EXPERT QUIBBLING

Arbitration on Brcko

The attempt to prove whose side justice was on which went on in Rome for several days did not offer a single essential argument which has not been heard before, but it was rich in expert interpretations which even in details saw significant meanings which could tip the balance to one or the other side. The solution will, however, be global and it will be founded on a specific political interest and the corresponding logic.

AIM Banja Luka, 24 Januar, 1997

When immediately after the agreement signed in Dayton President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic congratulated the Serbs from the left bank of the Drina on Republica Srpska, noone could have known that the "deal" agreed in the American military base concealed a serious "handicap" which might have the function of an explosive mixture with delayed ignition. In the abundance of conciliatory and peace-making declarations which were at the time meant to review war objectives, the then leadership of Republica Srpska thunderously stressed the thesis that the Serbs from Bosnia & Herzegovina had got a state which was also internationally recognized. Of course, not at all by accident, Brcko was not mentioned as a problem at the time, or it was done just by the way, as if it demanded a neglible correction of territory which did not encroach on the essence of relations in the newly established Bosnia & Herzegovina.

It is true that problems which emerged after the peace accords had been made public and after the first steps in its implementation had been taken did not allow Brcko to be given priority, especially since sufficient time was left for resolving of this case - a whole year, in fact. Reintegration into the Federation of the parts of Sarajevo which were controlled by the Serbs during the entire war pushed the global peace agreement and all its segments which waited to be implemented to the margins. Then demarcation between the entities followed; then there was demilitarization to the extent prescribed by the plan from Dayton, and finally the elections which renewed legitimacy to the old authorities in new Bosnia.

Rhetoric of election campaigns in both entities brought Brcko into focus as a topic on which it was possible to score a point most efficiently and easily in the consciousness of the electorate. At that time already parties on both sides launched a thesis that "Brcko is ours and ours it shall remain". As the process of arbitration intensified, and time passed, the exchange of messages of the interested parties accelerated and became bitter, and by the end of the year formulations acquired a clear tone of threats, and even arms were reached out for. Fortunately only verbally and with the phrase on application of "all available means", but even that was enough to make it evident how fragile peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina was. This "correspondence" between the two ruling national parties of the Serb and the Muslim people was intended primarily for domestic use, but it was also used for sending signals to the international community in order to express firmness of the stance and at the same time to produce a certain psychological effect on those whose word in decision-making about Brcko will have the power of judgement.

In the meantime, much confusion which arose about "case Brcko" in Republica Srpska, such as the one about defining the subject of the dispute, referring to maps which had either disappeared or had not existed, all the way to withdrawing of the Serb representatives from the Arbitration Committee, dispersed under pressure of the dilemma whether the legal or the political aspect of the dispute were more important for the final outcome of the process. In dependence of that determination, both parties stuck to the approaches which provided them with more powerful arguments, although political reasons speak in favour of the Serb entity. In evaluation of the significance of Brcko for the Federation and the Republica Srpska, there is no dooubt that provision of continuity of territory has greater weight than exit to the river Sava and that the value of these interests can be said to be equal. The Dayton accords, as a compromising political deal based on principles adopted by all parties signatories of the document, speaks in favour of this thesis because in Geneva, as one of the basic principles of the entire peace construction, the principle of continuity of territory was agreed upon. Should it be mentioned at all that shaking of these foundations may question everything that was erected on them.

In Dayton, under pressure exerted by the international community the Serbs made great concessions in respect to quality of territory. By loss of Sarajevo, an irreparable damage was done to the Serbs with far-reaching consequences of political, economic, social and cultural nature. Exclusion of Brcko from the integral territory of Republica Srpska would cause a disbalance in the established division of 51:49 per cent, which would be impossible to cempensate because of the mentioned loss of quality.

On the other hand, Sarajevo insisted on the thesis that remaining of Brcko in the Serb entity would mean that ethnic cleansing was awarded. This argument, however, is shaky because there are at least about ten big towns on both sides of the demarcation line between entities which were in the division of territories "awarded" to that respective entity for ethnic cleansing. The problem may, of course be observed from the ethical aspect too, but this would automatically raise the question of Drvar, Petrovac, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Zenica, Mostar and Sarajevo. These cities have also remained as a reward to those who had changed the ethnic picture in them. That is why the invitation issued by the highest Muslim officials to Sarajevo Serbs who have gone to Brcko after Dayton to return home can also be interpreted as an indirect confession that during the war and after it Sarajevo was a polygon of ethnic engineering.

The attempt to prove whose side justice was on which lasted for several days in Rome failed to offer a single essential argument which has not already been known, but it abandoned in expert interpretations which even in details sought meaning that could tip the balance to one or the other side. The solution was global and it will rest on specific political interest and corresponding logic. Using the conditions of complete isolation of the gathering and its participants, both parties appeared in public with statements which conveyed more or less restrained optimism, each of them claiming for itself the role of the winner in this round. By doing this, they are striving to pacify the public opinion and diminish promises given in the election campaign, but they are simultaneously reflecting the level of their powerlessness to influence the developments which concern national interest.

The situation which occurred concerning Brcko shows best that both the Federation and Republica Srpska, as constituent segments of Bosnia & Herzegovina are very far from the quality of mutual relations which could be called that of "partners" and that in order to achieve this goal, years will be needed. And until then, guardians shall decide about all significant questions. This is fortunately or unfortunately the only alternative.

(AIM) Mladen Krsmanovic

x y