CHANGED VOIVODINA

Beograd Feb 20, 1997

New View of the Province

AIM Belgrade, 12 February, 1997

Since the federal elections on 3 November last year until this day, the distribution of political forces in Voivodina has changed. Serb autnomy-lovers returned to the political life with new energy. Hungarian parties have recognized the autonomy of Voivodina as a necessary condition for accomplishment of minority ethnic autonomy of the Hungarians. This is the most important event in Serbia of this period, more important even than involvement of Adem Demaqi in party activities in Kosovo.

The significance of this progress is in the fact that with coalition Voivodina a force with purely civil tendencies was created, which is capable of being elected into any parliament - the provincial, republican or federal - without any trouble with election rules. So far this was possible only for nationalistic parties, either Serb, Hungarian or Albanian, so that this all at once greatly encouraged the part of the population which is in favour of creation of a democratic and decentralized political system. Hungarian parties in Voivodina signed the "Proposal for Change of the Constitutional Position of Voivodina" and in this way offered support to ideas of terrirorial autonomy of Voivodina and forced all Serb nationalistic parties, if nothing else, to seriously consider what they would do with the Hungarians in the future.

Voivodina autonomy-lovers are just apparently "Serb" localists. They do not demand Serb ethnic domination in political, economic and administrative activities, but use the Serb ethnic element in the history of autonomy in Voivodina in order to place on the same level the feeling of significance of the native Serbs with other parts of the Serb nation: those from Knin, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Herzegovina, Bosnia and others. Although it may seem strange, they least of all stress equality with the Serbs from Serbia, although they claim autonomy within Serbia. This is because they consider the Serbs from Sumadija (central Serbia) the least burdened by Serb nationalism and because they mainly consider them as opponents in issues of distribution of budget resources and contributions. They intentionally keep reminding the other Serbs about their cultural inferiority in order to stimulate a feeling of pride of the citizens of Voivodina and even a complex of superiority. The autonomy-lovers have in fact risen in order to fight for economic independence of Voivodina, in order to use its agrarian, industrial, natural resources - especially oil, but also educational and cultural potentials for the purpose of development, and they are aware that imperial all-Serb nationalism was their main opponent.

Hungarian parties in Voivodina still cannot decide whether they wish to run in the forthcoming republican elections in Serbia with the Voivodina coalition or without it. Jozsef Kassa and Szandor Pal would not like to stand side by side with the "Serb autonomy-lovers" if the latter do not previously try to reach an agreement with the Belgrade opposition about decentralization of the authorities in Serbia. In fact, aware that the opposition in Belgrade is more numerous than the autonomy-lovers, the Hungarians would not like to make them even more powerful by giving them the opportunity to accuse them that they, the Hungarians, were allegedly against Serbia if they decided to run in the elections with the autonomy-lovers. At the same time, they are also aware that they must not run in the elections together with the Belgrade opposition, because the autonomy-lovers would accuse them for betrayal of Voivodina. They are, therefore, between the devil and the deep blue sea, and perhaps they would not even have any objection to be mediators between these two groups.

Belgrade opposition still is not ready to resolve conflicts of interest in Serbia. The groups around the Civic Alliance of Vesna Pesic is certainly the closest to Voivodina coalition and the decentralized model of the political system in Serbia, but it has no negotiating power. Its membership is small although intellectually it is the richest political party. But even in it there is no special enthusiasm for the Voivodina concept.

Vuk Draskovic is not far from recognition of autonomy of Voivodina, although to the circle of people around him it is not quite clear how to reconcile that idea with the pathos of integral Serbia.

Zoran Djindjic is surrounded by opponents of the autonomy of Voivodina who are not too concerned over the fact that the Democratic Party due to that very reason practically has no significance in Voivodina. This party will therefore rather flirt with autonomy of Voivodina than agree to it.

Vojislav Kostunica is politically completely obsolete. His conception of Serbia is monarchist and centralistic. He does not at all understand the modern distribution of forces in the country and with his ideas he lags far behind all the serious parties in the country. In Voivodina he has completely lost support, because here it is impossible to pretend to advocate democracy through serb nationalism and war-mongering policy. That is why the only serious nationalist in the province is Seselj, since his chauvinist party is not labelled as democratic by anyone. He gathers the refuse of political ideas and psychological status of neurotic population. His force is caused by disturbances in the structure of normal moral values and life objectives. He is fed by Milosevic through persistent destruction of the society and can be easily promoted into the executioner and the final jailer of modern national future.

Voivodina coalition will wait for the Together coalition to try to reach an agreement with Demaqi in Kosovo about the status of the provinces in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Since in interpretation of the rights and force the Albanians do not feel inferior to the Serbs, the agreement would be almost impossible because both parties are deaf-mute. However, as long as they talk, the wrath of Serb nationalists will be spent on "treacherous" Belgrade opposition, on which the rightist patriotic criticism of aggressive and "high-quality" Serbs will be spent. Only after that, time will come for Voivodina coalition. Because, the Albanians will not be able to refuse point-blank whatever it will have to offer. Besides, Voivodina coalition, because of its own civic concept of decentralized Serbia could probably win support of the West which could easily guard its back. Of course, isolated agreement of the Albanians with the people from Voivodina without the Serbians would not be viable, but many people are not ready to wait forever for Serbia to come to its senses and become serious.

Serbia no more has the right to blackmail with its six million inhabitants the remaining four muillion in Kosovo and Voivodina for the sake of alleged inity, and constantly demand a selfish solution only to its own benefit. After all, Voivodina and Kosovo are not populated by the Serbians, so that it would be extremely ugly to deny the population of these regions the right to initiative and political pride.

(AIM) Dragan Veselinov