Minister, Prodi, visited Albania twice. He visited the center of revolt, Vlore, where he was given a tremendous welcome.

It should be mentioned that this is Italy's second military mission in Albania. In 1991, a limited military task force of 1,500 soldiers distributed food assistance within the operation "Pelican 1". However, Berisha, an ardent supporter of America at that time, later disagreed with the turning of this operation into a military logistic mission to assist the reform of the Albanian Army. Generally speaking, the Italian soldiers who will be stationed in larger towns, including Vlore and, the capital of Albania, Tirana, will have not much problems. The Albanians are the people who love the Italians.

The second neighbour of Albania, Greece, had a cautious approach to the "Alba" operation. It seems that accusations against the former Chief of Secret Police, Gazideda implying the involvement of some Greek nationalistic circles and the Greek lobby in the States in the armed revolt on the South of Albania, reflected discredit on the role of Greece in the multinational forces mission in Albania. Athens repudiated the charges, calling them ridiculous, but did not change its attitude. Athens even clearly stated that there would be no Greek troops in the South of Albania, where the Greek minority lives, so as to avoid misunderstandings. Greece will station its troops in central Albania. However, there is a strong feeling of envy present in the Greek press over the leading role of Italy in this mission. The papers in Athens have accused Italy of implementing the "Mare nostrum" dogma. But Rome refuted the above mentioned charges stating that the zones of influence were ancient history and that the "Mare nostrum" concept was the thing of the past.

However, if Athens is envious of Rome, Ankara does not hide that it feels more than envy, i.e. rivalry, towards Athens. Ankara took care of providing the same number of soldiers as Greece, i.e. 700 by each side. The participation of Turkey in the mission has not come as a surprise for anyone here. Turkey and Albania always maintained close relations, and Ankara always supported all the Albanian leaders, from Hoxha to Berisha.

France did not have any qualms as to its participation in the peace forces in Albania, and with 1,000 soldiers will be the second largest force in this mission. Foreign analysts recognize in the behaviour of France its well known inclination to immediately occupy the space vacated by the American policy. The military operation in Albania will undoubtedly serve as a good pretext for activating the European influence within NATO, which was and still is one of Jacques Chirac's strategic objectives. On the other hand, its presence in Albania is a good opportunity to play a francophonic card in Tirana. Tirana asked to become a member of the Francophone alliance, which means the return to pre-war traditions when Albania was considered a francophonic country. Maybe the behaviour of the French should be observed within a broader regional context, or perhaps within their aspirations to assume a larger role in the Balkans in general, as well as regarding the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia.

It seems that reasons of Spain are similar, since it was the first Western country to answer the Tirana's appeal for military aid. Actually, it cannot be said that relations between Tirana and Madrid were good. After the much criticised elections of May 1996, Spanish Government was the only right wing Government in Europe demanding the holding of new ones. And, although Albania opened its Embassy in Madrid, Spain still has not reciprocated. Be it as it may, the ancient historic tradition made these two Mediterranean nations friends and it is therefore believed that Spanish soldiers could be used, without any fear, in the most delicate and problematic regions.

It seems that the objective of 400 Rumanian soldiers, which are in a way the surprise of the mission, will be a possible test for Rumania's efforts to join the list of former communist countries which want to become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. And not only that. The participation in such an operation will be the realization of Bucharest's ambitions, both open and secret ones, to take over the leading role in the Balkans which, to say the least, many Rumanians think is rightfully theirs, both on account of the territory as well as population of Rumania.

There was quite a number of those who tried to explain the participation of Austria in this mission by the fact that the former Austrian Chancellor, Vranitzky, would lead the mission, both politically and diplomatically. Undoubtedly, this fact carries weight. But the fact that although Austria neither had nor has the influence of a great power in the European politics, it always represented an important factor for small Albania, should not be easily dismissed. On the other hand, Austria was very much present in the latest political developments in Albania, openly siding with President Berisha.

And finally, there is an explanation for the presence of a symbolic contingent of 100 soldiers. Denmark is the currently the OSCE presiding country. But, on the other hand, this Scandinavian country has only 15 percent media, civil society and similar projects in Albania and invests enormous sums of money there.

Operation "Alba" will officially be aimed at securing the distribution of much needed humanitarian assistance in Albania. Actually, the country's needs for food assistance have been somewhat overblown. It is clear that what Albania needs much more is the re-establishment of order or collection of arms, but these are not among the tasks of 6,000 soldiers which are heading towards Tirana. Irrespective of this, the very presence of the international forces is more important than the task they will be entrusted with. In other words, the symbolism of the mission and its psychological aspect are equally important.

Foreign troops in Tirana are considered an important premise for the holding of new elections, irrespective of the fact that these forces will not be directly engaged in the electoral process. But, naturally, not only soldiers, but also the countries sending them, should observe the strict political neutrality because otherwise, their mission might easily face unexpected difficulties. Actually, there is a danger that foreign troops might be used as an electoral trump card at the forthcoming elections. From the point of view of elections, it is impossible to claim that the presence of troops will be beneficial to Berisha. On the other hand, it is considered that their presence during elections will serve as a pacifying factor for those who still think that with Berisha in power it will be impossible to have honest elections.

Naturally, even Berisha himself will be more at ease with temporary presence of foreign units. After all, despite stories that this is nothing else but a neo-colonisation of the country, it seems that foreign troops with a mandate of practically all international bodies, have somewhat reassuring influence even on those who speak of the clans for the division or cantonisation of Albania.

Undoubtedly, one of the difficulties this mission will encounter is the fact that it organized on the unfamiliar ground, in a country which has deeply fallen into anarchy and among the armed population. However, it also has some advantages in comparison to Bosnia, e.g. the fact that the country is not caught up in a civil war, that the conflict has neither ethnic nor religious dimensions, as well as the fact that the Albanians are the people with friendly disposition towards foreigners, and above all that there is no political force or any other group, including civil committees of national salvation, which would be against the arrival of multinational forces.

"Alba" is coming to Albania, among the dilemmas and uncertainties, but not the hostility.

Remzi LANI AIM Tirana