THE SECOND STAGE FOR A HAND OF A FOREIGNER

Change in the foreign policy of the Serbian democratic revolt

AIM Belgrade, 9 February, 1997

It seems that only recently, after more than fifty days of walking and rallying the so called "foreign policy" of the Serbian democratic revolt was beginning to shape. The central point of this policy is Djindjic's statement that in the first stage, until the recognition of the election results of November 17 and the realization of the repercussions of the electoral theft, the world would not represent an important factor in this process. This process has to be carried out relying on our own forces. But, immediately after that, the presence of the world, especially its assistance in the economic reconstruction would not only be welcome, but also essential. Djindjic sees these stages as interlinked. The first one is practically illusory without the second.

This stand was preceded by a period of wavering. In the beginning leaders of the Coalition "Together", which is the ring-leader of the current Serbian revolt, turned their eyes to world offices, as much as to the people who rallied in the streets and squares of Serbian cities. There was nothing unnatural about it. For a long time now, apart from the already discovered peace-maker Milosevic, the world has been looking for forces that could represent a more original protagonists of the democratic transformation. The new electoral coalition had an impression that it could say: here, we are the ones!

The message was charged with emotions rather than politics, there was possibly no politics in it at all. A heart open to western countries, en bloc. Vuk Draskovic, the most charismatic leader in the Coalition, had his own schemes regarding this relationship and, judging by all, they were decisive in the beginning. Namely, in his speeches and moves Draskovic is in the habit of reverting to, for example, "old Serbian alliances", then to "countries victors" in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and finally to "Western democracies". All of them one to half a century old. That is without doubt one of the reasons why this model did not function. It goes without saying that there were other reasons too. The old Serbian ally, France, could not agree with the other, admittedly occasional, old Serbian ally, England. Victors of the World War II are today unable to manage foreign affairs without the then defeated country, Germany. Finally, when Western democracies wanted to see where they stand, it turned out that America was leading and that Europe was treading more cautiously, perhaps because it turned out that it was divided.

The first result were mild sympathies, although the media and public opinion in that same world, to which the Coalition gave its heart, showed much more.

What doesn't fit into our picture of Draskovic is Russia. His inclination towards the "Eastern giant", according to the pattern of classical Serbian traditionalism, is well known so that it is not quite clear why did Russia fall out of sight at the very beginning of the Serbian democratic revolt. Totally. It is true that Kremlin no longer has the onetime role of superpower and neither a significant role in international affairs, but as it turned out later, if it couldn't do much good, Russia could do much harm. Russia, which the Coalition "Together" overlooked and ignored, acted as the defender of the Coalition's greatest opponent - Milosevic's regime for two long months, until two weeks ago.

A modest result of the first stage which we have named mild sympathies of the world for the new democratic forces in Serbia, was not only a consequence of some old and outdated patterns, but of something else too. Namely, the basic component of the Coalition's foreign policy orientation towards the world was a request for the greatest possible help in toppling down Milosevic. It was a logical, but also irrational demand. What was demanded was precisely that which the world has painstakingly and at long last formulated as its mark: to uphold and support a peace-making Milosevic. And how could it disavow Milosevic now?

As for Milosevic, this situation proved a mine for his campaigns well known by his declarations, such as the one that "Serbia will never be ruled by foreigners" as well as accusing Coalition followers for being fifth-columnists, foreign mercenaries and traitors. For a long time his ally in this harangue was that same Russia which took out of mothballs the platitude on "non-interference in internal affairs" and stubbornly placed itself as a shield of Milosevic's Serbia. Understandably, this could not last long, and especially not for ever. But, no matter what, it certainly made the the Coalition's life miserable. Those famous flags of foreign countries which were carried without any complexes during the walks, as a sign of the mondial character of the movement, and cries for help against Milosevic made any break through of the Coalition on the domestic scene difficult and slowed down the winning over of wavering and undecided ones. When attacked, the movement's leaders reacted defiantly with "who cares", but no matter how nice it sounded, it was unproductive. Fortunately, the story about the "fifth column" and "a foreign hand" exhausted itself in its own narrow-mindedness and consequently no longer had any effect.

Still, all eyes were fixed upon America, but there was an impression that some fine tuning was still needed. In this period America was preoccupied with its own duties, among which Clinton's inauguration had a major place. It is precisely from this inauguration that the Coalition expected much, but nothing happened. First Milan Panic tried to send there, i.e. to Washington, all three Coalition leaders, but that possibility was soon forgotten when it was found out that it was not certain that, for example, Vuk Draskovic would be able to, at least, shake hands with Clinton. He was not fascinated by the offered meeting with Strob Talbot, who was acting as Secretary of State pending Albright's assumption of duty, so that neither Draskovic saw Washington nor Washington saw him.

Both this, as well as some other similar examples, illustrate well the foreign policy style of the leaders of "Together" which is treading on dangerous ground, from self-confidence to arrogance. The latter was evident when, for example, Greek Foreign Minister came and, as it seems, launched upon a story about a need to compromise, which Coalition partners interpreted as a story of simple trade and then, in an unpleasant tone, sent the chance guest from Greece straight back to Athens. "We are no worse than Greeks", said Djindjic. The Italian Minister was similarly taken to task, not to mention the Russians to whom Draskovic practically read a lesson ("not to offend the Serbian people") so that they made an official statement reminding Draskovic of whom he was talking to. When last week the Russians finally abandoned Milosevic, the Coalition welcomed this move with approval, but without euphoria. They had finally seen through him, they thought.

Naturally, the intention of placing Djindjic's approach on the disengagement of the world in the first, and its full engagement in the second stage, in the center of Coalition's foreign policy was to provoke positive reactions. Countries which want to help are now not pressured into doing it either publicly or on the sly. They have been given, perhaps a more difficult, but certainly a better, opportunity if the Serbian protesters succeed in securing it. This approach should also yield results at home. The first would be to deprive all stories of the puppet status of the Coalition of any foundation and political meaning. It goes without saying that no illusions should be harboured that there won't be any more attacks, but they will more than ever look like pure fabrications.

The selection of this approach was probably a hard one. It has possibly been chosen out of necessity as there was not much support from the world. There was more criticism of Milosevic for stealing votes than praises for the Coalition as the ring-leader of the revolt. In that respect only Kinkel and the Germans which he incited, did not spare praises. With others it was only paying of lip service. This style sometimes threw off balance particularly Vuk Draskovic who ironically, often with sarcasm, commented on the moves of the world which only formally attacked Milosevic. For his taste that was epiphanic water, in other words: nothing. But, wrath, even when understandable and just, is neither desirable nor very helpful in these affairs. Namely, it does not establish trust. And trust is the next stage which the world and the Serbian democratic revolt - on account of mutual sympathies - should embark upon. Naturally, if success is wanted.

(AIM) Radivoj Cveticanin