Agreement between RS and FRY on Special Relations

STORY ABOUT NOTHING

The paper consisting of 14 items will not bring RS and FRY a single inch closer to each other, but it will bring their leaders closer both to each other and to their voters who have not still become aware of it.

Banja Luka, 3 march, 1997 (AIM)

For a long time a single written document which refers to the Bosnian crisis has not caused so much trouble to analysts of local circumstances as the agreement on sepcial relations between Republica Srpska and FR Yugoslavia signed on Friday in Belgrade. Although the text of 14 items aroused interest among all specialists for the "Bosnian pot", despite the invested efforts they did not manage to find anything that would even resemble a bone, least of all meat. There is nothing but vegetables in it. Briefly, after the initial surprise, both those in favour of creation of the (all)Serb state and those against it will have to agree about one thing: there is nothing in that agreement which should cause either enthusiasm or concern.

Although there is nothing especially interesting in 14 items of this paper (except that it is interesting for that very fact), and especially not anything surprising - its signing was preceded by the drama of negotiations, almost similar to those from the time when the Serbs from both sides of the Drina had a much greater say about Bosnia than they have nowadays.

The initiator of signing of the agreement was President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic who still does not seem to stop to experience Republica Srpska as a polygon for improvement of his badly damaged rating among the Serbs. And since they are the ones who will vote in the forthcoming elections in Serbia, it turned out that Milosevic has correctly understood criticism of his new minister of information, Radmila Milentijevic, who reproached the state television and Politica for not paying enough attention to RS. Therefore, the left bank of the Drina returned to state-controlled media in Belgrade with great pomp.

Meeting

Serb representative in the Presidency of B&H, Momcilo Krajisnik, found Milosevic's idea attractive, because he believed that these "special relations" would be a good preparation for the forthcoming decisions with uncertain outcome which awaited him in Sarajevo, primarily the one about RS joining the central bank. Signing was preceded by a meeting of the two leaders on Tuesday in Belgrade, which was followed by a curt statement issued by Milosevic's office which was, nevertheless, a sufficient announcement for what happened two days later.

On Thursday afternoon there was another meeting. This time, the scene of the event was the residence in Dobanovci, the walls of which have seen many previous reached and broken agreements between Belgrade and Pale. On the one side of the table, apart from Milosevic, were Zoran Lilic and Momir Bulatovic, and on the other were Krajisnik, Dragan Kalinic and Gojko Klickovic. Having realized what Milosevic's motives for the agreement were, the guests from Pale tried to draw more benefits from it for themselves. Krajisnik strove to introduce the military aspect into the agreement, which would impose some kind of responsibility for RS on the Army of Yugoslavia. Even more than that, the Serb representative in the Presidency of B&H, devoted to the idea of free trade across borders, was vitally interested in customs policy. He demanded from Milosevic, Lilic and Bulatovic, exchange of goods between RS and FRY with no limitations whatsoever, in other words with no customs dues.

The hardest opponent to Krajisnik's wishes was the Montenegrin President, who in the scrape between Milo (Djukanovic, Montenegrin Prime Minister) and Sloba (Milosevic) who are at daggers drawn, did not like in the least the idea of sudden signing of special relations from the very beginning. In return for having put him in this awkward position, Milosevic and Lilic supported Bulatovic by referring to the Dayton accords and explaining to Krajisnik that even this was sufficient to cause concern in Sarajevo. The representative of RS had believed that he would persuade his interlocutors at least to an agreement about customs dues, so that the six men parted and left Dobanovci in the night between Thursday and Friday without having reached a final agreement, but with a feeling of renewed suspicions.

On Friday morning, after several hours of sleep, Serb officials in Belgrade were still not quite certain whether anything would be signed in the course of the day. Not long after, there was a call from Milosevic's office: everything was going according to the plan, the agreement would be signed. Along with Bulatovic and Lilic, Radoje Kontic and Mirko Marjanovic were also summoned to the Presidency of Serbia. Only what the President of Serbia had wished was signed, of course. The representatives of RS grumbled a little but signed, and a little later, the one among them who was the most inclined to big words (Klickovic) assessed the agrement as historical.

Noone mentioned its contents any more, the most important thing was that the agreement on special relations was signed. The guests from Pale wished to share joy with the journalists, but Milosevic opposed it, who had had enough as it was. The task to say a few words was assigned to Miomir Bulatovic, who believed that the most important thing to say was that this whole masquerade was "utterly in the spirit of Dayton accords".

The group then started on its way to the unavoidable Dobanovci again, where it was noticed that Biljana Plavsic and Milo Djukanovic were not present. As concerning the President of RS, the only question is whether she had not been invited by Milosevic or Krajisnik. The popular Milo understood that it was best for him to stay at home after the interview given to Belgrade weekly Vreme in which he had gravely accused Milosevic.

Details

In the relaxed atmosphere of Dobanovci residence, nobody cared any more that the Agreement on special relations did not mention any customs exemptions and reductions, that there was not a single word in it about payment operations, that military guarantees of FRY to RS could be brought down to the fact that parties would not "allow their territories be used for aggression against the other party", as well as that they would not "offer any military or any other assistance to the aggressor". In other words, RS and FRY have agreed that at least militarily, they would not directly plot against each other. The rest of the agreement was used for expressions of decisive loyalty to the Dayton accords and phrases about economic, cultural, etc. cooperation.

A seven-member Council for Cooperation will take care that everything goes well. It will be headed by Lilic and Krajisnik. The risk that somebody moght take the Council too seriously was eliminated very simply - the President of FRY will appoint three members of the Council, and Krajisnik two, which greatly reminds of the appearance of the Serbs in Dayton. Benignity of the agreement, according to its 14th item, apart from the Assembly of the FRY, should be ratified by the Assembly of B&H in which representatives of the Federation have the majority.

After all, the question remains who needed such an agreement. Primarily Milosevic, who is facing great challenges on the internal scene. At the moment when refugees from Slavonia are knocking at his door, it will do him no harm to remind all his undecided voters that he has not forgotten RS. When he convinces them that neither Serbia nor RS will be controlled from abroad, it will be, as Radio-Television Serbia would say, "another big step in his peace policy".

Krajisnik will also draw certain benefits from the deal. Whenever he makes a new concession to Sarajevo, he will be able to say: "Yes, but we have special relations with FRY". The leadership from Pale will find a pretext for everything that will be happening in the already initiated process of integration of RS in B&H either by explaining to their people who still do not understand anything, that on the last day of February a large step has been made towards uniting of "the two states" or, when everything does become clear to everybody, by saying that Milosevic has left them in the lurch again.

The essence of the agreement is, therefore, just another recognition of B&H as a state by Pale and Belgrade. Everything else is just a decoration which will not bring RS and FRY a single inch closer to each other, but it will bring their leaders closer both to each other and to their voters who still have not become aware of it. Because even a story about nothing is a story, it is just important to know how to read it.

(AIM) Ivan Dordevic

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