NEW DIPLOMATIC TRENDS

Normalization of Belgrade-Sarajevo Relations

AIM Belgrade, 17 April, 1997

In the shadow of the Agreement on special parallel relations between FR Yugoslavia and Republica Srpska, the so-called "Serb-Serb Agreement" exploited in all possible ways by the media, in the end of last week in Belgrade, it was registered just as a marginal event that the foreign ministry of FRY has sent to Sarajevo a draft agreement on full normalization of relations between the FRY and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Although the latter according to the Dayton peace accords should have been the "senior" document by all criteria, and the previous just derived from it (and in compliance with it to the last detail), this move made by Yugoslav diplomacy pushed to the margins by the propaganda is nevertheless raising hopes that Belgrade and Sarajevo will normalize relations in the foreseeable future, which would be expressed on the protocolar diplomatic level by accreditation of ambassadors and opening of embassies in the two capitals. The two presidents - of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and of Presidency of Bosnia & Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic - pledged their word twice - both times in Paris, in December 1995 and October 1996 - that they would do it.

Apart from that, one of the priority demands the international community (primarily the United States of America) made to Belgrade before it began lifting the outer wall of sanctions was normalization of relations with the newly-established states in the former Yugoslav space. As a reminder, FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have responded to this demand only in the case of Macedonia (although that, too, unwillingly, due to "traditional friendship" with Greece). When speaking of Bosnia & Herzegovina, in the past year and a half, this process has undergone various oscillations. There was a time when it seemed that it was gaining in speed: accompanied by considerable attention in the media, a regular bus line between Belgrade and Sarajevo was established (which was soon after and very discreetly abolished), visits were exchanged, some of them on quite a high level, like the one when Nikola Sainovic travelled to Sarajevo, and Ejup Ganic came to Belgrade.

At the time, Belgrade was probably exposed to high international pressure (and surveillance), but also, flirting with Sarajevo was part of Milosevic's need to discipline the leadership of Bosnian Serbs. When the international pressure relaxed - last spring the European Union acquiesced to recognition of Macedonia, and after that returned its diplomatic offices in Belgrade back to the level of ambassadors - and the developments on the internal political scene of Serbia acquired a new "dynamics" (preparations for the elections, theft of local election results, mass civil and students' demonstrations, etc.), so the diplomatic obligation to Sarajevo was pushed asidse. When speaking about it, one must keep in mind what is specific for Belgrade and Sarajevo in relation to other newly established states of former Yugoslavia.

The state of Bosnia & Herzegovina has initiated litigation at the International Tribunal in the Hague against the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) for aggression against it, with the intention to achieve international confirmation of responsibility for the war of the Serbian-Montenegrin party, that is, payment of war indemnities. The FRY conditions diplomatic recognition, however, by withdrawal of the appeal made to the International Tribunal. "I believe, although we have not been officially informed about it, that the FRY will repeat its previous stance, that is, that it will condition full normalization by desisting of B&H from its claim made to the Hague Tribunal. In other words, I have the impression that Belgrade is using this rather as a tactical move than as an actual longterm objective", says Novak Pribicevic, an experienced diplomat in the former joint foreign affairs service, now member of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia, especially for Slobodna Bosna, when asked to comment on the latest diplomatic trends between Belgrade and Sarajevo in the light of the old dispute. According to his opinion, "absolute mutual interest exists", especially since the two economies are compatible, nothing to say about the need of the citizens of B&H and Yugoslavia for contacts and normal communication, so one could hope for comparatively speedy full normalization: "Logical reflection leads to the copnclusion that it should not be postponed for after the (republican and presidential) elections (in Serbia)", says Pribicevic.

If logic were followed, Pribicevic would have certainly been right. Lessons learnt from experience, however, imply just the opposite. In other words, normalization of relations with Bosnia & Herzegovina will be measured by Belgrade in the next few months solely from the aspect of evaluations to what extent it can contribute to reinforcement of the (shaken) pre-election position of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Slobodan Milosevic. The current ones do not seem to speak in its favour.

As connoisseurs claim, even special American envoy, John Cornbloom, who has recently been in a farewell visit to Belgrade, was openly told that in the coming months all activities would be concentrated on domestic political needs and priorities. The hypocritical and in any case highly controversial "Serb-Serb agreement" on special parallel relations is part of this pre-election strategy aimed at reinforcement of the national cohesion trump card in the already considerably spent pack. In this context, however, possible pressure of the international community should not be eliminated. If the international community assesses that, for instance, in order to interrupt disintegration processes in Bosnia & Herzegovina more evident as implementation of the so-called civilian part of the Dayton peace accords proceeds, a clear signal is necessary from Belgrade in the form of full normalization of relations with Sarajevo, it could happen even before the elections in Serbia, which will be decisive for Milosevic. The collapse of Serbian economy has already acquired such dimensions, so Milosevic, however hard he may wish to, cannot afford the luxury to absolutely ignore the international community.

Seska Stanojlovic (AIM)