DJUKANOVIC DID NOT SAY HIS LAST WORD

Bulatovic on a Road of No Alternative

AIM Podgorica, 27 March, 1997

The relation of Montenegro towards the common state with Serbia, defined in a form of state policy, has been finally identified with the loyalty to the figure and work of Slobodan Milosevic. The session of the Main Board of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), has dispersed all doubts that have so far, as President Momir Bulatovic admitted, existed in the public when it came to the loyalty of Montenegrin Socialist to "modern federation". For full 16 hours, behind firmly closed doors, members of the highest body of the ruling Montenegrin party, 96 of them, persevered in their attempt to achieve "absolute unity vis-a-vis the FRY" and to persuade each other in that there was no need to "redefine, but only to foster the DPS electoral programme".

Finally, when the lights went out in the headquarters of the current Montenegrin authorities, visibly in a good mood because of the convincing support the session gave to his (?) option, President Bulatovic appeared before the press and nicely explained that "the FRY is a project with which we have linked our political destiny".

"There is no alternative way, no alternative programme or solution. Perpere is out of question, referendum is out of question. We are continuing along the way we have embarked upon", resolutely and definitely stated Momir Bulatovic in a cruelly direct way. All those who feared that Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic might open Montenegro to the world, introduce it to the international institutions which were willing to push its new reformist course, felt relieved. Momir Bulatovic translated the support of the majority of the party's Main Board members, he is heading, into a conclusion that there could be and must not be any other political course for Montenegro apart from the one determined by the multi-party Dedinje.

Thus, with Djukanovic's resignation from the position of Vice-President of the ruling party, for the time being ingloriously ended another attempt of Montenegro to put its own interests before the emotions. The official Belgrade remained faithful to its past practice, so well known in the history of Montenegro, of not only interfering with the policy pursued by Podgorica, but also actively creating it. It turned out that indications which Milo Djukanovic gave with his latest reformist attempts were not sufficiently strong and convincing for Montenegro to become itself again.

Nevertheless, the economic independence expressed in the finally achieved self-financing of Montenegro and pursuit of autonomous foreign policy, seemed as a solid basis for a more radical deviation from the official Belgrade. Djukanovic's story about how Montenegro already for two years had a balanced budget, was close to becoming economically independent and was ready for its independent dealings with the world, grated on the ears of the official Belgrade much more than it could be concluded from sporadic reactions. And when it was all garnished with frequent tours of the States where, it was assumed, he was encouraged to oppose Belgrade, the picture of a man who wanted to take Montenegro out of a joint state, was complete.

As long as things remained within the limits of, what was in the DPS inter-party jargon called, the division of spheres of interests with Momir Bulatovic, there was no problem. Occasionally, the inquisitive public would be incited by one or the other of the two, with a story how it was all the "matter of personal opinion" which in no way should be identified with, the so called, state policy. And God knows how long would that have functioned in perfect harmony, had there not been for a political crisis in Serbia, caused by manipulations at the local elections.

At that time when the whole world unanimously condemned the Serbian dictator, there was no space left for maneuvering. True, for some time Djukanovic and Bulatovic persisted in their skirmishing, but, still kept within the "permissible" limits. Namely, when Djukanovic sent a cable expressing support to Belgrade students, Bulatovic appeared at Milosevic's ceremony of a highway opening. Djukanovic's characterization of Milosevic as "outdated politician", Bulatovic received sitting on Milosevic's sofa, and when the Prime Minister demanded from the Serbian leader to resign, Bulatovic participated in the celebration of the signing of a historic agreement on "special and parallel links" between the FRY and the RS (Republic of Srpska).

And when the things got out of hand and it became clear that both have gone too far, a special welcome was organized for Djukanovic the moment his plane returned from his last visit to Washington. True, not at the airport, as the good manners require, but at the session of the Executive Committee of his party where he was fiercely criticized for statements given to his American hosts. Naturally, at that time Djukanovic could not fathom the true magnitude of what was in store for him, so that he even dared say that he saw once again that without deviation from Milosevic there would be no integration into the international community of civilized nations. Only then, realizing that he was dealing with an incorrigible advocate of changes, Bulatovic concluded that the time had come for a showdown. Naturally, according to the Milosevic's recipe. Similar to that which was, as it turned out, prepared for fostering leader's positions in Montenegro and the Republic of Srpska.

