REGIONAL APPROACH TO BE USED AT HOME

Zagreb Jan 31, 1997

AIM Zagreb, 26 January, 1997

After having tirelessly threatened against the danger of Croatia's being returned to a certain form of south Slavic or an even broader Balkan state community, Franjo Tudjman has decided in the past few days to show definitely that he really meant it. Submitting the regular annual Report on the Situation of the Croatian State and the Nation, he declared that he believed it "purposeful to add a new paragraph to Article 135 of the Constitution which would introduce a constitutional ban of initiation of a procedure of association of the Republic of Croatia into any unions of states of the south Slavic or Balkan creations, or any other form of union of states of south-eastern Europe".

Therefore, there shall be no unions in the direction of east or south, integration aspirations are permitted only towards the west, and Tudjman explicitly mentioned associations with which connections are allowed: the European Union and Partnership for Peace (NATO). But, the very desirable partners for Croatia's becoming a part of the world, according to Tudjman, are the main advocates of its involvement in despised "south-eastern" integrations. At the very beginning this creates confusion because it is not quite clear why they are so "desirable", but what may be confusing for ones need not necessarily be that for the others. Tudjman won the greatest applause in the overcrowded Assembly hall for the part of the Report in which he referred to the issue of European integrations, with the accent on the mentioned constitutional ban of association with the south-east of the continent.

The thunderous applause was by no means not accidental, although I deeply doubt its sincerity, because it precisely reflects a pyramid of priorities of the ruling elite on the eve of the series of this year's elections. For quite some time now it is felt that Tudjman and his party have had no convincing election bait which would be offered to the voters. The war has ended, diplomatic relations with FR Yugoslavia have been established, reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem is under close international observation, and even the hopeless Federation of B&H is somehow surviving. In such a situation it is hardly imaginable that a local crisis could be found which would be artificially stirred up, although the devil never sleeps so such a possibility can never completely be ruled out.

Therefore, all Tudjman's foremen have left is either the heated domestic field or digging into the large foreign political sack where something can always be found. From among the interal political topics, ex-Communists have the best chances to become the election cue of the ruling Croat Democratic Community (HDZ), since they are already accused of being a bad influence on the opposition which is allegedly neglecting main national interests and thus creating ill will between it and the ruling party. But, this attractive propagandist - which may serve as a basis for making in just a day or two a whole construction about the "red dragon" returning to the place of the crime - has one serious drawback.

The HDZ can hardly count on the possibility that it can win all the forthcoming elections and rule as the untouchable and lonely ruler. That is why it is seeking cooperation of opposition parties of the centre (HSLS, HSS) which are also anti-communist, although more moderate about it, but they will not readily accept to openly attack Racan's SDP with which they had cooperation in a few comparatively successful coalitions (mostly in Zagreb). After approximately six months of the Zagreb crisis, when it became evident that solidarity among the opposition is firm to such an extent that it is difficult to stir an open inter-partisan war, Tudjman seems to have decided to create an alternative election strategy.

He convened a session of the Presidential Council, some kind of a party super-body - which gathers HDZ officials from all parts of state authorities (including sometimes even the judiciary) - where he for the first time systematically presented the threat of south-eastern integrations. In the Report, Tudjman reminded of the session held in May last year, and underlined that on that occasion it a warning had been given that the idea of south-eastern integrations would certainly affect signing of the agreement on cooperation of Croatia with the European Union. Obviously in order to emphasize to what extent it was a far-reaching conclusion, he said that in the middle of the year, EU officially came out with the idea of "a regional approach".

The danger which this idea has for Croatia which would find itself in it with all the states of ex-Yugoslavia (without Slovenia, plus Albania), is so great that he believes that it was a revival of "Versailles views". Therefore, the intention is to revive a modified form of Yugoslavia! The American initiative (SECI), according to what the Croatian President says and to what can be read in regime-controlled media does not go in the same direction as the European initiative, and is partly even opposed to it. A much larger group of countries would be gathered by it - along with those mentioned, there is also Bulgaria, Romania, Moldavia, Greece, Turkey, Hungary and Slovenia - and the idea implies also partly reconstruction of Yugoslavia, but also creation of a block of countries which would be a counter-balance to the European Union.

Therefore, the thesis that these two "regional approaches" to a significant extent reflect rivalry between the USA and Europe, which Croatian diplomacy in the past few months especially in connection with the Bosnian developments, based many strategic evaluations on, and moreover staked everything on. This did not prove to be an exceptionally good choice, because whenever Zagreb defied Europe counting on American support, it failed to come, because Washington could not permit "separate" connections with Croatia to endanger its much more important partnership with the biggest European countries. To this, Zagreb responded with chilling of relations with the USA too, and it seems that the whole story is repeated nowadays on the occasion of the "regional approach".

At first, it was believed in Croatia that the European approach was more dangerous than the American, but as the Americans did not want to accept this "compliment", all at once it was concluded that according to the American approach, Croatia "would have found itself even deeper down in the Balkan framework" (Tudjman in the Report). This breakneck change of views forced Croatian ambassador in the USA Miomir Zuzul state in the weekly Globus that the danger of the American initiative was slightly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the approach which is advocated by Europe - Zuzul wisely concludes and then almost openly admits that during his comparatively short service in the USA he has already realized that Croatian interests must be represented in the American way, and not treat American interests in Croatian way.

But, the diplomatic refinement this young Ambassador is bragging with does not mean that he does not agree with the fundamental "strategic" assessments of his bosses in Zagreb. It is more likely that the Croatian official policy wishes to present itself in one light to foreign and in a completely different light to domestic partners and consumers. Therefore, it should not surprise that on the occasion of the recent visit of a high American delegation to Zagreb, the host unexpectedly in a conciliatory manner listened to the intentions of the "regional approach" of the United States. It was just said that Croatia could not agree to any reconstruction of complex state communities in this space, to which the answer was that this very reservation was the least necessary - because noone demands any such reconstruction.

But, ten days after that, Tudjman nevertheless proposed a constitutional ban of "initiation of a procedure" for south Slavic/Balkan state association, provoking ironic comments among the opposition and a part of the media that in this way he mistrusted his own people and underestimated independence of his own state. But, less than two months before the elections, the first man of the HDZ obviously has no time for intellectual quibbling, and a small populist gesture - he was certain - could do no harm to anyone.

MARINKO CULIC