ZAGREB - WHO WILL BE THE FIRST TO REACH THE HDZ

AIM Zagreb, 23 February, 1997

After Franjo Tudjman and his Government had called the elections - local and district - for the part of Croatia controlled by the regular authorities, Jacques Klein did the same for "his" part (region controlled by the UNTAES). Thus, for the first time after 1990 ballot stations all over the Republic of Croatia will be opened and the election day, April 13, will symbolically mark the "true" end of war and the beginning of parliamentary life. Whatever it may mean in these still transitional and insecure times.

At the moment there are 65 registered parties in Croatia, not counting some hastily scrambled and patched up regional and ethnic partlings. Even if a majority of them registers to run for the elections, it will very much resemble a stamped which, it is assumed, which only an enormous and pressing need can initiate. The reason might be a wish of some to "personally" come to power, as the existing protagonists of the political system have totally failed to represent differing views in the society. And perhaps it is simply a wish to change the situation which erupted forcibly and suddenly and for the time being cannot be differently expressed but as a paraphrase of streets and bars (the more so because neither the street nor the bar have an outstanding place on the political stage, which they occupy in countries of older and more developed political culture).

Be it as it may, the emergence of such a large number of parties is quite contrary to the wishes and expectations of Tudjman and his party. Already in early nineties they made it known that they would like Croatia to be a two-party state, with either the Liberals, Populists or the Party of ex-communists (the latter was the least preferred choice, so that after a brief partnership following the 1990 multi-party elections, Racan's party was urged to bring in order the left side of the political scene, i.e. to unite small and scattered socialist and social-democratic parties and introduce them to the brotherhood of "nation-building" parties) as the second party - obviously planned for a partner.

Although the idea on a two-party state was never realized in practice, somewhere from the background it influenced the behaviour of the main protagonists on the political scene. And probably equally those in the opposition, as much as those in the Government. The opposition parties verbally rejected the idea on partnership as yet another proof of the arrogance and haughtiness of the HDZ which was so impertinent as to choose the opposition to its liking. But, in reality it was only that intimate name (partnership), under which they were to cooperate with the authorities, that was rejected. On the other hand, between the three mentioned parties a subdued, but constant rivalry developed as to which one the HDZ would need most and would invite to cooperate with the aim of promoting high and holy interests of the homeland.

This discreet cavilling below the surface turned into a veritable public show when one of the opposition competitors - the Croatian Socio-Liberal Party - recorded a major failure at parliamentary elections in the fall of

1. Therefore, in the middle of last year the party leadership decided that the only way of avoiding the total defeat could be partnership with Tudjman's party and gave the official explanation that the Liberals would enter the Government in order to "rectify the situation from within". But, the Liberals - who were immediately attacked by major opposition parties with which they had cooperated in several successful coalitions - soon realized that they would thereby only help the HDZ restore the legitimacy of its rule which was practically annulled by the disregard of parliamentary rules of the game, plundering of property during privatization, etc.

Consequently, the already conceptualized and half-agreed partnership fell through and the inter-party flirting of this type ceased in the ensuing months, i.e. was never resumed to this day. However, the approaching 1997 elections have pumped the old, well-known adrenaline into the blood system of major opposition parties. True, none of them dared enter again into new arrangements with the ruling party, but relieved the old instincts by increasing their mutual rivalry. The Populists (HSS) and Liberals (HSLS) have broken the until recently successful coalition ties with Racan's SDP, with which they scored a convincing victory at the 1995 elections in Zagreb, which Tudjman has not recognized to this day, and decided to run for the elections on their own.

The explanation offered was that the HDZ should be opposed by a classical center with an ideologically impeccable record, where the "ex-communists" had no place, nor other, mostly small parties, which have so far subsisted on the political scene just because the bigger ones left them some breathing space. This caused an outburst of accusations against the two parties which chose for themselves an "elite" role in the opposition so that the Liberals soon changed their mind and joined the restored coalition of opposition parties in Zagreb without the HSS, while in many other cities connections with the SDP and other smaller parties were established. A relatively firm coalition of Liberals and Populists lasted only after the last elections for the District Chamber of the Parliament, which divided into two halves the electoral units in which one party led with the support of the other party, and vice versa. Even here they were unable to fully agree, because the HSLS, still the largest opposition party, demanded head-start for its candidates in a larger number of electoral units.

In contrast to the Liberals, the Populists did not have any qualms about stepping out of a relatively monolithic successful opposition bloc. On the contrary. Their front-rank man, Zlatko Tomic, firmly, even arrogantly pointed to the reasons which drew his part away from Racan's Social-Democrats, openly admitting that they still considered them communists, of Bolshevik descent, while the Populists were, allegedly, steadfast and incorruptible "anti-communists". This explicitly stated stance on the SDP surpassed even the things addressed to Racan's party by the HDZ. In these pre-election times, the ruling party is also gambling on anti-communism, but is itself packed with so many former communists (it admits to 50 thousand, while the SDP claims that there are many more, about 80 thousand), that it dares not use that card so much.

Now when the HSS has run up its appropriately spruced-up anti-communist flag, Tudjman's party does not have to risk any more efforts on this, and that leads to the conclusion that the two parties might have struck some kind of a pre-election deal on the division of tasks (it can be supposed that the Populists got the task of being an ideological hybrid of a kind, which will clear the electoral ground, so that the HDZ could continue with the role of a "center" with the aim of "rallying all strata of the society"). This even more clearly comes to mind because the HSS, on its part, through its most popular leaders such as Josip Pankretic, express open sympathies for and loyalty to Franjo Tudjman. It glaringly testifies that the opposition intentions of the Populists do not go as far as the removal of the HDZ from power, but that they would be satisfied to be some kind of a corrective (moral, class, etc.) mechanism of the ruling party.

In short, the HDZ would take the "money" and the Populists would get the "sheep", and on the basis of this poorly disguised partnership, Tudjman's party would try to remain in power, while the HSS is most probably aspiring to become the greatest "opposition" party. However, in view of the fact that the Populists have turned their backs on all other parties, thus becoming some kind of a "traitor" of a multiparty system, they will certainly pay their possible failure at elections with extremely high, perhaps even deadly, villeinage.

MARINKO CULIC