Bulatovic confessed that during the days that preceded the infamous session of the DPS Main Board (GO), painstaking discussions of the highest party leadership were held with a view to persuading Djukanovic to withdraw. When he refused, Milosevic ordered the two Bulatovics, Momir and Pavle (Federal Defence Minister), in his office, to execute Djukanovic. Just before that weekend the Prime Minister was given time until the GO session to answer to the ultimatum which included his obligation to reshuffle his cabinet, remove the undesirable ones and thereby change the current government policy.

How convinced Momir Bulatovic was in the quick and easy implementation of that idea was also proven by the fact that he had scheduled his meeting with the press for 1,00 p.m. that Monday (the GO session started at 10,00 a.m.). However, the battle of the members of the highest DPS body for the resolution of a serious dilemma whether "DPS and Montenegro were abandoning the policy with which they won at recent elections" lasted for hours. Sources claim that at the very start of the session Bulatovic announced the possibility of no confidence vote for Djukanovic only to realize, as the debate proceeded, that he had to redirect it towards the problem of loyalty to the common state. It was only at the first moment and at press conference that the result of voting (64 : 7 for Bulatovic, with only 22 abstentions) gave the impression of a convincing triumph of the executors of Milosevic's orders.

The information that subsequently leaked out actually showed that among the seven Bulatovic's opponents and 22 abstentions (who refused the very thought of having to vote confidence to Djukanovic) were the most influential and powerful people of the Montenegrin power structure. On the other hand, the majority of those who sided with Bulatovic were the people from the rural parts, without true information on the developments in the party top ranks. The decisive pressure was exerted by Federal Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic, who by his threats of war in case Montenegro failed to obey, not only changed the mind of the majority in the GO, but also confirmed the rule that sabre-rattling is the greatest obstacle to the independence of Montenegro.

The claim President Bulatovic uttered at a press conference that the whole affair was not directed against Milo Djukanovic, sounded too naive and transparent for anyone who knows how the Montenegrin political scene ticks. The hand offered to the Prime Minister implied an invitation that he "could join the DPS unity, unless he planned some other move". However, only subsequently, Bulatovic confirmed that this opportunity given to Djukanovic included his obligation to remove from the cabinet Vice-Prime Minister Slavko Drljevic (a man who advocated the introduction of Montenegrin currency), Minister of Culture Goran Rakocevic ("because he was more active in politics than in culture") and two chiefs: one of the State Security Service and the other of the Trade Mission of Montenegro in Washington. Later on, it turned out that that was to be only the first wave of Bulatovic's conditions to the Prime Minister, had he by chance decided to agree to everything and keep his place.

Those well versed in the situation soon discovered that a man, whose name was indisputably first on the list of personae non grata, was Vukasin Maras, head of the State Security Service (SDB) of Montenegro. Not only did Momir Bulatovic bear a personal grudge against that man, but the President estimated that his double role posed a serious threat to Milosevic's vision of Montenegro. Namely, Maras, as a loyal "Djukanovic's man" was in charge of transit (popularly: smuggling of cigarettes to Italy, a job that during hard years of blockade balanced the Montenegrin budget). Also, from the time he came to the helm of the SDB, Maras "purged" the police ranks of those who demonstrated too much loyalty to Milosevic's policy and prevented the Serbian secret police from operating in Montenegro.

In other words, Maras's elimination would not only return the control over monetary flows to Bulatovic's hands, but would make it possible for the Montenegrin police to become in near future what it had been in early 90's. Or, for that matter, after 1918. This was all in conformity with the plans of Slobodan Milosevic to take the armchair of the FRY President in June and promote Bulatovic to a Prime Minister and, together with him, build "a strong federal state". It was estimated that for the project of such a state, it would be risky to leave Milo Djukanovic and Svetozar Marovic at their positions, as they were major obstacles to its realization.

Indeed, Momir Bulatovic linked the destiny of Montenegro with the recovered Slobodan Milosevic. The only thing left to Milo Djukanovic was to lament over his bad timing (e.g. a three-month political crisis in Serbia) for the realization of his ideas and launching the attack on the Serbian leader, and for setting it all as a prelude to his new American tour. He could also be held guilty of rather shyly and often unconvincingly advocating stands which the modern world recognizes as reformist, by which he took some of the sting out of the independence-oriented inclination of Montenegro.

In any case, the smaller federal unit of the common state found itself at cross-roads. And while Bulatovic's way without alternative, was postponed until the fall perhaps, Djukanovic still has to say his last word. Even if he does not succeed in his intentions, there is no doubt that he will fight to the bitter end. The fact that the fate of many of his predecessors was similar because they overused the noun Montenegro, may be of some comfort.

Nebojsa REDZIC (AIM, PODGORICA)